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ABSTRACT 
 International business activities and foreign direct investment in particular involve an 
element of risk and uncertainty, sometimes to a great extent. Despite this almost axiomatic 
statement, less academic research has been conducted on this subject, compared to the 
considerations of return and cost. While the globalisation era introduces an integration of world 
economy, ever more diverse types of risks are looming on the horizon in relation to cross-border 
investment, ranging from political unrest to creeping appropriation, from natural disaster to 
terrorism, and from technological failure to industrial espionage, all of which tend to deter the 
free movement of capital and value-adding resources around the world. 
 
 This thesis provides by far the most extensive review of the research on risk and 
uncertainty across the macro management fields of studies. Particular attention has been paid to 
construct clarity and how construct clarity can serve to categorise a vast body of knowledge and 
address previous inconsistent conclusions. To further the inquiry, this thesis focuses on one of 
the conceptualisations of risk that is most relevant to the context of foreign investment decision 
making. New insights are generated by proposing a microfoundational framework based on a 
key construct – risk propensity – as a necessary complement to the current research on risk in 
foreign direct investment. Conventional understanding of the capabilities paradigm is 
reformulated in this light. In order to test the efficacy of “risk propensity” and the static 
assumption of risk preference embedded in the conventional theories, this thesis draws upon 
quasi-experiment methods and models managerial heterogeneity based on stated preference data. 
In addition to individual level choice modelling, firm level analysis of location choice is 
conducted, yielding new insights into the role of experience in firms’ decision making. China 
provides the empirical setting for both analyses. It is found that a theoretical understanding of 
risk helps explain the varying effect of context and experience on risk-taking. Generalisations of 
this statement may be made to strategic decision making, organisational learning and 
behavioural strategy research. 
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1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
Despite that world economy is under recovery, the financial crisis of the Euro zone and 
the sluggish growth of the leading emerging economies cast new clouds over the economic 
outlook for the next few years. Global investors have expressed renewed concerns over political 
risk and uncertainty in the aftermath of the Greek crisis and the Arab Spring. If the potential of 
cross-border investment was fully unleashed, the world economic recovery would gain much 
stronger momentum. Surprisingly, even though risk is one of the defining features behind the 
phenomenon of foreign investment, it is also among the under-addressed topics in international 
business (IB) research. This is unfortunate since risk and uncertainty could be one of the key 
areas over which IB scholars can produce significant, impactful knowledge, and contribute to 
the management scholarship at large. The current thesis is motivated by the observation that 
empirical IB studies tend to use intuitive, ad hoc definitions of the concepts, leaving 
unaddressed the ambiguity on what is meant by the term risk and how risk influences strategic 
decision making. The choices among the plethora of risk and uncertainty measures seem to have 
been driven by the researchers’ idiosyncrasies and discretions rather than a coherent theoretical 
framework. We seek a theoretical solution to this problem, and make the initial attempt to close 
the gap in the literature. 
 
Our efforts to address this issue follow through four integrated steps. In Chapter 2, we 
examine various theories of risk and uncertainty from which a novel typology of 
conceptualisations is developed. Our typology clearly delineates between the four categories; 
‘risk as frequency’, ‘risk as propensity’, ‘uncertainty as degree of confidence’, and ‘uncertainty 
as opportunity creation’. This enables us to categorise the vast empirical research agendas and 
theoretical traditions across the strategy, entrepreneurship and international business literatures 
on strategic decision making, and attribute some inconclusive findings to the contested views on 
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risk and uncertainty. Future research opportunities arise from “boundary-spanning” thinking 
that links a) one category with another, and b) our typology with general strategy theory. 
 
 Based on the previous conceptual clarification, Chapter 3 presents a theoretical analysis 
of the risk research in the foreign direct investment (FDI) context. Studies of how firms respond 
to host country risk have assigned explanatory primacy to organisational capability and 
managerial risk preference. The organisation-level account is built on the premise that capability 
is a prerequisite for risk-taking while the individual-level account focuses on the managers’ 
intrinsic behavioural attitude. Without integrating one with the other, the former is open to 
many alternative explanations while the latter remains only a source of heterogeneity. We 
propose that employing the microfoundations approach can address the limitations of each 
account and yield a fuller understanding of FDI risk-taking. Drawing upon behavioural decision 
theory and the concept of risk propensity, we describe the lower-level mechanisms that generate 
the empirical regularity between firm experience and risk-taking, which has been attributed to 
the macro-level capabilities paradigm. We finalise the framework with an account as to how 
individual-level mechanisms can be incorporated into the context of organisational strategic 
decision-making. 
 
In Chapter 4, we test empirically the concept of risk propensity and its antecedents in 
the context of FDI location choice using primary, quasi-experiment data. In internationalisation 
theories, a firm’s high-risk investment is considered to be a function of managers’ dispositional 
risk preference and its experience in high-risk countries. However, the literature does not 
directly examine what is learned from experience but rather attributes the relationship between 
experience and subsequent high-risk investment to unobserved firm capabilities. This study 
draws on the concept of risk propensity to examine the experience-based cognitive process 
underlying risky location decisions. Discrete choice modelling shows that managers hold 
heterogeneous risk propensities, which can be explained by their perceived past success of home 
country venturing and the firm’s potential slack resources. The results lend strong support to the 
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lower-level mechanism proposed in Chapter 3. Given the various aspects of international risk, 
applying risk propensity in the FDI context also makes a significant contribution to behavioural 
decision theory. 
 
In Chapter 5, we test empirically the moderating role of experience in FDI location 
choice using secondary firm-level data. Firstly, FDI literature has presented consistent evidence 
that firm experience moderates the negative effect of risk on entry, this conclusion is contested 
by recent research. By revisiting the conceptualisation of risk by economists and behaviourists, 
we show that the proposed learning mechanism only applies to controllable risk, not non-
controllable risk. As assessing controllable risk involves self-evaluation of risk-reducing 
capability, it is posited that firms have differential tendency to take such risks even when 
experience is accounted for. We find a significant variation in firms’ responses to controllable 
risk, as opposed to non-controllable risk. This lends further support to our microfoundational 
framework proposed in Chapter 3. Secondly, we employ signalling theory to understand 
ministerial visits to the host country. The visits by home country’s commerce minister 
accompanied by executive delegates rather than a political leader send an efficacious signal of 
its approval of a foreign regime’s inward investment policies and home country’s institutional 
support, which encourages domestic firms’ entry into that host country. International experience 
reduces signal strength and negatively moderates this relationship. This suggests that in cases 
where firm capabilities cannot be established, firms may rely on external assurance about the 
investment location. In other words, external assurance substitutes for internal learning.  
 
Overall, the key novelty of this thesis lies in addressing the concepts of risk propensity, 
controllable risk and non-controllable risk, and in shedding light on the cognitive process of 
learning. We contribute to the FDI literature by connecting these concepts with the current 
scholarly debates. We hope this thesis can clarify some lasting confusions over the 
understanding of FDI, and provoke researchers’ thinking on such topics as risk, uncertainty, 
learning process and managerial heterogeneity. 
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2 THE ROLE OF RISK PROPENSITY IN STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Strategic decisions, by definition, have significant potential consequence for the 
organisation. One of the prominent features of strategic decisions is the prevalence of risk and 
uncertainty. Comparing the empirical properties of alternative risk and uncertainty measures 
(Aaron, 1994; Downey, Hellriegel, & Slocum, 1975; Duncan, 1972; Miller & Bromiley, 1990; 
Miller & Reuer, 1996; Sharfman & Dean, 1991) has sparked two fruitful streams of literature – 
the debate on the paradox of risk-return relationship (Bowman, 1980; Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 
1988) and the role of environmental uncertainty in contingency theories of organisational 
structure (Ford & Slocum, 1977; Miles & Snow, 1978), both contributing substantially to 
management research. A puzzle remains as to why many strategic decisions entail both risk and 
uncertainty simultaneously (Sanders & Hambrick, 2007) whereas academics claim that risk and 
uncertainty refer to two mutually exclusive states of the world (Alvarez, Barney, & Anderson, 
2013). A common narrative is that decision-making under uncertainty is equivalent of risk-
taking (March & Shapira, 1987). Management researchers often jump from one term to the 
other without explicitly clarifying their conceptual boundaries, or downplay the importance of 
making a distinction between risk and uncertainty (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). Although 
both risk and uncertainty revolve around “unpredictability”, what “unpredictability” brings to 
the organising processes differs under the conditions of risk and uncertainty, invites disparate 
responses from actors, and assumes divergent roles in the on-going academic debates.  
Management disciplines present too many ways of describing risk and uncertainty and not 
enough theoretical integration (Hambrick, 2005). By teasing out researchers’ idiosyncrasies and 
discretions, we aim to establish a common means of conceptualisation, consolidate the core 
knowledge of strategic decision making and maximise the benefits of cross-disciplinary 
conversation 
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This chapter reviews the current knowledge and proposes a typology of 
conceptualisation of risk and uncertainty. We build our conceptualisations on the classics and 
develop a typology that serves as an analytical structure upon which we can synthesise the 
contemporary empirical research on how firms and managers behave under risk and uncertainty 
and why. Drawing upon the works by Knight, Keynes, Popper, and Penrose, we identify two 
conceptualisations of risk and of uncertainty, ranging from realist to social constructionist 
perspectives. The theory of risk suggests that as the future is unpredictable, rational actors rely 
on the calculation of expected values and use “spread” of the potential outcomes to compare 
“risk” (Janney & Dess, 2006). We contribute to the theory of risk by distinguishing between 
“risk as frequency” which concerns the deviation from expectation based on a well-defined 
probability distribution and “risk as propensity” which describes a situation where subjective 
assessment prevails over historical inference due to scant empirical data. The theory of 
uncertainty contends that the extent to which individuals perceive future environmental state to 
be unpredictable is one of uncertainty (Milliken, 1987). We contribute to the theory of 
uncertainty by distinguishing between “uncertainty as degree of confidence” which refers to the 
sense of doubt around the risk estimates arising from non-stationary probability distribution and 
“uncertainty as opportunity creation” which is associated with the unknowable future to be 
enacted by the decision makers.  
 
Each conceptualisation of risk and uncertainty has spawned distinct research agendas in 
varied sub-disciplines of management, which may use the same term to describe different states 
of the world. A comprehensive review of these literatures is conducted to categorise the 
research agendas and their associated theoretical approaches according to the underlying, often 
implicit, understanding of risk and uncertainty. It can be seen that different natures of risk and 
uncertainty are addressed by different theories and are used to study different phenomena. We 
specify the conditions under which each approach is most relevant. Moreover, we illustrate how 
researchers’ choice of a conceptualisation may be responsible for theoretical contentions and 
inconsistent empirical findings. Some lasting empirical puzzles in the literature may be due to 
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the fact that researchers rely on different conceptualisations of risk and uncertainty when 
studying the same phenomenon. 
 
 In the next section, we discuss how classic literature views risk and uncertainty by 
presenting the distinction between two conceptualisations of risk and two conceptualisations of 
uncertainty, followed by the review of contemporary empirical management research. A matrix 
is established to illustrate the boundary disputes between the conceptualisations and show that 
addressing the disputes may improve extant research. This chapter concludes with a discussion 
on the implications of our conceptual integration for future research. 
 
2.2 Conceptualising Risk and Uncertainty 
We draw on the seminal works on risk and uncertainty to provide an integrative 
typology that covers two distinct concepts of risk and two of uncertainty. We argue that the 
concepts form a “subjectivity” spectrum where one end – “risk as frequency” – is characterised 
by relatively complete information and objective reality, and the other end – “uncertainty as 
opportunity creation” – is a notion of complexity and social constructionism. “Risk as 
propensity” and “uncertainty as degree of confidence” lie in between. Table 1 summarises the 
conceptualisations and their empirical applications. 
 
2.2.1 Risk as frequency 
Following the philosophical Enlightment, Western society is dominated by modernist 
thinking that upholds the pursuit of objective rationality in decision making (Miller, 2009). The 
tension between rationality and individuals’ inability to precisely predict future environmental 
states is addressed with probabilistic statements. Individuals are assumed to be able to make 
rational decisions by maximising expected value with regard to a predetermined goal even in the 
face of “an uncertain future”. 
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Table 1 Conceptualisations of risk and uncertainty in strategic decisions 
 Risk as frequency Risk as propensity Uncertainty as degree of confidence 
Uncertainty as opportunity 
creation 
Definition Deviation from the expected 
value as dictated by the 
statistical probability of past 
occurrences 
 
Subjective understanding of the 
propensity of an event to incur loss, 
as reflected in the estimated 
magnitude of loss and probability of 
loss 
Subjective belief on the 
accuracy of risk estimates 
A priori unknown future 
pathways to be created by 
actors and endorsed by the 
others 
Origin Knight (1921) Popper (1959) Keynes (1921), Penrose (1959)  Alvarez and Barney (2007); 
Knight (1921); Sarasvathy 
(2001) 
Quotation “Empirical evaluation of the 
frequency of association 
between predicates, not 
analysable into varying 
combinations of equally 
probable alternatives” 
(Knight, 1921: 225) 
“Singular even a possesses a 
probability p(a, b) ” owing to the 
fact that it is an event produced, or 
selected, in accordance with the 
generating conditions b, rather than 
owing to the fact that it is a member 
of a sequence b.” (Popper, 1959: 
34) 
“Uncertainty resulting from the 
feeling that one has too little 
information leads to a lack of 
confidence in the soundness of 
the judgments that lie behind 
any given plan of action.” 
(Penrose, 1959: 59) 
“There is no valid basis of 
any kind for classifying 
instances.” (Knight, 1921: 
225); 
 
“Creation theory suggests 
that the ‘seeds’ of 
opportunities to produce new 
products or services do not 
necessarily lie in previously 
existing industries or 
markets.” (Alvarez and 
Barney, 2007: 15) 
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Philosophical 
stance 
Objective realism Social realism Social realism Social constructionism 
Most suited 
decision contexts 
Repeated operational and 
routine decisions; Decisions 
based on systematic data 
analysis 
Major, heterogeneous strategic 
decisions 
Major, heterogeneous strategic 
decisions; Venture formation 
and other entrepreneurial 
decisions 
Iterative process of action 
and adaptation 
Empirical 
research agendas 
§ Risk-return paradox;  
§ Determinants of 
organisational risk;  
§ Multinationality advantage 
§ Strategic decision making;  
§ Risk mitigating strategies;  
§ Organisational learning of risk 
management;  
§ Determinants of managerial and 
firm risk-taking 
§ Strategic decision making; 
§ Entrepreneurial decision 
making  
§ Uncertainty mitigation 
§ Entrepreneurial action 
Major theoretical 
perspectives 
§ Portfolio theory 
§ Behavioural agency model 
§ Upper-echelon theory;  
§ Behavioural decision theory; 
§ Organisational learning theory 
§ Entrepreneurial trait theory 
§ Opportunity discovery theory 
of entrepreneurship 
§ Transaction cost economics;  
§ Real option theory;  
§ Organisational learning 
theory;  
§ Neoinstitutional theory 
§ Opportunity creation 
theory of entrepreneurship 
§ Resource based view 
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In economics and management literature, the most influential thinking on risk and 
uncertainty is provided by Knight (1921). Knight follows the modernist tradition to conceive of 
risk as measurable probabilities of outcome states. A priori probability distribution like coin 
tossing is practically never met with in business. Instead, Knight uses statistical probability to 
gauge risk where event instances – or “trials” – can be classified into distinct classes and 
empirical data obtained to indicate the frequencies of the outcomes of these classes. Although 
future states cannot be perfectly anticipated, they are drawn from an unobserved, true 
probability distribution with fixed mean and variance. As the distribution remains stable, more 
confidence can be placed on the statistical probability as empirical data accumulate over time. 
 
It can be inferred from Knight’s conceptualisation that the environment is real and 
exogenously given (Miller, 2007), which reflects an objective realism stance in that decision 
makers seek to work out the objective odds, or relative frequency, of the event, regardless of 
whether the conditions of the event sequence are ill-defined. Nevertheless, statistical probability 
is by no means the equivalent of “objective” probability. A common confusion of Knightian 
bifurcation of risk and uncertainty concerns whether decision makers have subjective 
probability (LeRoy & Singell, 1987). Given imperfect information about the laws governing the 
probability, risk assessment will always involve a certain degree of personal judgment in 
classifying events or instances (Miller, 2007). Which of the instances are sufficiently 
homogeneous to be grouped together into one class is not so obvious as in the case of a priori 
probability. Statistical probability is derived from the proactive process of data collection, 
classification and computation, and dependent on the decision maker’s ability to classify past 
events (Meltzer, 1982). Nevertheless, subjectivity is not the central focus of Knight’s framing of 
risk. Emphasis has been placed on “the formation of an estimate” rather than “the estimation of 
its value” (Knight, 1921: 227). 
 
As risk is used to characterise recurring events whose frequency can be known from 
past occurrence, this understanding of risk is closely related to the frequentist school of 
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probability, which views probability as “the limit of the relative frequency of an event that can 
be observed in a large number of trials” (Cabantous & Gond, 2015: 444). Since the whole 
probability distribution can be easily calculated, attention has been paid to the extent to which 
future environmental states deviate from expectation. The underlying assumption is that when 
the real value is relatively predictable, it is more likely for decision makers to attain the 
expected value. Thus risk is translated into the “spread” of potential outcomes (Janney & Dess, 
2006). This interpretation of Knightian risk is widely received and has profound influence on 
the empirical literature. Despite managing risk being one of the key challenges for managers, it 
is considered an insignificant issue by Knight’s followers since “spread” can be well 
accommodated through hedging and insurance (Meltzer 1982). 
 
One approach to addressing the effect of risk on firms’ expansion is to make allowances 
in the cost and revenue calculation by adjusting downward the estimates of demand or upward 
the estimates of cost from the values they consider most likely to occur (Penrose, 1959). 
Alternatively, managers adjust the rate of financial cost to discount the estimated future cash 
flow generated by capital investment. An implicit assumption underlying dealing with “risk as 
frequency” is that managers or entrepreneurs are passive “risk bearers” and can do little to 
reduce the risk they face. Risk bearers simply adjust the resources to be committed to the 
investment, and risk affects firm expansion the same way as demand and market competition 
(Wu & Knott, 2006). Whether two otherwise similar managers choose to bear the risk or shy 
away from it depends on their intrinsic attitude to risk, which is a dispositional trait.  
 
2.2.2 Risk as propensity 
 Knight (1921) suggests that as the unobserved distribution of outcomes is stable, the 
estimated distribution can be modified according to private information and feedback derived 
from repeated trials (Miller, 2009). Such information is not only inaccessible to outsiders but 
often tacit in nature (Casson, 1982). Theoretically, each trial generates a set of observations that 
help illuminate the shape of the distribution curve. Information is only useful when combined 
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with prior knowledge and data, which form the capacity to make sense of feedback and yield 
precise estimations (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Therefore, risk-taking behaviour evolves as the 
decision makers uncover the latent distribution with a series of careful experiments. 
 
Despite the far-reaching influence of Knightian risk, it is not without controversy. The 
nature of many strategic decisions simply does not provide sufficient empirical basis for 
managers to obtain probability estimates of outcomes (Slattery & Ganster, 2002). Knight’s 
definition of risk as well as the frequency statistics cannot answer the question of how decision 
makers calculate the probability for the first event of a sequence. Although a stable yet 
unobserved probability distribution might exist, managers are not always able to draw causal 
belief from scant historical data to derive a reliable probabilistic account on which rational 
decisions can be made (March, Sproull, & Tamuz, 1991), especially when managers view the 
distribution as having a fatter tail rather than being symmetrically bell-shaped (Andriani & 
McKelvey, 2007). 
 
Both Knightian risk and singular-event risk are empirical in nature (Galavotti, 2015). 
The tension between those two understandings of probability is one of interpretation. Whether 
probability represents the possibility of things independent of our knowledge or is shaped by 
our knowledge is central in this debate (Daston, 1994). More specifically, the two schools of 
thought diverge on how prior probability distribution should be defined. Scholars point out that 
real world is replete with one-off events where the frequentist methods of inference based on the 
repetition of standardised phenomena is to little avail (Liesch, Welch, & Buckley, 2011). For 
example, the decision to launch radically new products is not based on sampled evidence 
(Cabantous & Gond, 2015). In such cases, probability is no long the intrinsic property of an 
event sequence, but rather of an experimental setup that would generate the sequence if 
reproduced repeatedly. The virtual sequence would contain certain characteristic frequencies as 
determined by the property of the generating conditions. Popper (1959) thus defines probability 
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as “propensity” – propensity to generate a specific sequence as seen in experimental 
arrangements – as opposed to frequency, in order to interpret the probability of singular events. 
 
Dealing with “risk as propensity” does not necessarily equate to following the Bayes’ 
rule in the sense that equal probability should be assigned to every possible a priori event under 
conditions of ignorance (Cabantous & Gond, 2015). In contrast, “risk as propensity” reflects a 
social realism stance in that decision makers’ conjecture of the generating conditions to which 
they attribute their probability estimates is infused with a strong sense of subjectivity and great 
reliance on judgment. This is because, as suggested by the behavioural decision theory, 
managers refuse to be identified with gamblers, who are faced with predetermined, exogenous 
odds (March & Shapira, 1987). They rather believe that riskiness of a choice in managerial 
situations can be controlled and reduced to an acceptable level thanks to their skills, talents and 
capabilities (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011; McCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986). There are ways 
open to the managers to transfer some of the managerial resources to dealing with risk (Penrose, 
1959). Only when those resources that could have been used to reduce risk are fully committed 
can we claim that risk becomes the final hurdle to firm expansion. Therefore, managers’ 
perception about their own ability contributes heavily to the understanding of the influence of 
risk.  
 
The switch of focus from well-specified distribution toward subjective probability has 
profound implications. Just as expected utility does not exist “out there”, probability now 
becomes a less measurable entity in the minds of individual managers, who feel it instead of 
quantifying it (March & Shapira, 1987). The number of alternatives and interrelationships 
makes the risk situation mentally too demanding to be computationally tractable (Maitland & 
Sammartino, 2015a). Even if a range of probabilities could be estimated, the second-order 
probability of any point within that range might remain unknown (March & Shapira, 1987). 
Specifying the whole distribution now requires substantial amounts of cognitive capacity upon 
which managers seek to economise (Simon, 1955). Thus attention has been directed away from 
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depicting the whole distribution toward the probability of attaining a value below a subjectively 
expected minimum (Penrose, 1959). The “loss” may or may not be a monetary one; it could be a 
failure of achieving a pre-set corporate goal (Aharoni, 1966). Moreover, since subjective 
probability is much more difficult to estimate than frequency, the potential magnitude of loss is 
elevated to great importance to managers if a negative outcome were to occur (March & Shapira, 
1987). A risky choice is one that could possibly incur a huge loss (Forlani, Parthasarathy, & 
Keaveney, 2008), and often referred to as threat, danger or hazard (Gephart, Van Maanen, & 
Oberlechner, 2009). A simple example is a firm putting 10% and 30% of cash reserve to the 
same investment plan. Although the chance of failure is exactly the same, they may pose 
substantially different risk to the firm as losing 30% of reserve could endanger its financial 
position as a whole (Penrose, 1959). Each increment of investment increases the risk a firm has 
to bear, holding the chance of loss constant, and this so-called “principle of increasing risk” 
limits a firm’s ability to expand its investment (Kalecki, 1937). The focus on the magnitude of 
loss is particularly germane to entrepreneurs who expose their personal wealth to the possible 
financial distress of the ventures as well as managers who expose career reputation and 
employment compensation to the investments. In management research, certain topics (e.g., new 
venture vs. foreign expansion) and actors (e.g., first-movers vs. latecomers) might be more 
closely related to the magnitude of loss than the probability of loss, and vice versa (Janney & 
Dess, 2006; Mullins & Forlani, 2005). 
 
2.2.3 Uncertainty as degree of confidence 
Knight (1921: 225) uses uncertainty to refer to unknowable probabilities and outcome 
states, a situation lacking “valid basis of any kind” for formulating a probability distribution. 
The reason is that each instance seems to be too dissimilar for decision makers to make a 
classification for the assessment of frequency. Under uncertainty, calculations of expected 
values are unfounded so that rational decision makers would either make efforts to reduce it to 
risk, or refuse to take action altogether (Dixit, 1989). In other words, the distinction between 
risk and uncertainty is not immutable and “a matter of degree only” (Knight, 1921: 225). Rather 
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than just following “animal spirits” (Keynes, 1936), decision makers can learn to make 
classifications. 
 
Knight’s bifurcation of risk and uncertainty has a wide influence on how management 
research defines uncertainty (Downey, Hellriegel, & Slocum, 1975; Duncan, 1972). It seems 
that uncertainty refers to a qualitative state distinct from measurable, quantitative risk. For 
example, Ghosh and Ray (1992) explicitly differentiate unambiguous uncertainty and ambiguity, 
the former being risk. The latter, synonymous with uncertainty, refers to the state in which 
individuals are unable to specify appropriate probability distribution for a given decision option 
due to lack of information. For Milliken (1987), risk and uncertainty that risk is concerned with 
known probabilities of outcomes whereas uncertainty is related to probabilities that are not 
knowable at all. 
 
However, the familiar notion of “unknowable unknown” is not the entire meaning of 
uncertainty (Casson, 1982; Milliken, 1987). Many view uncertainty as inextricable from the 
prediction of future outcomes. Keynes (1921) uses “weight” to describe uncertainty in that 
decision makers would place the lowest weight on the probability assigned to a particular 
outcome when they have little confidence in their ability to classify the instances giving rise to 
the outcome. An event that is almost certain to occur would receive a high weight on a very low 
probability (Meltzer, 1982). Put differently, uncertainty might have no effect on risk since 
holding the risk assessment constant, there could be a continuum of uncertainty perceived by 
different individuals ranging from complete ignorance to near certainty (Penrose, 1959). 
Classifying together the heterogeneous instances based on personal judgment gives rise to the 
sense of doubt, unreliability and anxiety, which weighs on managers’ mind (Casson, 1982). 
Uncertainty is thus defined as the degree of confidence in the correctness of subjective 
probabilities (Penrose, 1959), and as a matter of individual perception (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997; 
Milliken, 1987; Shepherd, Williams, & Patzelt, 2015). Similarly, decision theorists direct 
attention from viewing risk and uncertainty as two distinct states toward understanding the 
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interaction between them. Sarin and Weber (1993) find experimental evidence that ambiguity 
leads to psychological discomfort of the decision maker, thereby raising the perceived risk and 
affecting decision choices. Kahn and Sarin (1988) suggest that the influence of risk is 
accentuated in the presence of ambiguity when it comes to formal investment evaluation 
involving new technology. Conceptualising uncertainty as a sense of doubt that qualifies 
personal belief and blocks action is also well received in the entrepreneurship and organisation 
literature (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). A general consensus is that 
“different individuals may experience different doubts in identical situations” (Lipshitz & 
Strauss, 1997: 150). Ultimately, “uncertainty as degree of confidence” reflects a social realism 
stance in that decision makers are bounded by information insufficiency and limited cognitive 
capacity when evaluating the accuracy of probability estimates regarding the frequency of the 
event or its propensities. 
 
Then the question is posed as to why would decision makers become unable to classify 
the instances, or in other words, lose confidence in their prediction? Arrow (1974) argues that 
under Knightian uncertainty, individuals do not have faith in the description of the world in 
terms of a single probability distribution but rather consider it to be represented by one or 
another range of states. Each range of states represents a complete, stand-alone distribution. 
Uncertainty exists in that individuals do not know which range of states is true, and the true 
probability distribution may not be stable and could switch from one range of states to another. 
In this case, one has every reason to doubt if an instance similar to some previous ones can be 
classified into that group. As outcomes randomly deviate from a non-stationary trend, a 
diversified portfolio of investments can no longer accommodate the deviation or yield a 
predictable return (Meltzer, 1982). 
 
A prominent reason for the mean and variance of the probability distribution to change 
is environmental dynamism (Dess & Beard, 1984; Teece & Pisano, 1994). Environmental 
dynamism makes it difficult for managers to predict not only the state of the environment, but 
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also the effect of the environmental change on organisational success or failure (Milliken, 1987) 
and the organisational consequence of a specific action under new environment (Duncan, 1972). 
Examples include a dramatic shift in consumer preference after a new technology is introduced, 
and a major change in competitive landscape when an established technology breeds business 
model innovation. Environmental dynamism creates a systematic and a random component of 
uncertainty (Figueira-de-Lemos, Johanson, & Vahlne, 2011). Arising from the stochastic acts of 
nature, the random component is inherently unpredictable and can count as “noise”. Even the 
systematic component is too “surprising” for boundedly rational individuals to predict based on 
past stationary distributions. However, environmental volatility does not just bring “non-
controllable disturbances” to transactions (Williamson, 1985: 58); it also creates a constant flow 
of new opportunities for entrepreneurs to reallocate resources (Alvarez, Godley, & Wright, 2014; 
Casson, 1982). It is rewarding to forecast correctly even just the direction of change (Meltzer, 
1982). The potential economic profit incentivises entrepreneurs to learn how to interpret current 
events and adapt to environmental changes (Miller, 2007). While the estimation of risk 
determines the attractiveness of each decision option, whether managers will make risky 
decisions at all is predicated on the perceived uncertainty that makes risk estimation possible 
and this perception is widely considered a function of “local” knowledge (McMullen & 
Shepherd, 2006). 
 
2.2.4 Uncertainty as opportunity creation 
 Uncertainty plays an important role in most theories of entrepreneurship (McMullen & 
Shepherd, 2006). Yet the conceptualisation of uncertainty is not uniform, and exactly what role 
uncertainty plays depends on the theory employed. There are two worldviews on entrepreneurial 
opportunity. In discovery theory (Alvarez & Barney, 2007) or causation theory (Sarasvathy, 
2001), opportunity is assumed to be an objective reality to be discovered by unusually alert 
entrepreneurs while uncertainty is viewed as “doubt” – more specifically hesitancy, 
indecisiveness, and procrastination (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006) – that prevents entrepreneurs 
from acting to seise the opportunity (Casson, 1982). Often, doubt arises from exogenous 
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environmental volatility that potentially disrupts the competitive equilibrium - such as changes 
in technology, consumer preference, political and regulatory institutions and social 
demographics (Kirzner, 1973; Shane, 2003). This is consistent with our notion “uncertainty as 
degree of confidence”, and the uncertainty here does not depart from that in the transaction cost 
economics or other organisational theories. 
 
 In creation (Alvarez & Barney, 2007) or effectuation theory (Sarasvathy, 2001), 
opportunity does not exist “out there” and needs to be created endogenously by the 
entrepreneurs, who act, react or enact to build a market for a new product or service (Baker & 
Nelson, 2005; Gartner, 1985). Such actions can be either deliberate or “blind” at the beginning 
of the process, but in reality is most often myopic. Entrepreneurs may start with a blind, 
accidental variation from the well-defined path and follow on from the prior belief about a new 
market (Alvarez & Barney, 2007). This belief becomes part of the context in which future 
behaviour is understood and enacted, and the behaviour reshapes the context over time (Weick, 
1979). Therefore, “uncertainty as opportunity creation” reflects a social constructionism stance 
in that opportunities do not exist independent of decision makers’ perceptions and beliefs, 
which themselves may change as the enactment process proceeds. Moreover, entrepreneurs may 
be wrong about the prospects of the market and could misinterpret the market response to 
previous actions. For an enacted opportunity to be able to generate economic wealth, the initial 
beliefs and following interpretations have to be put up for test against the collective social 
constructions, i.e. market demand (Campbell, 1960). After rounds of iterative actions, 
evaluations and adjustments, entrepreneurs may finally manage to create a “vision” that is either 
well received by others or influence the social constructions of others, including customers and 
suppliers (Alvarez, Barney, & Anderson, 2013). What the end product would be – the social 
construction built by the entrepreneur – is unknown at the beginning of the creation process. 
Neither is the extent to which the social construction would be accepted by others. 
 
 18 
 
In this regard, the process of opportunity creation is path-dependent and implies a 
source of competitive advantage as a small difference in choices, knowledge or interpretations 
of results in the beginning between two otherwise similar entrepreneurs may lead to 
dramatically different, costly-to-copy opportunities at the end (Arthur, 1989). Given that 
entrepreneurs can take on various paths through the creation process, it is not possible – at the 
point a decision to form an opportunity is made – to predict the outcomes ex-ante or base 
entrepreneurial decisions on such predictions. One cannot see “the end from the beginning” 
because there is simply no “end” until the opportunity is fully enacted. In Alvarez and Barney’s 
(2007: 17) words, “it is not possible to measure the height of a mountain that has not yet been 
created”. This notion may be a new understanding of uncertainty from the conventional focus 
on information incompleteness or entrepreneurs’ cognitive capacity, yet it does not depart far 
from the “unknowable unknown” delineated by Knight (1921).  
 
2.3 Empirical Applications of the Risk and Uncertainty Concepts 
In this section, we survey the contemporary management literature and identify how 
different conceptualisations of risk and uncertainty have spawned different research agendas. 
We focus on empirical studies because we are interested in how researchers have applied the 
conceptualisations, explicitly or implicitly, to study the way in which firms and managers 
behave under risk and uncertainty in strategic decision making. We searched for “risk”, 
“uncertainty”, and “ambiguity” in the abstracts of major empirical management journals. We 
restrict our survey to the studies with clear and direct relevance to strategic or entrepreneurial 
decision making. In total, we identified 113 articles across six 4* management, strategy and IB 
journals and three grade 4 entrepreneurship journals, as classified in the Association of Business 
Schools’ Academic Journal Guide 2015. Using thematic analysis, we incorporate each article 
into our discussion of the empirical research streams associated with the four conceptualisations 
according to its theoretical foundation and treatment of risk and uncertainty, and manually count 
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the articles that fall into each of the four categories. Table 2 presents a breakdown of the number 
of articles by journal and discipline1. 
 
2.3.1 Frequency and risk-bearing 
A “risk as frequency” conceptualisation is important in strategic decision making when 
the possible outcomes associated with a new investment and the probability of these outcomes 
are known a priori and thus present value calculation is feasible. But this is often not the case. 
Therefore, much of the attention in the literature has been paid to the variability of return as a 
manifestation of risk (Arrow, 1965; Fisher & Hall, 1969) as historical data on the distribution of 
returns allow for the calculation of frequency. Empirical research predominantly measures risk 
by the chance of reaching outcomes away from the expected return, i.e., their historical mean 
(Armour & Teece, 1978). In finance theory, as investors can presumably enter and exit financial 
market at little cost, any unsystematic variance from stock return can be arbitraged away in a 
fully diversified portfolio. What matters is the non-diversifiable, systematic component of risk, 
reflected in the covariance between stock return and the return of market portfolio (Fama & 
Miller, 1972). The strategy literature mostly employs the simple variance of the accounting 
returns to measure organisational risk or so-called “income stream uncertainty” in empirical 
research (Baird & Thomas, 1985; Miller & Bromiley, 1990). An implicit premise is that 
organisational risk is different from project level risk that can be fully diversified according to 
modern capital market theory (Miller, 2009). But the portfolio theory legacy still plays an 
important role as firms having more variable return are undoubtedly characterised as risky ex 
post. 
 
                                               
1 Journals include Academy of Management Journal, Strategic Management Journal, Organisation 
Science, Administrative Science Quarterly, Journal of Management, Journal of International Business 
Studies, Journal of Business Venturing, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, and Strategic 
Entrepreneurship Journal. 
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Table 2 Number of articles per journal and discipline 
  Frequency Propensity Degree of 
confidence 
Opportunity 
creation 
Overall 
AMJ 7 13 3 0 23 
SMJ 8 8 17 0 33 
OS 1 3 9 0 13 
ASQ 0 3 3 0 6 
JOM 3 5 0 0 8 
JIBS 3 1 3 0 7 
JBV 1 5 4 3 13 
ETP 0 5 2 0 7 
SEJ 0 1 1 1 3 
Overall 23 44 42 4 113 
Strategy 15 25 23 0 63 
IB 7 10 12 0 29 
Entrepreneurship 1 9 7 4 21 
 
While “risk as frequency” fits perfectly with financial decisions maximising risk-
adjusted return and has contributed to the strategy literature on the risk-return paradox (Henkel, 
2009; McNamara & Bromiley, 1999; Ruefli, 1990), this definition may be misleading if 
researchers intend to infer the ex-ante influence of risk on strategic decision making from ex-
post, after-equilibrium firm behaviour. For instance, early IB research takes a portfolio 
investment approach to foreign direct investment where each project in one country constitutes 
an investment in the firm’s portfolio and the return variability shared by projects in every 
country represents the systematic risk. As researchers observe a negative relationship between 
stability of earnings and foreign operations, it was argued that the decision to invest abroad is 
motivated by a risk reduction advantage of multinational enterprises (MNEs) over non-MNEs as 
the former can diversify sales in various national economies (Rugman, 1976). However, later 
research suggests that international diversification is more likely to be driven by other motives 
than an intention to reduce risk (Buckley, 1988; Caves, 1996), and firms cannot always realise 
risk reducing advantages by diversifying to multiple countries (Belderbos, Tong, & Wu, 2014; 
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Kwok & Reeb, 2000). Corporate risk-taking research shows that using different risk measures 
imposed by the researchers leads to qualitatively different relationships between risk and return 
(McNamara & Bromiley, 1999; Miller & Bromiley, 1990; Wiseman & Catanach, 1997). The 
same caution needs to be exercised in the strategic decision context. When the downside risk 
measure is used – one incorporating both variability and loss (Baird & Thomas, 1985; Miller & 
Bromiley, 1990; Miller & Leiblein, 1996; Miller & Reuer, 1996), it is found that 
multinationality is no longer related to organisational risk while engaging in international joint 
ventures even increases risk (Reuer & Leiblein, 2000). It is reasoned that multinational 
operations may incur additional risk like exchange risk, political risk and information 
asymmetry that offset the benefit of diversification (Reeb, Kwok, & Baek, 1998). 
 
 Variance of projected rates of return count as ex-ante risk is assumed rather than tested 
(Eisenmann, 2002; McNamara & Bromiley, 1999; Miller & Chen, 2004). IB researchers, for 
instance, have taken a leap of faith in assuming that adjusting the required return or cost of 
capital reflects the way MNE managers treat country risk in reality. When what concerns 
managers does not conform to the researcher’s post hoc rationalisation of firm behaviour 
(McNamara & Bromiley, 1997), “risk as frequency” may be of limited relevance in the context 
of strategic decision making (Miller & Reuer, 1996; Ruefli, Collins, & Lacugna, 1999). 
 
One line of inquiry discussing the ex-ante role of “risk as frequency” employs agency 
theory and the behavioural agency model to explain how managers’ risk bearing, i.e. perceived 
wealth at risk, affects strategic decisions (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Strategy research 
generally agrees that managers deliberately make risky strategic choices on resource allocation 
to align their organisations with the environmental conditions (Palmer & Wiseman, 1999), 
which in turn influences performance volatility (Miller & Friesen, 1980). Fundamental to the 
agency literature is the assumption that much of managers’ career prospect, reputation and 
personal wealth are exposed to the firms’ performance and stock price volatility and thus their 
own strategic choices (Larraza-Kintana, Wiseman, Gomez-Mejia, & Welbourne, 2007; Latham 
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& Braun, 2009). Managers’ compensation arrangements (Gray & Cannella, 1997) and stock 
options (Deutsch, Keil, & Laamanen, 2011; Ellstrand, Tihanyi, & Johnson, 2002; Martin, 
Gomez-Mejia, & Wiseman, 2013; Sanders, 2001; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007; Wright, Kroll, 
Krug, & Pettus, 2007; Wright, Kroll, Lado, & Van Ness, 2002), insider owners’ wealth portfolio 
(Wright, Ferris, Sarin, & Awasthi, 1996), boards with more insiders or led by CEO (Ellstrand, 
Tihanyi, & Johnson, 2002) and institutional equity ownership (George, Wiklund, & Zahra, 2005; 
Wright, Kroll, Krug, & Pettus, 2007) all encourage strategic risk-taking, whilst family 
ownership and managerial equity holding and discourage risky decisions (Alessandri & Seth, 
2014; Block, 2012; George, Wiklund, & Zahra, 2005; Martin, Gomez-Mejia, & Wiseman, 2013; 
Matta & Beamish, 2008; Wright, Kroll, Lado, & Van Ness, 2002). The latter relationship is 
moderated by corporate governance structure (Lim, 2015), managers’ dispositional risk 
preference (Gray & Cannella, 1997), cash-based compensation (Devers, McNamara, Wiseman, 
& Arrfelt, 2008), hedging ability and vulnerability to dismissal (Martin, Gomez-Mejia, & 
Wiseman, 2013), may differ with the specific forms of equity-based pay (Devers, McNamara, 
Wiseman, & Arrfelt, 2008) and may also be curvilinear in nature (Wright, Kroll, Krug, & Pettus, 
2007). 
 
2.3.2 Propensity and risk-taking 
“Risk as propensity” cannot be calculated from past evidence and has a clear forward-
looking orientation. It concerns primarily the upcoming risk that managers or entrepreneurs are 
to take when making strategic decisions or launching new ventures.  
 
In strategy research, managers are generally assumed to be unwilling to make risky 
strategic choices regardless of how risk is operationalised – be it new products, R&D 
investment, capital expenditure, merges and acquisitions (M&As), expanding to high-risk 
countries or even corporate tax avoidance (Christensen, Dhaliwal, Boivie, & Graffin, 2015). 
Consistent evidence reveals that environmental risk negatively affects various investment 
decisions, including market entry (Rothaermel, Kotha, & Steensma, 2006), location choice 
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(Garcia-Canal & Guillén, 2008; Holburn & Zelner, 2010; Oh & Oetzel, 2011), resource 
commitment (Delios & Henisz, 2000; Khoury, Junkunc, & Mingo, 2015) and mode of market 
entry (Parker & van Praag, 2012).  
 
Despite such agreement, heterogeneous propensities for risk-taking have been observed. 
Two broad explanations have been provided. First, some firms have a stronger ability to manage 
risk than others. Despite having no frequency data to calculate the probability distribution 
regarding foreign expansion, international new ventures can balance out the revenue exposure, 
country risk and entry mode commitment in each country to keep the overall risk acceptable 
(Shrader, Oviatt, & McDougall, 2000). Firms can also design effective defence mechanisms to 
protect their resources from partners’ misappropriation (Katila, Rosenberger, & Eisenhardt, 
2008), use non-competition agreements to contain knowledge leakage to competitors (Conti, 
2014), and increase the extent of foreign subsidiaries’ within-firm sales to reduce the impact of 
host country’s discretionary policy change (Feinberg & Gupta, 2009). Experienced firms can 
utilise their “non-market” knowledge and capabilities generated from operating in politically 
risky countries to overcome the threat of similar risks in other countries (Delios & Henisz, 2000; 
Delios & Henisz, 2003a; Delios & Henisz, 2003b; Holburn & Zelner, 2010). Such experiential 
learning also helps incumbent firms to expand in the countries suffering high-impact natural and 
technological disasters as well as terrorist attacks (Oetzel & Oh, 2014). 
 
Second, some firms have a stronger tendency to take risk than others. An intuitive 
explanation is centred on managers’ dispositional risk preference and cognitive ability (Wally & 
Baum, 1994). Yet the trait approach receives mixed support, not least in the entrepreneurship 
literature (Block, Thurik, van der Zwan, & Walter, 2013; Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Dai, 
Maksimov, Gilbert, & Fernhaber, 2014; Miner & Raju, 2004; Palich & Bagby, 1995; Stewart & 
Roth, 2001). Upper-echelon research suggests that fund source (Mullins & Forlani, 2005), 
firm’s reputation (Petkova, Wadhwa, Yao, & Jain, 2014), managers’ political orientation 
(Christensen, Dhaliwal, Boivie, & Graffin, 2015), CEO narcissism and overconfidence 
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(Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011; Li & Tang, 2010; Simon & Houghton, 2003; Simon & Shrader, 
2012; Zhu & Chen, 2015, 2014), CEOs’ social class origin (Kish-Gephart & Campbell, 2015) 
and emotion (Foo, 2011; Podoynitsyna, Van der Bij, & Song, 2012; Stanley, 2010) influence 
strategic risk-taking. Following prospect theory and behavioural decision theory (March & 
Shapira, 1992), strategy research examines how and the extent to which managers depart from 
normative decision rules (McNamara & Bromiley, 1997). An array of studies have tested the 
contextual influences on firms’ risk-taking, including resource slack (Bromiley, 1991; Greve, 
2003; Singh, 1986; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996), attainment discrepancy (Palmer & Wiseman, 
1999), and performance feedback (Sitkin & Weingart, 1995; Taylor, Hall, Cosier, & Goodwin, 
1996). Nevertheless, applying behavioural decision theory to the strategic decision context has 
led to equivocal results (see the review by Holmes, Bromiley, Devers, Holcomb, & McGuire, 
2011). The “house money” thesis and prospect theory put forth opposing predictions on risk-
taking under prior success (Thaler & Johnson, 1990). Slattery and Ganster (2002) simulate a 
realistic decision task featuring uncertain outcomes and find that poor performance induces 
individuals to set less risky goals in subsequent decisions, as opposed to problemistic and 
increased risk-taking predicted by prospect theory (Ketchen & Palmer, 1999). This finding is 
aligned with the “risk as propensity” conceptualisation that managers take into account their 
own abilities when making risky decisions (March & Shapira, 1987). Those who have positive 
experience with risk-taking tend to view a risky strategic action, e.g. disruptive business model 
innovation, as more of an opportunity than threat (Dewald & Bowen, 2010; Osiyevskyy & 
Dewald, 2015). Contingency explanations have also been offered to reconcile the mixed 
findings; for instance, the relationship between attainment discrepancy and risk-taking may be 
reversed depending on organisational learning, legitimacy and inertia (Desai, 2008).  
 
2.3.3 Confidence and uncertainty-mitigation 
 Uncertainty as degree of confidence is well used in organisation and entrepreneurship 
literature. McMullen and Shepherd (2006: 135) conclude that “‘uncertainty’ can be viewed as a 
sense of ‘doubt’ that is inextricable from the beliefs that produce action”. Most of the discussion 
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about such uncertainty focuses on external and non-controllable volatility – particularly the 
resolution of technology and changing market conditions (Bergh & Lawless, 1998; Downey, 
Hellriegel, & Slocum, 1975; Duncan, 1972), and its impact on organisations (McKelvie, Haynie, 
& Gustavsson, 2011). Nevertheless, any factors giving rise to the sense of doubt on predicting 
and managing risk can be treated as contributors to uncertainty (Håkanson & Ambos, 2010), 
which may, or may not, be environmental characteristics. 
 
 Following Penrose (1959), entrepreneurship studies have focused on two accounts of 
how entrepreneurs overcome the sense of doubt to pursue business opportunities in the face of 
substantial uncertainty. First, entrepreneurial traits distinguish them from the rest and 
distinguish one entrepreneur from another. For example, entrepreneurs are more inclined than 
non-entrepreneurs to rely on cognitive biases and heuristics such as overconfidence and 
representativeness – a simplifying decision style particularly effective under the conditions of 
uncertain and complex environment (Busenitz & Barney, 1997). Regulatory focus influences 
entrepreneurs’ ability to exploit opportunities in dynamic industries (Hmieleski & Baron, 2008). 
Second, entrepreneurs address insufficient information about future events in various ways. 
Although prior knowledge does not allow for the calculation of probability distribution under 
uncertainty, it nevertheless stands as an important source of information that can boost 
confidence in entrepreneurs’ judgments about which market to enter and how to serve the 
market (Shane, 2000). Uncertainty may obscure the fit between entrepreneurs’ prior knowledge 
and a particular venture idea, thus inhibiting the discovery of opportunity (Patel & Fiet, 2009). 
Systematic research of known information sources, including peers at university (Kacperczyk, 
2012), rather than accidental recognition of unknown venture ideas can moderate the effect of 
environmental uncertainty (Patel & Fiet, 2009). Parker (2006) finds an interaction between the 
trait and information perspective in that older and younger entrepreneurs adjust prior beliefs 
differently in the light of new information. 
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 Strategy and IB research focuses on how firms respond to environmental uncertainty in 
strategic decisions or, put differently, how uncertainty can be mitigated through various 
strategies. Prominent examples include real option and hierarchical governance. A real option is 
a set of short term projects, including R&D, alliances and foreign direct investment, that can 
easily change when environment changes (Girotra, Terwiesch, & Ulrich, 2007; McGrath & 
Nerkar, 2004; Vassolo, Anand, & Folta, 2004). The general argument is that firms will delay 
investment (or divestment) decisions and, if deciding to invest (or divest), will delay full 
commitment (or complete divestment) until the uncertainty resolves favourably (or 
unfavourably) (Damaraju, Barney, & Makhija, 2015). When the chance of loss is less for the 
portfolio of investments as a whole than for any part of it, firms do not need to withdraw from 
an underperforming investment as long as it maintains a switch option value (Belderbos & Zou, 
2009). This value depends on the correlation between the focal investment and other 
investments in the portfolio (Girotra, Terwiesch, & Ulrich, 2007; Li & Chi, 2013; Vassolo, 
Anand, & Folta, 2004). Under uncertainty, holding a diversified portfolio increases information 
sources about market demand (Sorenson, 2000) and spreads the bets on unproven innovations 
(Klingebiel & Rammer, 2014). The flexibility also benefits discrete investments (Folta & Miller, 
2002; Miller & Folta, 2002); for example the growth option allows multinational firms to shift 
gradually to net present value based decision making under the receding perception of 
uncertainty (Fisch, 2008b).  
 
Hierarchical governance follows from the transaction cost economics, which argues that 
uncertainty reduces firms’ ability to manage subsidiaries efficiently and can be accommodated 
by managerial fiat (Williamson, 1991). Empirical findings so far have been mixed (David & 
Han, 2004) and suggest that this prediction may differ depending on the type of uncertainty and 
the characteristics of the firms (Sutcliffe & Zaheer, 1998). In industries with high technological 
uncertainty and complexity, alliance may be favoured over hierarchical governance (Dyer, 1996; 
Osborn & Baughn, 1990). Industrial deregulation and regulatory uncertainty may increase the 
efficiency of both vertical integration and market transaction, but not the hybrid structure 
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(Delmas & Tokat, 2005). Market, technological and behavioural uncertainty point to divergent 
theoretical predictions on governance mode (Luo, 2002; Robertson & Gatignon, 1998). Highly 
diversified and less diversified firms respond to uncertainty in opposite fashion in terms of 
acquisition and divestiture (Bergh & Lawless, 1998). Interestingly, under technological 
uncertainty, firms may face a trade-off between the value of the growth option associated with 
low commitment structures and the efficiency gain derived from hierarchical governance (Folta, 
1998). Combining these two explanations, one might argue that the predictive power of real 
option theory is stronger in the case of technological or exogenous uncertainty while transaction 
cost logic prevails under behavioural or endogenous uncertainty (Santoro & McGill, 2005; van 
de Vrande, Vanhaverbeke, & Duysters, 2009).  
 
Another stream of literature concerns how imitative strategies help firms enter new 
markets in the light of firm-specific uncertainty (Beckman, Haunschild, & Damon, 2004; Gaba 
& Terlaak, 2013) about organisational legitimacy and economic feasibility (Belderbos, Olffen, 
& Zou, 2011). Neoinstitutional theory and organisational learning theory suggest that in markets 
with high level of environmental uncertainty, firms tend to imitate the investment behaviour – 
including foreign expansion, location choice, entry mode and partner selection – of their own 
(Chan, Makino, & Isobe, 2006). Alternatively, they choose to imitate the investment behaviour 
of peer organisations a) with similar characteristics, b) having certain traits, c) having repeated 
investments in the target market, d) showing desirable outcomes, e) from the same home 
country, f) from the same prior industry, g) from the same business group, or h) competing with 
the focal firm in other markets (Belderbos, Olffen, & Zou, 2011; Benner & Tripsas, 2012; 
Fernhaber & Li, 2010; Gimeno, Hoskisson, Beal, & Wan, 2005; Greve, 1998; Guillén, 2002; 
Haunschild & Miner, 1997; Henisz & Delios, 2001; Li, Qian, & Yao, 2015; McDonald & 
Westphal, 2003; Stephan, Murmann, Boeker, & Goodstein, 2003). Again, firms’ responses to 
uncertainty differ depending on the extent to which they can control it (Beckman, Haunschild, 
& Damon, 2004). For example, firms tend to proactively reduce the uncertainty around the 
resolution of technology by advancing its own technology and pre-empting the competition 
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against rivals (Toh & Kim, 2012). When the uncertainty is shared across a group of firms over 
which any of them have little control, they will reinforce the existing practices to retain 
legitimacy (Beckman, Haunschild, & Damon, 2004). Moreover, the predictive power of 
different theories may depend on the level of uncertainty. As uncertainty grows from low, 
medium to high, firms base partner selection on technical capability, prior relationship and 
internalisation advantage respectively (Hoetker, 2005).  
 
2.3.4 Opportunity creation and uncertainty-building 
 The opportunity creation view and the associated understanding of uncertainty are in a 
nascent state. It contends that entrepreneurs endogenously generate uncertainty in order to 
amplify the initial small differences to the rivals, create costly-to-copy, heterogeneous resources, 
and enact opportunities others cannot conceive (Alvarez & Barney, 2007). In this case, 
uncertainty is no longer a barrier to investment, and may even become the source of sustainable 
competitive advantage. We can see corroborating evidence emerging. For example, it is found 
that expert entrepreneurs focus more on “affordable loss”, perceive different possible courses of 
actions and favour more strongly non-predictive control than novices, who seek to predict the 
future and avoid “surprises” (Dew, Read, Sarasvathy, & Wiltbank, 2009; Read, Dew, 
Sarasvathy, Song, & Wiltbank, 2009). Wiltbank, Read, Dew, and Sarasvathy (2009) report that 
angel investors who rely on non-predictive control strategies and seek to transform the 
environment in which they operate tend to make small investments in the ventures and 
experience fewer failures than those who employ prediction-based approaches and pursue 
preconceived goals. Chandler, DeTienne, McKelvie, and Mumford (2011) confirm that 
uncertainty is positively associated with entrepreneurs using experimentation and negatively 
with causation processes. Ventures that simultaneously develop diverging search paths of 
business models from an initial idea may have higher odds for long-term survival than those 
focusing commitment on a single business model (Andries, Debackere, & van Looy, 2013). 
Nevertheless, management literature so far is lacking systematic examination of how 
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entrepreneurs utilise experimentation to exploit uncertainty and how they benefit from creating 
uncertainty, above and beyond a real option explanation. 
 
2.4 Fitting Conceptualisations with Empirical Questions 
 Contention arises when empirical research attempts to span the boundaries of 
neighbouring risk or uncertainty cells and relies on different concepts to address the same 
research question. We discuss the four boundaries respectively and emphasis opportunities for 
future research. 
 
Figure 1 Spanning the boundaries: Contested views and opportunities for future research 
 
 
2.4.1 A) Entrepreneur – risk bearing or uncertainty bearing? 
 Entrepreneurship literature provides two major explanations of what distinguish 
entrepreneurs from non-entrepreneurs, depending on the nature of entrepreneurial opportunity in 
the eyes of the researchers. On the one hand, entrepreneurs are believed to have a stronger 
intrinsic inclination to risk as entrepreneurial action is theorised as an opportunity discovery 
process (Brockhaus, 1980; Stewart & Roth, 2001). On the other hand, entrepreneurs are 
arguably more willing to bear the uncertainty in the process of opportunity creation in pursuit of 
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economic profit (Knight, 1921). Alvarez and Barney (2007) point out that one can always 
interpret ex post the formation of an opportunity as resulting from either discovery or creation. 
Linking the system-level outcome to the actors’ characteristics may unwittingly impose the 
observers’ assessment of the novelty of the situation on the actors (McMullen & Shepherd, 
2006). There are certainly cases where an activity occurs on a personal knowledge frontier – i.e. 
new to the entrepreneur, but appear to researchers as an incremental improvement or just 
imitation. 
 
 It is the entrepreneurs’ perception about the situation that determines the actions they 
are to take, and the situation being risky or uncertain has different implications. Under 
conditions of risk, an entrepreneurial actor would employ present value and scenario-based 
techniques to plan everything ahead and then bear the risk that the outcome may not occur as 
expected (Alvarez & Barney, 2005). Under uncertainty, entrepreneurs would rely heavily on 
judgment and emphasise flexibility by keeping the options open to exploit the contingencies. 
Yet it is the assumption held by the researchers that determines the way they theorise about the 
observed behaviour and where they attribute its cause. The mismatch between the researchers’ 
assumption and that in the minds of the actors ex ante may be one reason why actors’ intrinsic 
tolerance for risk cannot consistently explain venture formation decisions (Simon, Houghton, & 
Aquino, 2000) or distinguish entrepreneurs from managers (Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Low & 
MacMillan, 1988; Miner & Raju, 2004). The trait approach may only be supported when the 
experimental setting stimulates an opportunity discovery, risk-bearing environment (Mullins & 
Forlani, 2005). 
 
 One way to reconcile the findings is to focus on the actual actions entrepreneurs take 
through the process of enterprising. Their underlying beliefs about the nature of the situation 
will be manifest in the decision tools or cognitive processes being applied (Sarasvathy, 2001). 
Systematic information search and analysis implies the assumption that future is relatively 
measurable and there is an existing opportunity to be discovered. Experimental and iterative 
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learning implies the assumption that the future is to be created. Whether the hypothesis is 
congruent with the real context in which entrepreneurs are operating is another question and 
may have implications for ventures’ financial performance (Alvarez & Barney, 2007). But only 
when the explanation of the determinants of entrepreneurship is built on correct assumptions 
would the research lead to convergent, meaningful findings.  
 
2.4.2 B) Risk bearing and risk-taking – inadequate interaction 
 There is a notable clash between behavioural agency model and agency theory in that 
the former focuses on how managerial equity and option holding increases risk bearing and thus 
the tendency to avoid risky behaviour (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998) while the latter 
discusses how equity-based compensation aligns managerial interests with the principals’ so as 
to encourage risk-taking (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Mixed support of the broad “agency 
theory” has been reported as risk-bearing and incentive-alignment argument concerns either the 
gain or the loss consequences of a gamble and provides opposing theoretical predictions 
(Alessandri & Seth, 2014; Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Sanders, 2001). Contention arises as to 
whether the passive bearing of risk or proactive taking of risk better explains the agency 
phenomenon. A plausible yet unaddressed explanation lies in what kinds of decisions can count 
as “risky”. Whether R&D investment or diversification is a risk-laden or risk-reducing choice 
depends on where the risk arises from, which may vary for different agents in a multi-agent 
model (Alessandri & Seth, 2014; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2010). Compensation 
volatility and perceived loss of wealth have different implications for risk bearing and, if 
undistinguished, may result in positive or negative confirmation of the agency theory (Larraza-
Kintana, Wiseman, Gomez-Mejia, & Welbourne, 2007). 
 
 An alternative approach concerns the interaction between risk bearing and risk-taking 
perspectives. Previous empirical studies contribute to theoretical refinement by examining the 
interaction between behavioural agency model and agency theory (Martin, Gomez-Mejia, & 
Wiseman, 2013) and between agency theory and behavioural decision theory (Lim, 2015; Lim 
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& McCann, 2013a, 2013b). Lim and McCann (2013b) find that the effect of  negative 
attainment discrepancy on risk-taking is moderated by the values of agents’ stock options and 
the moderating effect differs for CEOs vs. outsider directors. Chng, Rodgers, Shih, and Song 
(2012) suggest that it is the fit between agents’ compensation scheme, dispositional trait and 
organisational performance context inducing strategic risk-taking. 
 
Despite these recent advancements, attention has been concentrated on the effect of 
compensation level relative to a reference point. There remains inadequacy of substantive 
interaction between risk bearing and risk-taking perspectives. In risk bearing studies, 
particularly agency studies, strategic risk-taking is viewed as a pure gamble where agents only 
passively bear any consequences of the decisions and the level of personal financial and human 
capital exposed to the consequences determines their tendencies to avoid risk (Martin, Gomez-
Mejia, & Wiseman, 2013). In risk-taking studies, managerial risk-taking is driven by the self-
assessed ability to reduce the chance of adverse outcome and contain its impact on the 
organisations over the process of pursuing better performance. This fundamental difference 
presents opportunities for future research to reconcile the explanations for the agency 
phenomenon. One might reason that CEO and outsider directors have different risk profiles not 
only because of the varied level of risk-bearing but also because CEOs are more likely to fall 
prey to competence trap and self-serving bias given their direct involvement in risk management 
(Billett & Qian, 2008). In this regard, prior success may influence differently CEOs and outsider 
directors whose personal wealth is tied to restricted stock or stock option value. This disparity 
may be particularly salient in the light of social praise for the CEOs’ prowess. In much the same 
way behavioural agency model results from an insightful combination of behavioural decision 
theory and agency theory, we argue that the interaction between risk bearing and risk-taking 
research may settle the theoretical debate and advance the growing stream of both multi-agent 
perspective and behavioural strategy. 
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2.4.3 C) Risk-taking and uncertainty-mitigation – implications for “overconfidence” 
 Overconfidence is one of the most common cognitive biases researched by management 
scholars in attempts to explain managerial and firm behaviour. However, the term itself is often 
loosely used and conflated with other constructs, such as narcissism, hubris, ego and 
overoptimism. Moore and Healy (2008) identify three distinct types of the psychological 
processes of overconfidence in the extant literature: (i) overplacement of one’s performance 
relative to others, (ii) overprecision in one’s beliefs and judgment, and (iii) overestimation of 
one’s abilities and performance (see also Hayward, Shepherd, & Griffin, 2006 for a review). 
Most of the entrepreneurship research on overconfidence has been focused on individual’s 
overestimation of the correctness of his/her knowledge and on biased prediction of the 
occurrence of non-controllable events. This follows a trait approach wherein overconfidence is 
one of domain-free, personal characteristics (Hiller & Hambrick, 2005; Russo & Schoemaker, 
1992) and closely related to narcissism (Zhu & Chen, 2015, 2014). In contrast, most of the 
strategy research on overconfidence is concerned with managers’ self-assessment about the 
efficacy of their past coping mechanisms and about the organisations’ future performance 
(Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011; Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Hayward, Rindova, & Pollock, 
2004; Li & Tang, 2010; Tang, Li, & Yang, 2012). This literature conceptualises overconfidence 
as socially constructed sense of potency driven by actors’ construal of their experiences and the 
social praise. 
 
 While both types of “overconfidence” are valid and of interest to psychologists 
(Klayman, Soll, Gonz, aacute, lez-Vallejo, & Barlas, 1999), each is more likely to be found in 
one strategic decision context than another and has implications for different theories of risk and 
uncertainty. Overprecision may bear a closer relation to the estimation of future outcomes and 
thus play an important role in taking “risk as propensity” where incomplete information prevails 
in a structured decision task and actors persist in predicting the unobserved probability 
distribution. Conversely, overestimation about one’s own ability may be more associated with 
“uncertainty as degree of confidence” in the case of ill-structured decision environments (Simon 
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& Houghton, 2003). Overestimation occurs when actors truncate mental search to the most 
available information inputs – guided by the natural tendency to avoid excessive cognitive 
burden – and place too much confidence on the diagnosticity of the inputs initially retrieved 
from memory (Feldman & Lynch, 1988). When environment changes, previous strategies and 
performance feedback may become tenuously linked with positive outcomes. Those fixated on 
the wrong diagnostic cue tend to express extreme certainty about the prospect of their 
performance yet end up with failure (Simon & Shrader, 2012).  
 
Conflating risk and uncertainty as well as overprecision and overestimation has led 
entrepreneurship studies to disprove the effect of overconfidence on risk-taking (Simon et al., 
2000). One might reason that it is the overestimation of ability and performance driving 
entrepreneurial actions and excess market entry (Wu & Knott, 2006). Social praise, celebrity 
effect and attribution bias may only amplify the overestimation of ability, as opposed to the 
overprecision of prediction (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011; Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; 
Hayward, Rindova, & Pollock, 2004; Li & Tang, 2013). Thus it is important to specify the type 
of overconfidence being discussed and how it relates to the decision context under research – be 
it risky or uncertain. Construct clarity is the first step for researchers to develop convergent but 
varied measures in search of robust findings (Suddaby, 2010). Only when different 
overconfidence measures can agree on what they assess would the studies become 
commensurable and the systematic building of knowledge be achieved (Hill, Kern, & White, 
2012). 
 
2.4.4 D) Uncertainty: a good thing or a bad thing? 
“Uncertainty as degree of confidence” and “uncertainty as opportunity creation” are 
internally consistent accounts of uncertainty and follow from classic insights. What distinguish 
one from the other are the varying implications for the role of uncertainty in decision making.  
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Entrepreneurship literature has extensively discussed the role of uncertainty in 
preventing individuals or firms from engaging in entrepreneurial activities (McKelvie, Haynie, 
& Gustavsson, 2011). Causation and discovery models suggest that uncertainty as arising from 
information incompleteness or inadequate cognitive capacity undermines individuals’ ability to 
design a return-maximising strategy. It is also received that profitable opportunities lie beneath 
environmental volatility, such as technological changes (Shane, 2000). In evaluating the 
feasibility of the opportunities, entrepreneurs attach confidence to their prior beliefs about the 
market through the exercise of entrepreneurial judgment (Casson, 1982). Whether judgment 
transforms to action depends on the perceived level of uncertainty (McMullen & Shepherd, 
2006), which undermines the capacity to form correct judgments and preclude the validity of 
planning (Penrose, 1959). To this end, entrepreneurs tend to avoid investment options filled 
with a strong sense of doubt or strive to reduce it using real option, internalisation and imitative 
strategies. 
 
In stark contrast, effectuation theory downplays the detrimental role of uncertainty. 
Whether an actor is subject to bounded rationality or pure uncertainty is no longer the point. 
Effectuating actors first decide on the level of affordable loss – a notion closely related to 
magnitude of loss – that they are willing to forgo in case of failure to create opportunities, and 
experiment with as many strategies as possible within this constraint (Sarasvathy, 2001). Unlike 
the case of opportunity discovery where information search is extensively used to enhance the 
degree of confidence in prediction, entrepreneurs now strive to generate “volatility” and build 
“uncertainty” in the sense that more future options are to be enacted in order for them to be able 
to increase returns under any unexpected contingencies (Alvarez & Barney, 2007). Risk is still 
important in the opportunity creation process. But when risk is accounted for – in fact the level 
of affordable loss has to be determined prior to any entrepreneurial action – uncertainty is not so 
much a hindering factor as suggested by the discovery or causation theory of entrepreneurship 
and may even become desirable considering its value in fending off imitation (Alvarez, Barney, 
& Anderson, 2013). As Sarasvathy (2001: 250) puts, “to the extent that we can control the 
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future, we do not need to predict it”. If researchers confuse the meaning of uncertainty between 
those two contexts, one might conclude that it is at odds with the conventional thinking that 
human beings prefer risky to uncertain situation (Ellsberg, 1961).  
 
 Compared to other boundary disputes, the contention over how uncertainty matters in 
the process of enterprising has arisen only recently as a sub-argument underneath the major 
debate on the theory of entrepreneurship, and requires most scholarly attention. A clear 
boundary definition as to when each conceptualisation of uncertainty is most likely to 
predominate and how the situation prompts the shift of dominance from one to the other may 
spawn new research avenues for entrepreneurship. The next step may be finding empirical 
evidence of whether and how entrepreneurs deliberately create and embrace uncertainty to 
explore future contingencies and ward off potential followers. 
 
2.5 Conclusion and Future Research 
It is not uncommon for social scientists to conflate risk and uncertainty. Williamson 
(1975: 23) claims that “the distinction is not one with which I will be concerned – if indeed it is 
a truly useful one to employ in any context whatsoever”. The difficulty of modelling uncertainty 
has particularly led economists to assume away those cases where the future cannot be 
represented by probabilistic statements (Epstein & Wang, 1994). Even if the bifurcation is 
drawn, some argue that the boundary is vague and have no problem with applying probabilistic 
calculus to uncertainty (LeRoy & Singell, 1987). One might wonder if it is necessary to 
distinguish one from the other. This chapter provides an answer to this question by reviewing 
two broad literatures; how risk and uncertainty are conceptualised in seminal studies, and how 
contemporary empirical research understands the role of risk and uncertainty in strategic 
decision making. We offer an attempt to integrate and synthesise the vast and diffuse body of 
knowledge produced by strategy, entrepreneurship and IB scholars, and show that clarifying the 
conceptual distinctions may improve these disciplinary research. 
 37 
 
 
Drawing on works including Knight, Keynes, Popper, and Penrose, we identify two 
distinct conceptualisations of risk. “Risk as frequency” refers to known probabilities assigned to 
known outcomes. This is the foundation for the classic notion of risk aversion where actors 
prefer a slightly less certain payoff to a higher expected value from an uncertain payoff (Weber 
& Milliman, 1997). Nevertheless, strategic contexts are rarely featured with a clearly defined 
probability distribution, rendering risk-as-variance computationally intractable (Baird & 
Thomas, 1985). “Risk as frequency” has led measurement to focus on ex-post calibration of 
return volatility, and thus fits imperfectly with management scholars’ fundamental concern 
about the ex-ante role of risk in strategic decision processes (Ruefli, Collins, & Lacugna, 1999). 
In contrast, “risk as propensity” applies the propensity interpretation of probability to the 
context of strategic risk-taking where, more often than not, managers have too little empirical 
data to calculate the probability distribution. This interpretation paves the ground for the crucial 
role of managerial ability and control in decision making (March & Shapira, 1987). When risk 
is defined as frequency, individuals’ attitude toward risk is largely determined by personal 
dispositions and the extent of risk bearing. When risk is defined as propensity, behavioural 
theory contributes substantially to our understanding of how context overrides disposition and 
affects managers’ tendency to take risk. Thus “apparent risk seeking” is more likely to result 
from a strong belief in one’s own ability and skills rather than a great tolerance for the chance of 
loss (Wu & Knott, 2006).  
 
 Similarly, we identify two distinct conceptualisations of uncertainty. “Uncertainty as 
degree of confidence” refers to an individual’s degree of belief on her ability to predict future 
states of the world, particularly the estimates of risk. The familiar notions of behavioural 
uncertainty, environmental uncertainty and technological uncertainty all fall in this category. As 
the degree of confidence in the estimates of risk needs not to be correlated with the level of risk, 
we show that risk and uncertainty can exist simultaneously, as practitioners often claim. 
However, uncertainty invites disparate responses from firms and managers compared to risk. 
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Transaction cost economics, real option theory and organisational learning theory all contribute 
to our understanding of how firms mitigate uncertainty. No doubt is it true that the capacity to 
assume uncertainty and place confidence in one’s own judgment about unforeseeable events is a 
distinguishing feature of entrepreneurs (Knight, 1921). But it is also evident that non-
entrepreneurial decision making could involve substantial uncertainty. In contrast, “uncertainty 
as opportunity creation” seems to be unique to the entrepreneurial context. Within the 
constraints of collective social constructions, entrepreneurs seek to build the future states in 
their own favour. This form of uncertainty comes close to the familiar notion of unknowable 
unknown because no one knows how the future will unfold ex ante. 
 
 So far “Risk as propensity” and “uncertainty as degree of confidence” have attracted 
most attention. It seems that these conceptualisations well reflect the major risk and uncertainty 
faced by managers in strategic decision making. In the theory of the growth of firm, Penrose 
(1959) points out that risk refers to the possible loss that might be incurred as result of a given 
action, and uncertainty refers to entrepreneurs’ confidence in his estimates. This definition is 
also shared by transaction cost economists, who further attribute uncertainty to “disturbances”, 
be it behavioural or environmental (Chiles & McMackin, 1996). It is unlikely that a single 
measure of risk or uncertainty can be generalised across settings, and certain topics of strategic 
decision making align better with some specific aspects of risk or uncertainty than others 
(Janney & Dess, 2006). Empirical research has unsurprisingly generated a whole host of 
measures and proxies to capture these concepts. We did not focus on how any context-specific 
risk and uncertainty is conceptualised and measured. Nevertheless, our discussion of the 
concepts can guide future research on using correct operationalisation to align with the theory, 
and may address the equivocal findings resulting from the mismatch between theory and 
measurement. 
 
More importantly, we identify important boundary disputes among the 
conceptualisations. Distinguishing between risk and uncertainty and between one 
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conceptualisation and another may contribute to answering four perplexing questions; a) Are 
entrepreneurs risk bearing or uncertainty bearing? b) Do mixed findings of managerial risk-
taking arise from the lack of interaction between risk bearing and risk-taking research? c) Are 
managers overconfident of their knowledge entering into the predictive calculus or their ability 
to cope with ill-structured situations? d) Is uncertainty a good thing or bad thing to 
entrepreneurial action? These puzzles sum up the contested views researchers put forth to 
understand strategic and entrepreneurial decision making. We require a clear understanding of 
what it is that concerns decision makers in strategic decision making. Conceivably, the benefits 
of bifurcating risk and uncertainty conceptualisations go beyond those examples we have 
discussed. 
 
2.5.1 Future research 
 Unlike previous research (e.g., Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001), we categorise the existing 
studies by their implicit or explicit understanding of risk and uncertainty, rather than 
disciplinary traditions. Nevertheless, the disciplinary foci have resulted in the fact that risk 
studies are concentrated on strategy and IB while entrepreneurial decision research is biased 
toward the study of uncertainty. We suggest that a careful thinking on uncertainty may bridge 
those two broad streams by shedding light on the interactive relationship between risk and 
uncertainty.  
 
 Consider the case that researchers often conflate environmental risk and uncertainty in 
studies of uncertainty mitigation. For instance, because MNEs with dispersed international 
network can switch productive activities among different locations in response to factor cost 
fluctuation in any given country including the home country, international diversification is 
considered to confer a real option advantage over non-MNEs, as opposed to a risk reducing 
advantage (Belderbos & Zou, 2007; Fisch & Zschoche, 2012; Lee & Makhija, 2008, 2009; Lee 
& Song, 2012). While it is well received that real option provides firms with operational 
flexibility under uncertainty, Cuypers and Martin (2009) nevertheless acknowledge that the 
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concept of uncertainty in real option theory is by definition one of risk. To confront this issue, 
one needs to distinguish between endogenous uncertainty – which is addressed by learning and 
growth option, and exogenous uncertainty – which is addressed by hedging and switch option 
(Xu, Zhou, & Phan, 2010). The definition that Cuypers and Martin (2009) use may be one 
reason why they find supportive evidence of the option value of joint venture under exogenous 
uncertainty but not endogenous uncertainty. We argue that an alternative approach is to 
distinguish between strategy and operational flexibility because the former is more closely 
related to mitigating “uncertainty as degree of confidence” through “wait and see” while the 
latter allows for reducing “risk as frequency” through orchestrating and coordination (Belderbos 
& Zou, 2007; Tong & Reuer, 2007). These distinctions may reconcile the equivocal findings of 
the growth option value associated with joint venture in particular (Li & Li, 2010; Reuer & 
Leiblein, 2000; Tong, Reuer, & Peng, 2008). Interestingly, Hawk, Pacheco-De-Almeida, and 
Yeung (2013) report an interplay between risk and uncertainty. Firms with the ability to execute 
investment projects faster than rivals face less risk of being preempted so that they can delay 
entry into an uncertain new market and still achieve superior performance. Although we did not 
focus on the boundary between “risk as frequency” and “uncertainty as degree of confidence”, 
we believe that a fine-grained conceptualisation is also instrumental in reconciling previous 
contentions. 
 
 In addition, “uncertainty as degree of confidence” can be viewed as subjective 
individual perception that hinders experiential learning. Organisational learning research 
suggests that firms may not always be able to extract benefits from previous experience 
(Heimeriks, 2010; March, 1991; Zollo, 2009). The notion that prior experience generates 
valuable knowledge and influences managers’ risk-taking tendency is based on the premise that 
managers can effectively identify common aspects among contexts and make appropriate 
inferences (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Levinthal & March, 1993). Uncertainty makes 
ineffective the analogical mapping schema that managers use to classify the environments based 
on the degree of structural similarity (Agarwal, Anand, Bercovitz, & Croson, 2012; Miller & 
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Lin, 2014), and increases the chance of superstitious learning that jeopardises performance 
(Miller, 2012). High level of perceived uncertainty casts doubt on managers’ judgment of what 
evidence of past cases and what elements of the current context should be taken into account in 
efficiently and effectively adapting to the new environment (Galavotti, 2015), thus jeopardising 
managers’ ability to mitigate the associated risks and weakening their tendency to take risk. 
 
Extant literature has implied several sources for uncertainty that allow for firm level 
operationalisation of the concept. First, a great level of causal ambiguity due to psychic distance 
largely undermines managers’ ability to understand the links between actions and outcomes 
(Johanson & Vahlne, 2009). As a result, managers may have little confidence in the efficacy of 
the preconceived coping mechanisms accumulated in their mental portfolio. Although trial and 
error learning and post hoc adjustments are always feasible (Prashantham & Floyd, 2012), 
distant markets are unforgiving of missteps and success is bound to come at high price when 
learning is ineffective (Petersen, Pedersen, & Lyles, 2008). Managers may either pick up the 
salient signals of the new context that differ dramatically from what they have experienced or 
become overwhelmed by the growing feeling of doubt, unreliability and anxiety. Hence the 
intention to take risk is suppressed. This view is partly supported by empirical evidence that 
very few large MNEs branch out to psychically distant markets located outside the home region 
(Rugman & Verbeke, 2004). Future research can examine how different aspects of psychic 
distance reduce risk-taking in different ways and under what conditions the effect of psychic 
distance can be contained. 
 
 Second, the novelty of the focal task may moderate the efficacy of past experience. 
When the focal task is distinctly novel, the way the task needs to be managed changes 
dramatically and the action-outcome relationship becomes ambiguous (Miller, 2012). 
Knowledge acquired by experiential learning now gives little guidance on both predicting future 
scenarios and evaluating managers’ coping abilities, thereby undermining their confidence of 
surviving the risk (Zollo, 2009). An extreme example of task novelty is investing in a new 
 42 
 
industry in a foreign country, where the accumulated knowledge related to risk hedging and risk 
management no long applies and may thus constrain managers’ confidence of controlling the 
project risk within tolerable levels. This effect is found among various modes of market entry 
(Finkelstein & Haleblian, 2002; Inkpen, 2000; Reuer, Shenkar, & Ragozzino, 2004). It has been 
shown that even opportunity discovery is not simply a risk-taking task, but could involve 
substantial level of uncertainty depending on task novelty (Miller, 2012). Following our 
conceptualisation, future research may yield important insights into the varying interplay 
between risk and uncertainty under opportunity discovery vs. opportunity creation. 
 
Third, the heterogeneity of the stock of prior experience has an impact on learning. 
Managers’ sense of doubt can emanate not only from a lack of key information but also when 
they are overwhelmed by the abundance of conflicting meanings the current information 
conveys (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). Diverse experience can address this problem by increasing 
the breadth of knowledge sources, from which managers can make a precise recognition of the 
structural similarities between source and target situations (Gary, Wood, & Pillinger, 2012) and 
acquire more accurate understanding of the action-outcome relationship (Gavetti, Levinthal, & 
Rivkin, 2005). Significant variation in the experience base also confers managers a wide variety 
of potential approaches to be employed to grapple with the adverse occasions (Haunschild & 
Sullivan, 2002; Perkins, 2014). In stark contrast, depth of experience in the same, repeated task 
undermines managers’ ability to adapt to new contexts and thus produces rapidly diminishing 
returns (Chetty, Eriksson, & Lindbergh, 2006; Gary, Wood, & Pillinger, 2012; Gavetti, 
Levinthal, & Rivkin, 2005). Future research may investigate whether a manager would become 
less susceptible to contextual influences and exhibit more consistent decision models as she 
gains more experience of varied tasks within a distinct group of decisions and under what 
conditions structured vs. adaptive decision models improve performance. 
 
Although it is unlikely that strategic decision can be judged as good or bad based on a 
normative rule, the way in which managers adjust strategic choices to risk and uncertainty often 
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has performance implications. Uncertainty undermines the effectiveness of deliberate learning 
such that relying on the existing architectural knowledge and predefined adaptive design may 
cause firms to experience first a significant drop in performance and then a period of recovery 
when expanding into a new market (Petersen, Pedersen, & Lyles, 2008). In contrast, learning-
by-doing and real option strategy may be better suited to addressing uncertainty, and result in 
superior performance (Alvarez, Barney, & Anderson, 2013). Various research designs can be 
employed to examine the decision-performance relationship. On the one hand, eliciting 
techniques such as cognitive mapping and verbal protocol would reveal how managers arrive at 
a strategic decision – by comprehensive planning and systematic search or by a flexible, open-
ended approach, and the evaluation heuristics being used in the decision process (Williams & 
Grégoire, 2015). On the other hand, experimentation allows researchers to manipulate 
hypothetical risky or uncertain environments by changing the amount of information, the extent 
of non-controllable disturbance or capability cues on managers’ ability. Adaptive simulation 
game can also be designed to take managers through the process of opportunity creation 
wherein the world is defined by uncertainty. Repeated experiments are effective in shredding 
capricious, idiosyncratic cognitive processes associated with any single decision, and draw 
attention to the logic underlying the behaviour rather than the rationalisation of the behaviour. 
All of these methods can shed new light on the relationship between decision process and firm 
performance. 
 
In the following chapter, we build on our clarification of the risk and uncertainty 
concepts. Our review of the general management research is applied to illuminating how the IB 
literature has examined the role of risk and uncertainty in FDI decisions. We focus, in particular, 
on “risk as propensity” that has been mostly researched in the literature at the firm and 
managerial levels of analysis. We propose that a unifying framework of FDI risk-taking is 
needed to address the limitations of the current approaches. The framework is informed by the 
recent microfoundations movement in strategy theory and established around the concept of risk 
propensity to account for the heterogeneity in managers’ tendencies to take risk. We suggest 
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that the theory of FDI could benefit from a revisit to the nature of “risk” and our 
microfoundational reconceptualisation of risk-taking. 
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3 EXPERIENCE AND FDI RISK-TAKING: A MICROFOUNDATIONAL 
RECONCEPTUALISATION 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Managing risk is one of the most important strategic objectives for managers of MNEs 
(Ghoshal, 1987). Given the pervasiveness of risk and the significant resource commitments of 
cross-border venturing (Cosset & Roy, 1991), an extensive literature has been devoted to 
understanding the impact of risk and uncertainty on FDI decisions (e.g., Delios & Henisz, 2003a; 
Delios & Henisz, 2003b). Globalisation has given rise to new forms of risks, including cyber 
attack, industrial espionage, governmental surveillance and public-private tension, among others. 
It is imperative for IB scholars to revisit the state of current knowledge and examine whether 
extant theoretical and empirical approaches can address the questions posed by the ever 
increasingly complex world. 
 
The past two decades has seen a steady and remarkable growth of FDI into developing 
countries (Feinberg & Gupta, 2009). There is an incomplete explanation as to why MNEs 
engage rather than avoid weak institutions and policy hazards commonly found in these markets. 
The dominant explanation is predicated on an observed relationship between a firm’s 
international experience and risk-taking, attributing this relationship to firm-level capabilities 
(Delios & Henisz, 2003b). This explanation further extends to home country experience, which 
is hypothesised to be one of the major sources of international competitive advantage for 
EMNEs (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011; Del Sol & Kogan, 2007; Luo & Wang, 2012). While it is true 
that repeated exposure to the same risk may help managers develop coping mechanisms to 
contain the effect of adversity and to recover from it so that they believe they can condition the 
odds suggested by external information (Oetzel & Oh, 2014), the firm-level capabilities are only 
inferred and often assumed to be an automatic result of experience. We question whether the 
organisational capability is real or a misconception of the decision makers, especially when 
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generalizing experience from one context to another is often required for FDI decision-making, 
which involves the transfer of knowledge across the borders. This is not an unreasonable 
question given that cognition research suggests that individuals work within a framework 
constrained by numerous cognitive biases, leading to misconceptions (Schoemaker, 1993). 
While the primacy of organisations is a prevalent assumption in FDI research, the study of risk 
particularly requires taking into account managers’ own views (March & Shapira, 1987). The 
fact that IB scholars rarely engage in the discussion of risk-taking with, for example, cognitive 
psychologists, has deprived the literature of the benefits of cross-disciplinary conversation (Hill, 
Kern, & White, 2012). 
 
 In this chapter, we review the current empirical literature on FDI risk-taking and 
consolidate this field of study with a microfoundational framework. Different terms have been 
used to represent environmental risk in the home and host country, including country risk, 
institutional risk and political risk (see Table 1). While country risk encompasses many aspects 
of country-specific conditions, institutional and political risk are more narrowly defined 
(Feinberg & Gupta, 2009). We focus on the theoretical account that could contribute to our 
understanding of MNEs’ responses to any environmental risk. Our review points to two 
prevalent accounts in this field of study – the firm-level explanation based on organisational 
risk-taking and the individual-level explanation based on managerial risk preference. Both yield 
important insights into this phenomenon. Yet the lack of an integrative framework leaves the 
question open as to why economic theory of FDI has generally received empirical support while 
individual-level of analyses conclude that managers display idiosyncratic tendencies to take 
risks (Maitland & Sammartino, 2015a; Schotter & Beamish, 2013). The former argues that 
various behavioural assumptions may be suppressed by managers’ fiduciary responsibility and 
organisational routines, so that the macro fact can be sufficiently accounted for by macro 
causality without appeals to individual actors (Greve, 2013). The latter contends that individual-
specific histories explain variation in revealed preferences and firm decision-making (Buckley, 
Devinney, & Louviere, 2007; Maitland & Sammartino, 2015b). Researchers focusing on one 
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level of analysis will find it hard to agree with those focusing on the other as to what causes 
firms’ differential risk-taking in FDI.  
 
 We bring these separate accounts together by employing the microfoundations approach 
as a meta-framework. “Microfoundation” is a suitable lens in that it focuses explicitly on micro-
level actions as a source of heterogeneity in the macro-level outcomes. In line with previous 
studies (Felin, Foss, & Ployhart, 2015), we refer to individual as “micro” or “lower-level” and 
organisation as “macro” or “higher-level”. Drawing upon behavioural decision theory, we use 
the concept of risk propensity to represent individual managers’ current tendencies to take risk 
(George, Chattopadhyay, Sitkin, & Barden, 2006; Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). Despite the long-
standing assumption of managers being risk neutral in FDI theories (Buckley & Casson, 2009), 
we posit that individual risk propensity changes and is more the result of contextual influences 
than it is of dispositional trait – i.e. one’s intrinsic risk preference. While in the studies of 
decision-making, researchers can practice infinite regress to the life history of the manager in 
search of the ultimate causes (Kish-Gephart & Campbell, 2015), our focus is to identify the 
microfoundations for the macro-level cause-effect relationship – i.e. the capabilities paradigm 
(Gavetti & Levinthal, 2004). We reformulate the relationship between firm experience and 
subsequent FDI by reference to the underlying cognitive processes at the micro level. A general 
theoretical account for FDI risk-taking is established that can be applied to any MNEs and has 
particular implications for understanding EMNEs’ behaviour. Moreover, the meta-framework of 
microfoundations suggests focusing on the aggregation principles that transfer individual 
cognition to organisation-level decisions. We therefore integrate individual-level mechanisms 
into the organisational context, and complete the logic chain flowing from firm experience 
through managerial cognition to firm FDI, leading to a comprehensive microfoundational 
framework for FDI risk-taking. Each link in this logic chain may be a promising research topic 
in its own right. Yet only when researchers can combine the study of managerial cognition with 
organisation-level theories can we resolve the tension between the current macro-level and 
micro-level approaches and a fuller understanding of FDI risk-taking emerge.  
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Table 3 Environmental risk concepts in the FDI literature 
Concept Definition Measurement Examples of empirical 
studies 
Country risk A collection of various 
aspects of risk that 
exists in the host 
country environment 
Perceived Environmental 
Uncertainty (PEU) 
(Miller, 1993; Werner, 
Brouthers, & Brouthers, 
1996) 
Agarwal and 
Ramaswami (1992); 
Brouthers (2002); 
Brouthers and Brouthers 
(2001, 2003); Cui and 
Jiang (2009); Kim and 
Hwang (1992); Tseng 
and Lee (2010) 
Institutional 
risk 
Host country risk 
arising from the under-
developed institutions, 
including regulatory 
quality, rule of law, 
control of corruption 
and political instability 
World Governance 
Indicator (WGI) 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, & 
Mastruzzi, 2009) 
Lu, Liu, Wright, and 
Filatotchev (2014); Oh 
and Oetzel (2011); 
Ramasamy, Yeung, and 
Laforet (2012); Slangen 
and Beugelsdijk (2010) 
Political risk The discretionary 
policymaking 
capacities as a result of 
insufficient checks and 
balances upon political 
actors of the host 
country 
Political Constraints 
Index (POLCON) 
(Henisz, 2000) 
Alcantara and 
Mitsuhashi (2012); 
Delios and Henisz 
(2000); Delios and 
Henisz (2003a); Delios 
and Henisz (2003b); 
Demirbag, Glaister, and 
Tatoglu (2007); Garcia-
Canal and Guillén 
(2008); Henisz and 
Delios (2004, 2001); 
Holburn and Zelner 
(2010); Slangen (2013) 
 
 This chapter contributes to the literature on FDI decision-making in two respects. First, 
we reconcile the mixed findings by organisational risk studies, and provide a theoretical lens for 
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managerial risk studies to search for the lower-level source of heterogeneity. By casting light on 
the missing role of the managers through the lens of risk-taking, we complement the 
conventional economic determinism of FDI theories. Second, we integrate the individual-level 
account of risk-taking into the organisational context in order to propose a causal mechanism 
underlying the observed relationship between firm experience and firms’ FDI risk-taking. By 
taking into account firm experience as the proximate cause of managerial cognition and the way 
in which managerial cognition transforms to firm-level decisions, this comprehensive 
framework has the potential to consolidate the current literature and resolve the tension between 
organisational risk and managerial risk research.  
 
 In Section 2, we review the extant empirical literature on risk in FDI, and discuss the 
tensions and limitations of the current approaches. In Section 3.1 and 3.2, we explore the nature 
of the risk to justify an individual-level theoretical mechanism, built on the concept of risk 
propensity drawn from behavioural decision theory. Section 3.3 describes the microfoundations 
of the dominant capabilities paradigm by reformulating the relationship between firm 
experience and FDI. This is not an alternative approach to the capabilities paradigm at another 
level of analysis, but a starting point for a holistic framework for understanding FDI risk-taking, 
which requires incorporating the social context in which FDI decisions are made. Section 4 
illustrates how individual-level mechanism may interact with organisational theories to 
aggregate to firm actions, leading to the comprehensive microfoundational framework. 
Implications for future research are discussed in Section 5, by reference to the internalisation 
theory and the Uppsala model, as well as new avenues for empirical inquiries. 
 
3.2 Risk in the FDI literature 
We review the extant empirical research that explicitly incorporates risk or uncertainty 
into theoretical development or that directly operationalises the concepts in empirical testing, or 
both, in attempts to explain FDI entry, governance and commitment decisions. We started with 
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a keyword search of “risk”, “uncertainty” and “hazard” in the abstracts to retrieve the relevant 
articles from five core IB journals (International Business Review, Journal of International 
Business Studies, Journal of International Management, Journal of World Business, and 
Management International Review) and used cross-citations to identify other papers that were 
not captured by the keyword search but fell within our sampling criteria. 93 articles are 
identified, covering the time period from 1976 to 2015 (see Appendix). We find that, 
chronologically, risk studies in IB move from aggregate analysis to firm heterogeneity and, 
most recently, shift toward managerial heterogeneity. While risk and uncertainty are used 
interchangeably, the vast majority of the studies indeed examine the role of host country 
environmental risk and align well with the “risk as propensity” concept. Tensions exist as to 
whether organisational risk-taking and managerial risk preference is the most appropriate level 
of analysis. 
 
3.2.1 Organisational risk-taking 
Early international trade research spawned aggregate analyses of FDI flows. The 
underlying theoretical logic is that country risk is viewed as one of location disadvantages that 
firms try to avoid (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). Drawing upon country-level data, the aggregate 
analyses present mixed findings. Whilst some report a negative effect of political risk on FDI 
(Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, & Siegel, 2014; Levis, 1979; Schneider & Frey, 1985), others fail 
to find a significant relationship (Asiedu, 2002; Bennett & Green, 1972; Globerman & Shapiro, 
2003; Kobrin, 1976). The inconclusive evidence runs counter to the anecdotal evidence that 
political risk is of the most concern to managers in choosing investment locations (Kobrin, 
Basek, Blank, & Palombara, 1980; Nigh, 1985). 
 
In response, IB researchers have cast the spotlight on the firms that make risky 
investments. The firm as the unit of analysis and firm-level data allow researchers to study the 
effect of risk on investment behaviours other than location choices, including entry mode, 
equity stake in subsidiary and various expansion patterns. These studies pay particular attention 
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to firms’ heterogeneous tendencies to take risks and ascribe the phenomenon to industry sector 
(Brouthers & Brouthers, 2003; Brouthers, Brouthers, & Werner, 2002) and firms’ capabilities 
(Tseng & Lee, 2010). Most notably, it is found that previous experience in risky environments 
has a positive effect on subsequent entry to risky countries (Del Sol & Kogan, 2007; Delios & 
Henisz, 2000; Delios & Henisz, 2003b; Fernández-Méndez, García-Canal, & Guillén, 2015; 
Holburn & Zelner, 2010). Researchers attribute this empirical regularity to the organisation-
level capabilities since organisational learning theory posits that economic agents and naturally, 
firms, gain informational advantages that can be redeployed in the neighbourhood of their past 
courses of action (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011; Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008).  
 
3.2.2 Managerial risk preference 
Most organisation-level studies leave open the question as to what extent observable 
characteristics of the environment can sufficiently reflect managers’ subjective perception of the 
environmental risk, which often vary with contextual factors and individual information 
processing abilities (Milliken, 1987). Risk-taking is, after all, a matter of strategic choice, and it 
is the managers who make the choice. This notion has led a number of studies to employ a more 
micro-level lens on managerial heterogeneity. International entrepreneurship (IE) researchers 
have examined the effect of managers’ risk perceptions on entry mode choices (Forlani, 
Parthasarathy, & Keaveney, 2008) and speed of internationalisation (Acedo & Jones, 2007). 
Particular attention has been paid to the way in which managers define risk and employ 
perceptual measurement scales accordingly. Kiss, Williams, and Houghton (2013), in particular, 
define internationalisation risk bias as the difference between objective risk indicators and 
managers’ subjective risk perceptions, which explains post entry international scope.  
 
Perceptual studies of risk, Henisz (2000) argues, suffer from an endogeneity issue. This 
has led follow-up studies to focus on managers’ and shareholders’ intrinsic characteristics. 
Researchers draw upon agency theory to delineate the heterogeneous risk preference of various 
groups of agents. Rather than being measured directly as an individual-level trait, risk 
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preference is inferred from firm behaviour in FDI, including equity stake in foreign subsidiaries 
(Filatotchev, Strange, Piesse, & Lien, 2007), scale and scope of internationalisation (George, 
Wiklund, & Zahra, 2005), the act of internationalisation and entry mode (Liang, Lu, & Wang, 
2012), and location choices (Strange, Filatotchev, Lien, & Piesse, 2009). Most recently, the 
level of analysis has matched up with the level of theory. Building on cognition research, 
researchers focus on the heterogeneous ways in which individual managers evaluate host 
country political risk, and how individual-level experience accounts for this heterogeneity and 
compensates for the lack of organisational routines regarding risk-taking (Maitland & 
Sammartino, 2015a). This remedies the assumption by the capabilities paradigm that individuals 
are a priori homogeneous or individual characteristics are randomly distributed (Felin & Foss, 
2005). 
 
3.2.3 Limitations of the current approaches 
 Both organisation-level and individual-level accounts have generated important insights 
and provided contingency perspectives on why some firms are less deterred by host country 
environmental risk than others, thereby unveiling a distinct source of competitive advantage for 
MNEs (Oetzel & Oh, 2014). Both suffer from limitations that have hindered theoretical 
development. Coleman’s (1990) “bathtub” model of social science explanation summarises the 
tension between the current approaches (see Figure 1). The organisation-level account, 
represented by arrow 4, is predicated on the assumption that macro mechanisms can sufficiently 
account for the macro fact to be explained, thereby attributing the differential risk-taking 
behaviour to firm capability (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2011). This is, in fact, a post hoc 
rationalisation of firms’ behaviour. Analyzing a macro-level phenomenon without direct 
evidence of its generative mechanism would inevitably leave findings open to alternative 
explanations (Felin & Foss, 2005). Although capability by definition does confer a potential 
competitive advantage, it neither is directly observed nor would necessarily be an antecedent to 
FDI decisions (Hashai & Buckley, 2014). Insufficient attention has been paid to the decision-
making process and a negligible role assigned to the decision makers. The individual-level 
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account, in contrast, is predicated on the assumption that managerial cognition is a non-trivial 
source of heterogeneity in macro outcomes and needs to be taken into account in variance 
analyses (Buckley, Devinney, & Louviere, 2007; Maitland & Sammartino, 2015a; Maitland & 
Sammartino, 2015b). Individual heterogeneity is primarily accounted for by the most proximate 
causes – personal traits and characteristics (arrow 2). This line of research lacks a coherent 
theoretical lens by which cause-effect relationship can be well explained, and the link is missing 
between individual cognition and firms’ decisions (arrow 3).  
 
Figure 2 Coleman's general model of social science explanation 
 
 
The two approaches run in parallel and each may account for some of the variance in 
the macro-level phenomenon. Unsettled is the question whether the individual-level account can 
provide a much needed causal mechanism for the observable macro-macro links. This question 
becomes particular salient when researchers seek to explain the effect of experience on FDI 
risk-taking. While the organisation-level account cannot reveal the underlying mechanism by 
which firm experience induces firm risk-taking, the individual-level account focuses only on 
how personal histories affect managerial cognition in order not to conflate firm experience with 
individual experience (Buckley, Devinney, & Louviere, 2007; Maitland & Sammartino, 2015a). 
It is also difficult for micro-level research to depict the way in which individual cognition 
contributes to firms’ strategic decisions ex post. Put differently, arrow 1 and 3 remain missing, 
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and the two approaches remain paralleled sources of heterogeneity. Researchers focusing on one 
level of analysis will come to a very different conclusion as to what is behind FDI risk-taking, 
compared to those focusing on the other. The fact that IB literature has viewed FDI risk-taking 
as one of the major competitive advantages of EMNEs makes its explanations of particular 
theoretical importance. The lack of interaction between higher-level and lower-level accounts 
has deprived the literature of the opportunity to complete the logic chain as to how firm 
experience influences FDI decisions, despite it being an enduring topic of interest in IB (Martin 
& Salomon, 2003).  
 
3.3 Risk study in IB: In Search of Microfoundations 
 We argue that, to integrate the macro and micro accounts, the first and foremost step is 
to explore the role of the managers – the lower-level vehicle by which the observed higher-level 
decisions are made. Examining how individual managers’ behavioural attitudes matter provide 
the most proximate mechanism through which organisational variables affect organisational 
decision-making. This goes beyond establishing the empirical regularity as though some 
identifiable firm characteristics would automatically lead to certain strategic decisions (Felin, 
Foss, & Ployhart, 2015).  
 
 Our microfoundations approach is built on the discussion of the nature of risk. Review 
of the literature suggests that intuitive use of the risk concept has led it to being conflated with 
various location-specific characteristics such as cultural and historical ties (Strange, Filatotchev, 
Lien, & Piesse, 2009), governance cost (Teece, 1983; Werner, Brouthers, & Brouthers, 1996) 
and management challenges (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992). An unintended consequence is 
that risk studies in IB remain remotely connected with other disciplinary literatures, particular 
on behavioural strategy, which have proposed conceptual frameworks for risk-taking strategies 
based on sound decision theories and established causal understanding using experimental 
methods (Bateman & Zeithaml, 1989; Simon, Houghton, & Aquino, 2000; Thaler & Johnson, 
 55 
 
1990). Drawing on behavioural decision theory, we describe the microfoundations of risk-taking 
in FDI, which builds on the concept of risk propensity. 
 
3.3.1 The nature of “risk” 
 In IB theory, there is a consensus that FDI decisions are made by MNE headquarters, 
who select from a discrete set of alternatives in the optimal interest of the MNEs based on a 
calculative analysis of projected revenues vis-à-vis transaction costs (Buckley & Casson, 1976). 
When investment return is known, risk should not matter (Buckley, Devinney, & Louviere, 
2007). Nevertheless, under most of the existing studies lies the risk aversion assumption in 
human nature held by neoclassical economists and agency theorists (Chiles & McMackin, 1996; 
Eisenhardt, 1989), as evidenced by the common hypothesis that country risk is negatively 
associated with foreign entry. An often unnoticed assumption in this approach is that risk is 
treated as an objective feature of the exogenous environment so that MNEs take risk as given 
and adjust the amount of resources to be committed to the specific market (Brouthers, 1995). 
While this implicit view is widely shared by previous studies, it leaves the role of managers 
negligible in the decision-making process.  
 
Subjectivity 
In strategic choices including FDI, risk involves ex-ante evaluation of future outcomes 
(Yates & Stone, 1992) and “exists in the eyes of the beholder” (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011: 
203). Under the uncertainty of disequilibrium, a location choice made to maximise risk-adjusted 
return may be judged as involving unwarrantedly high risk when assessed ex-post using country 
risk indicators developed by outside observers from a post equilibrium stance (Liesch, Welch, & 
Buckley, 2011). An immediate reflection of the subjective nature of risk is that the buyers of 
political risk insurance rarely agree on the price the issuers charge (Henisz, 2003). 
 
According to behavioural decision theory, risk arises from both the probability and the 
magnitude of loss (George, Chattopadhyay, Sitkin, & Barden, 2006; March & Shapira, 1987). 
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This definition departs from the instability of the environment per se and focuses on the adverse 
impact of environmental change on the firm. Weick (1979: 125) contends that “decision-makers 
in organisations intervene between the environment and its effects inside the organisation, 
which means that selection criteria become lodged more in the decision-makers than in the 
environment”. Managerial control over the environment constitutes the missing piece that 
previous studies of international risk have rarely considered. When managers evaluate an entry 
opportunity, they tend to rely on a biased overestimation of their own ability rather than external 
information of the unbiased performance distribution in a market (Wu & Knott, 2006). The 
predictions on the riskiness of a choice are colored by managers’ perceived ability to mitigate 
the negative consequences through reactive strategies and anticipatory plans (Bingham & 
Eisenhardt, 2011; Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011; George, Chattopadhyay, Sitkin, & Barden, 
2006; March & Shapira, 1987).  
 
Further, different managers sacrifice different alternatives at the moment of choice as 
dependent on the choice set constructed. The observation that prior decision narrows down the 
range of the choices at a later stage of the FDI decision-making process is consistent with the 
nested structure discussed in the general choice modelling literature (Louviere, Flynn, & Carson, 
2010; Tallman & Shenkar, 1994) and behavioural strategy theory (Gavetti, Greve, Levinthal, & 
Ocasio, 2012). While managers commonly employ economic thinking to screen out inefficient 
options at the consideration stage, they tend to switch to a different set of criteria and focus on 
minimizing the risk when making the final location choice among the shortlisted alternatives 
(Buckley, Devinney, & Louviere, 2007; Mudambi & Navarra, 2003). A range of individual-
level factors may influence this selection process (Schotter & Beamish, 2013), such that a risky 
option in one choice set may be the least risky one in another. Without knowing the full choice 
sets it is hard to estimate the marginal contribution of risk in the final decision. Therefore, FDI 
studies need to take into account the “risk” as it appeared in the decision-making process rather 
than in the eyes of the researchers. 
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Controllable and non-controllable risk 
In aggregate analyses of FDI, risk is entirely exogenous in that MNEs are assumed to 
respond passively to the environmental characteristics of the host countries. The organisation-
level accounts adopting the contingency perspective move one step forward to posit that, rather 
than purely assessing the environment per se, firms take into consideration their ability to enact 
a favorable firm-environment relationship and develop entry strategies in accordance (Ring et 
al., 1990). This view is also consistent with behavioural decision theorists’ focus on “control” in 
distinguishing managerial risk-taking from a gambling scenario (March & Shapira, 1987). 
Theoretically, one can draw a spectrum along which MNEs, at one extreme, passively accept all 
environmental risks as given and, at the other extreme, proactively seek to influence all risks to 
which they would be exposed. The distinction between controllable environment that cannot be 
influenced and non-controllable environment that results from firms’ influential behaviour has 
important theoretical implications (Alvarez & Barney, 2007; Weick, 1979). Conflating 
controllable and non-controllable risk has led to confusing conclusions on managers’ risk-taking 
tendencies (Wu & Knott, 2006). 
 
An illustrative example is the nature of political risk. The political institutions literature 
suggests that political risk is an endogenous variable as MNEs have “the ability to block adverse 
and/or promote favorable policy change” within the given political structure (Henisz, 2003: 
181). Firms face such an eventuality in the ex-post policy environment that the favorable terms 
negotiated at the time of entry may be altered by the host country government in an obsolescing 
bargaining scenario, so that managers have to factor their ability to guard against the 
overturning, alteration or reinterpretation of policy commitments into the entry decision 
(Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Delios & Henisz, 2003a). A common “non-market” strategy is to 
leverage the influence of the relevant political actors, the local electorate and the international 
and multilateral lending agencies (Henisz, 2000). Differential lobbying skills to engage these 
actors as a surrogate may lead the identical location to pose varying level of risk to two 
otherwise similar MNEs. However, there are other types of political risk such as societal turmoil, 
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ethnic conflict and civil warfare that result from the political dynamics between various 
branches of the government (Dai, Eden, & Beamish, 2013; Henisz, 2003). These risks arise 
when the power handover is contested via uprising by those who seek to challenge the political 
status quo, and often lead to asset seizure in the light of antiforeigner sentiment (Maitland & 
Sammartino, 2015a). Unlike the “status-quo” setting, MNEs may have little ability to forestall 
the occurrence of violence under turbulent circumstances and have to take the risk as given. 
Previous research suggests that firms respond to controllable and non-controllable risks in 
different fashion since the capacity of using insurance to hedge against exchange (non-
controllable) risk vis-à-vis policy (controllable) risk varies substantially (Henisz & Zelner, 
2010). 
 
3.3.2 Risk propensity – an integrating concept 
 Behavioural decision theorists have developed the concept of risk propensity to 
substitute for the trait approach predicated upon individual disposition (George, Chattopadhyay, 
Sitkin, & Barden, 2006; Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). Risk propensity refers to an individual’s current 
tendency to take or avoid risk (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). While individuals always hold a 
dispositional attitude toward risk-taking in general, the real tendency to take risk is 
overwhelmed by contextual factors (Sitkin & Weingart, 1995). Behavioural research proposes 
that, to economise on the scarce attention capacity, boundedly rational managers form 
simplified cognitive representations of the complex environment in decision-making (Gavetti & 
Levinthal, 2000). In a similar vein, risk propensity reflects a coherent cognitive structure, or 
“heuristics”, for dealing with a range of similar problems without reference to the details of any 
specific ones (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011). A risk situation can thus be reduced to workable 
aspects so that a rational actor would maximise her utility against the overall risk propensity – 
the weighted sum of the constituent aspects, be it controllable or non-controllable risk (March, 
1981). Thus one might show more or less tolerance for risk depending on the decision domain 
(Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002) and the specific aspect of country risk being discussed (Wu & 
Knott, 2006). A straightforward manifestation of the power of the concept of risk propensity lies 
 59 
 
in the fact that it can be used to address the persistent myth that entrepreneurs are not 
fundamentally more inclined to risk than the others (Stewart & Roth, 2001) by identifying a 
context-specific risk-seeking orientation only devoted to chasing business opportunities but not 
in other life domains (Palich & Bagby, 1995). 
 
 Behavioural research has ascribed the variation in individuals’ risk propensity to an 
array of cognitive factors (Schoemaker, 1993), the most prominent being performance feedback. 
As an integrating concept, risk propensity can accommodate competing theories that predict 
varied effect of previous performance on risk-taking. For instance, prospect theory suggests that 
framing creates a steeper utility curve on the loss side of a reference point than on the gain side 
so that poor performance may induce decision-makers to bet on the upside potential and make 
risky choices (Bateman & Zeithaml, 1989; Bazerman, 1984; Weber & Milliman, 1997). Quasi-
hedonic editing theory, in contrast, argues that prior failure in goal attainment leads decision-
makers to set lower goals and take less risk in subsequent decisions (Slattery & Ganster, 2002). 
The most pertinent explanation in the strategic decision context may be the one provided by 
managerial decision research (March & Shapira, 1987). Studies show that managers will persist 
in taking risks if prior outcomes are positive, giving rise to a sense of potency and self-serving 
attribution (Osborn & Jackson, 1988; Sitkin & Weingart, 1995). The outcome history of 
forestalling the occurrence of unfavorable scenarios and mitigating the impact on the foreign 
affiliate provides readily available evidence to managers about the extent to which their skills, 
talents and capabilities can help control the risk in this particular task (March & Shapira, 1987). 
Appearing to be a satisficing rather than an optimizing solution, the tendency to follow 
experience when constructing the choice set can be regarded as a rational process of adaptive 
learning that aims to reproduce past successes (Denrell & March, 2001; Hutzschenreuter, 
Pedersen, & Volberda, 2007), and is coined “feedback strategy” in the behavioural strategy 
literature (Greve, 2013). 
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More importantly, risk propensity can account for the subjective nature of the risk, 
which is assumed away by macro-level studies. Past successes and failures of the individual 
managers are translated into stereotypes and provide them with a frame of reference and a 
habitual way of evaluating new situations (Garud & Rappa, 1994). For example, managers’ 
experience with a particular set of entry modes serves to constitute the “consideration set” for 
subsequent entry mode decisions in order to reduce the range of mode options to be evaluated 
(Benito, Petersen, & Welch, 2009). Risk propensity can also account for the distinction between 
controllable and non-controllable risk. As prospect theory was developed in such task settings 
that odds are exogenously given, the loss aversion thesis is more likely to hold when non-
controllable, external threat is involved (Holmes, Bromiley, Devers, Holcomb, & McGuire, 
2011). Conversely, risky behaviour is more likely when managers perceive a sense of control 
over the risk in question (George, Chattopadhyay, Sitkin, & Barden, 2006). This may explain 
why previous firm-level research has found mixed results on the relationship between 
experience and risky entry (Oetzel & Oh, 2014). 
 
While an organisation-level account can only infer the mechanism from the relationship 
between two macro-level variables, individual-level theories emphasise individual actor-hood 
and specify the causal conditions for risk-taking behaviour. In the light of multiple realisation of 
a macro-level outcome, experimentation can test directly the competing hypotheses by different 
theories, and examine under what conditions any theory would prevail. To illustrate the 
usefulness of the concept, we reformulate the theoretical mechanism between experience and 
FDI using risk propensity, and show how the individual-level account can complement the 
dominant capabilities paradigm. 
 
3.3.3 Microfoundations of the capabilities paradigm 
Existing FDI studies have primarily attributed the relationship between experience and 
FDI entry into risky locations to firm-level capabilities (Fernández-Méndez, García-Canal, & 
Guillén, 2015), not least in the case of EMNEs. A typical argument is that EMNEs have honed 
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unique capabilities and expertise in dealing with poor institutional governance in the home 
country, and such capabilities are transferable to other developing countries of a similar level of 
institutional development (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Del Sol & Kogan, 2007). This is not 
an unreasonable argument from the behavioural strategy perspective since the capacity to 
perform an activity tends to improve with experience (Zollo & Winter, 2002). However, 
research shows that simply gaining experience is not sufficient for creating capability (Haleblian, 
Kim, & Rajagopalan, 2006; Hayward, 2002), and capability is not necessary for a firm to enter 
risky locations (Mitchell, Shaver, & Yeung, 1992). What is learned from experience is not 
specified by this literature, calling for a micro-level explanation of what underpins the observed 
decisions (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011; Bingham, Eisenhardt, & Furr, 2007). 
 
The search for microfoundations is particularly germane when the decision context 
changes. Cognition research suggests that individuals’ performance of mental activities depends 
on their training and experience in the same task domain (Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996). As 
MNEs move from one country to another, the link between experience and capability may 
become tenuous. The specificity of a firm’s routines hinders deployment of the existing 
capabilities outside its current geographic markets (Powell & Rhee, 2015). For MNEs, the 
inherited knowledge and home country imprint cannot always transfer to other similar markets 
(Giarratana & Torrisi, 2010), and experience of engaging with local stakeholders does not 
automatically lead to expertise in political hazard assessment (Maitland & Sammartino, 2015a). 
Experimental evidence suggests that even when we impose a utility maximisation model on 
managerial decision-making, the behavioural postulate – i.e. experience affects risk-taking – is 
still evident (Buckley, Devinney, & Louviere, 2007). If it is not capability, what induces the 
risky decisions? 
 
Microfoundations research suggests that individual cognition poses a non-trivial source 
of heterogeneity for firm behaviour. Individuals’ mental representations shape decision 
heuristics concerning what informational cues are indicative of risk, where to find that 
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information, and what constitute the evaluation criteria for interpreting the information 
(Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011; Bingham, Eisenhardt, & Furr, 2007), so that managers adopting 
different heuristics to search for and analyze information would hold a higher or lower 
estimation of the probability of loss associated with investing in a given project. When the 
context changes and information is ambiguous, boundedly rational managers naturally employ 
analogical reasoning to extrapolate from their existing knowledge by making assumptions 
beyond what is firmly known (Jones & Casulli, 2014; Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997), in order to 
anticipate roughly the consequences of the alternative courses of action (Gavetti, Levinthal, & 
Rivkin, 2005). The complexity of the individuals’ mental representations, in terms of the 
number of causal actors, linkages and their directions, is a function of individuals’ context-
specific experience (Maitland & Sammartino, 2015a; Maitland & Sammartino, 2015b). Whether 
managers can generalise their experience to another context depends on the nature of the risk. 
When managers have successful experience of dealing with the power structures and institutions 
similar to those in a particular host country, they place strong belief in their foresight related to 
identifying the pitfalls associated with regulations and contracting at the time of deal negotiation 
and also in their precautionary strategies, including partnering with certain stakeholders, that 
can best block adverse policy changes and remove the firm’s image of being an exploiter (Ring, 
Lenway, & Govekar, 1990). The sense of confidence may be further amplified by social praise 
for managerial success and prowess (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011; Hayward & Hambrick, 
1997; Hayward, Rindova, & Pollock, 2004; Li & Tang, 2013). In contrast, the experience with 
non-controllable risk is less of a cue to managers about their ability to control the risk and thus 
hardly transfers to other contexts (Oetzel & Oh, 2014). This explains the macro-level puzzle as 
to why experience has varying influence on MNEs’ responses to controllable political risk and 
non-controllable macroeconomic turbulence of the host country (Garcia-Canal & Guillén, 2008). 
 
However, analogical reasoning is not necessarily compatible with the capability 
argument for two reasons. First, the capabilities paradigm rightly points out that the usefulness 
of firms’ prior experience hinges on the degree of structural commonality shared by two 
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contexts (Delios & Henisz, 2003b; Li, Qian, & Yao, 2015; Padmanabhan & Cho, 1999), e.g. 
regulatory environment (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Perkins, 2014) and cultural similarity (Hong & 
Lee, 2015). When the commonality is only superficial, managers’ foresight resulting from 
analogical reasoning could be misleading (Miller & Ireland, 2005; O'Grady & Lane, 1996). For 
example, Heidenreich, Mohr, and Puck (2015) find that managers tend to be overconfident 
about their ability to mitigate institutional uncertainty regarding a developing country market as 
they believe – based on prior experience in a developed country – that certain political strategies 
should work in their favor. This illusion of control over the environment induces managers to 
underestimate the external threats and drives an unwarrantedly risky entry decision. This is 
particularly prevalent when the new environment does not provide clear-cut information on the 
efficacy of the actions (Gavetti, Greve, Levinthal, & Ocasio, 2012) and when an individual is 
deeply committed to an old domain (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015). Second, the risk propensity based 
on previous experience may itself be unwarranted. The assumed capability underlying the risk-
taking tendency could be a result of self-serving bias and superstitious learning (Zollo, 2009), 
which prompt managers to rely on semi-automatic processing and prevent them from attending 
to the unique characteristics of the focal context (Castellaneta & Zollo, 2015). In these cases, 
experience is not translated into capability or competitive advantage, yet still induces managers 
to make risky FDI decisions.  
 
Following this logic, we can reformulate the argument underlying EMNEs’ entry into 
other risky countries. Since home country institutions shape managers’ mental models, EMNE 
managers are more tolerant of the risk that contracts may not be enforceable, compared to MNE 
managers from developed countries where enforceable contracts are the norm (Hoskisson, Eden, 
Lau, & Wright, 2000). The tendency to look at a novel environment through the lens of a 
domestic mindset is strengthened when the novel environment features noisy information 
(Nadkarni, Herrmann, & Perez, 2011; Nadkarni & Perez, 2007) and when managers have an 
emotional attachment to successful past strategies (Gavetti, 2012). Compared to MNE managers, 
it is more difficult for EMNE managers, who in general have a shorter history of international 
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venturing, to counter this tendency and adopt solutions that violate the domestic mindset 
(Contractor, 2013). Ceteris paribus, EMNE managers are more likely to opt for those countries 
where the local market institutions fit with their domestic mindsets. These countries are often 
rated as risky by institutional risk or political risk indices.  
 
However, this is not to deny that EMNEs may have a home-country-based advantage. 
As emerging markets see constant and rapid evolution of competitive and regulatory conditions, 
EMNE managers have been required to attend regularly to the environmental changes for 
emerging opportunities (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015) and to the threats brought by certain 
institutions – institutions commonly featured in emerging countries in general (Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2006; Ramos & Ashby, 2013). Managerial attention, their interpretations of environmental cues, 
and responsiveness to institutional changes drive firms’ tendency to act on opportunities in other 
similar fast-growing markets (Dau, 2012; Del Sol & Kogan, 2007). This tendency may be 
further reinforced by a self-serving attribution of the positive home country performance, which 
is likely to be driven by the pro-market reform rather than the internal skills (Cuervo-Cazurra & 
Dau, 2009). In contrast, managers from developed countries are bounded by their ability to 
overcome the behavioural failures that prevent them from sensing cognitively distant 
opportunities conditioned by a different set of institutions from what they are familiar with 
(Gavetti, 2012). That said, while this superior cognitive capability of information search and 
processing may be a source of advantage that helps EMNEs tap into the growing developing 
country markets, it may not necessarily guarantee better performance of the firm. 
 
3.4 A Microfoundational Framework of Risk-taking in FDI 
 While employing the concept of managerial risk propensity can yield insights into the 
behavioural foundation of the firm-level internationalisation, the microfoundations approach 
needs to go beyond assigning explanatory primacy to individual attitude and preference (Barney 
& Felin, 2013). It is likely that managers’ preference accounts for a non-trivial portion of the 
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variance in firms’ internationalisation behaviour (Hutzschenreuter, Pedersen, & Volberda, 2007). 
Yet question remains as to whether the nature of the borrowed concept and its associated micro-
level mechanism would change when applied to a specific social context (Felin, Foss, & 
Ployhart, 2015). Behavioural strategy literature draws simple analogy between organisational 
routines and individuals’ mental representations in that history is retrieved as representation and 
patterns by individuals and as routines by organisations (Levitt & March, 1988). In the IB 
context, the way in which managerial cognition influences firms’ FDI decisions is, more often 
than not, assumed rather than theorised (Aharoni, Tihanyi, & Connelly, 2011). Confusion arises 
as to whether individuals’ cognitive capability and “mindfulness” (Levinthal & Rerup, 2006) 
remain a significant explanation in the organisational context (Gavetti, 2012). Although the risk 
propensity concept we draw upon has been tested in various managerial task settings (e.g., 
Sitkin & Weingart, 1995), a complete microfoundational framework would require the 
understanding of aggregation principles specific to the focal social context – i.e. how 
individuals’ risk propensity transforms to organisational risk-taking decisions. 
 
 On the manager’s side, a straightforward principle concerns how top managers 
formalise, legitimise, and alter decision rules at the organisation level. Individual decision 
heuristics imply a degree of codification and mindfulness (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011). 
Shared cognition is interpersonally negotiated in cases lacking the informational basis for 
foresight (Garud & Rappa, 1994). Transferring individual heuristics to organisation-level 
decision rules requires managers to convince other internal stakeholders of the efficacy of the 
personal heuristics and change their worldviews when meeting resistance (Gavetti, 2012). Skills 
are needed to persuade stakeholders that the opportunity presented falls into a specific mental 
representation as per experience. The manager’s cognitive capability of influencing others’ 
mental representations creates an important source of heterogeneity in organisation-level 
decisions. This capability may be of less importance in some organisational structures – for 
example in firms controlled by owner-managers. 
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On the organisation’s side, the aggregation is hardly a linear function of its top 
managers’ characteristics and backgrounds. Organisational context may both amplify and 
suppress the effect of individual cognition. Psychology research suggests that social interaction 
narrows the scope of cognitive thinking and analogy and thereby reduces the productivity of 
group discussion (Diehl & Stroebe, 1991). Diversity of beliefs among the top management team 
(TMT) may further hamper decision comprehensiveness and extensiveness (Miller, Burke, & 
Glick, 1998). Moreover, the social context of the corporate elite commonly sees managers 
engage in flattery and opinion conformity toward CEOs who have high social status in order to 
advance personal interests. This tendency amplifies CEOs’ overconfidence about the efficacy of 
their past actions in strategic decision-making (Park, Westphal, & Stern, 2011). In contrast, 
firm-level monitoring arrangements are often put in place to override cognitive biases and align 
managerial behaviour to shareholders’ interests. Monitoring is set to initiate controlled mental 
processing and a reality check on managers’ personal beliefs as to the similarity of the focal 
context to previous ones and the validity of their self-serving attribution. A prominent 
monitoring arrangement is the board. CEO’s power over the board determines the extent to 
which individual preference transfers to organisation-level decisions. Research shows that when 
performance declines, board of directors will increase their attention toward monitoring the 
CEO’s behaviour while CEO duality reduces this tendency (Tuggle, Sirmon, Reutzel, & 
Bierman, 2010). 
 
Aggregation does not just include checks and balances at the boardroom. On the one 
hand, conflict between organisational members arises when the manager insists that heuristic 
processing is necessary and effective in such strategic decision situations that information is 
ambiguous and time is pressing (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015). The transition from lower-level to 
higher-level is thus complicated by the circulation of power and political coalition within the 
organisation. Outcome history not only affects managers’ risk propensity but also alters the 
distribution of power and influence among the members of the decision group. In the case of 
performance shortfall, the CEO’s power will be contested by other senior management who 
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seeks to redefine the firm’s strategic agenda (Zhang, 2006). On the other hand, aggregation 
principles are not necessarily nested at the top management or board level. Travelling managers’ 
personal preferences, particularly based on experience of inconvenience in previous trips, may 
affect the investment location shortlist by shaping the way in which the advantages and 
disadvantages of potential sites are compiled and communicated to other organisational 
members (Schotter & Beamish, 2013; Welch, Welch, & Worm, 2007). This results in a different 
range of choice sets presented to top managers, which eventually contributes to the variance in 
the final decision.  
 
Figure 3 A meta-framework for understanding FDI risk-taking 
 
Adapted from Coleman (1990) 
 
Figure 2 summarises the microfoundational framework of risk-taking in FDI. While the 
capabilities paradigm links the macro-level variables and organisational actions (arrow 1), the 
microfoundational framework (arrows 2–3) poses an alternative explanation based on 
individual-level cognition and risk propensity underlying the observed empirical regularity. 
Section 3.3 explicated how firm experience influences managerial cognition (arrow 2), which in 
turn accounts for the heterogeneity in firms’ FDI entry into risky locations. Section 4 
complements this account by delineating the potential dynamics through which individual 
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managers’ cognition may aggregate to organisation-level decision-making. This seeks to open 
the black box of the micro-macro link (arrow 3), and does not undermine the value of 
individual-level concepts and mechanisms (Felin & Foss, 2005). As with any scientific inquiry, 
the microfoundations research needs to be built on well-specified initial conditions (Barney & 
Felin, 2013). The individual is a natural initial condition in the studies of decision-making since 
the way in which individuals collect and process information guides the construction of choice 
sets among which the final decision is made. This is undoubtedly crucial in the light of 
increased CEO effect and manager fixed effects on firms’ investment behaviour and 
performance (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Quigley & Hambrick, 2015). With arrow 3 in place, the 
individual-level account is no longer a mere source of heterogeneity but an indispensable 
mechanism in theorizing about the macro outcomes.” 
 
3.5 Implications for Future Research 
3.5.1 Microfoundations and FDI theories  
 Major FDI theories have been criticised for the lack of microfoundations (Aharoni, 
Tihanyi, & Connelly, 2011). Both internalisation theory and the Uppsala model are founded on 
the static assumption of managerial risk preference in search of parsimonious theory building 
while downplaying the implications of variable risk preference. Given that both theories are 
essentially theories of managerial choice (Chiles & McMackin, 1996; Johanson & Vahlne, 
1977), the search of microfoundations may benefit them in meaningful ways. We briefly 
illustrate how the microfoundational perspective based on risk propensity alters their prediction 
on entry mode and location choice. 
 
Internalisation theory 
Internalisation theory views the firm as a stylised decision maker who makes the choice 
on organisational boundary while taking individuals’ preferences and attitudes as given 
(Buckley & Casson, 1976, 2009). Nevertheless, Chiles and McMackin (1996) highlight the role 
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of managers who make the decision and argue that there are other behavioural bases for 
managerial actions that may interact with the economic rationality of cost minimisation. Others 
have explicitly called for relaxing the assumption of risk neutrality to enhance the validity of the 
theory in predicting the governance structure of MNEs (Buckley & Strange, 2011). Managers’ 
risk preference may shift the switch point of asset specificity level at which hierarchical 
structure will be preferred. Yet in the FDI literature, little is known as to how managers’ risk 
preference vary. Behavioural research on risk propensity effectively links experience with 
governance structure to provide an ex-ante predictor for boundary choice. 
 
The difference between controllable risk and non-controllable risk suggests that not all 
experience can have an influence on risk propensity. Experience with natural disaster, 
technological failure and terrorist attack does not moderate the negative impact of such risk on 
subsequent foreign entry (Oetzel & Oh, 2014). For those who have beaten the odds in the past, 
successful passive response to non-controllable risk may be attributed to luck rather than 
competence (Clapham & Schwenk, 1991). One implication for internalisation theory is that the 
influence of experience on hierarchical structure vs. external market may be asymmetrical. 
Positive experience of partnerships, including joint venture, alliance and even low-integration 
acquisition can transfer from one of these contexts to another (Zollo & Reuer, 2010) so as to 
increase managers’ tendency to take contractual risk, whereas dealing with non-controllable risk 
for wholly owned subsidiary does not encourage managers to take a similar risk in another 
country (Oetzel & Oh, 2014). As experience spillover is more commonly observed in 
partnerships, the breadth and heterogeneity of previous experience may be particularly relevant 
to contractual governance as opposed to hierarchical control (Jiménez, Luis-Rico, & Benito-
Osorio, 2014; Powell & Rhee, 2015; Reuer, Park, & Zollo, 2002), leading economic 
determinism to be less accurate in predicting international cooperative venture formation 
(Hennart & Slangen, 2015; Tallman & Shenkar, 1994). In contrast, when non-controllable risks 
associated with market demand and macroeconomic turbulence become the dominant form of 
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risk in an FDI decision, internalisation theory is likely to remain a robust explanatory 
framework. 
 
The Uppsala model 
The Uppsala model claims that managers are risk averse and have an inherently low 
level of maximum tolerable risk, which serves as the behavioural base for cautious, stepwise 
internationalisation patterns, in terms of both location and entry mode choice (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1977). All else being equal, host country experience reduces liabilities of foreignness 
and enhances the probability of survival (Zaheer, 1995) whilst general international experience 
creates organisational routines, procedures and structures for cross-border venturing (Eriksson, 
Johanson, Majkgard, & Sharma, 1997). Both experiences encourage risk-averse managers to 
increase foreign market commitment (Johanson & Vahlne, 1990). However, behavioural 
research shows that managers’ tendency to take risk is a dynamic concept and a function of 
outcome history. As a descriptive theory, the Uppsala model should take into account variable 
risk preference, and examine what leads some managers to be more or less averse to risk than 
others, and how empirical anomalies can be accommodated in this view. 
 
 Risk propensity suggests that managers are not uniformly averse to all type of risk at the 
start of the internationalisation process (Wu & Knott, 2006). MNEs can trade off one aspect of 
international risk against another while keeping the overall risk profile under control (Miller, 
1992). Shrader, Oviatt, and McDougall (2000) find that small firms, often reflecting the lead 
entrepreneurs’ behavioural tendencies, are able to achieve accelerated internationalisation in the 
absence of significant network resources by balancing out the risks of the country entered, the 
mode of entry used, and the proportion of total firm revenue exposed to the risks of that country. 
Following this logic, managers with successful inward internationalisation experience – e.g. 
partnering up with foreign investors in the home country – may be less averse to contractual or 
dissemination risk so that they are more inclined to venture into distant locations and balance 
the overall project risk by means of joint venture entry, compared to inexperienced managers. 
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Moreover, EMNE managers with successful domestic internationalisation experience – i.e. 
venturing into the heterogeneous regional markets within the national border (Wiedersheim-
Paul, Olson, & Welch, 1978) – may be less deterred by political and regulatory risks when 
expanding to another developing country. These microfoundational mechanisms rested on home 
country experience provide alternative but well-founded explanations for the empirical 
anomalies to the model prediction, which so far have been partly attributed to firms’ 
entrepreneurial orientation and entrepreneurs’ intrinsic risk seeking preference (Oviatt & 
McDougall, 2005b). Moreover, performance feedback in certain host countries and 
organisational performance pressure may induce managers to reverse the progressive 
internationalisation (Garcia-Canal & Guillén, 2008). It is reasonable to expect the proposed 
learning process to be more complicated and flexible when managers’ cognitive processes, 
abilities and biases are accounted for (Petersen, Pedersen, & Lyles, 2008; Zollo, 2009). 
 
3.5.2 Directions for empirical research 
 Current individual-level research agendas are driven by the contention that individual 
cognition accounts for a non-trivial portion of the variance in organisations’ decisions. While 
this is by all means a valid claim, research is predicated on the automatic reflection of lower-
level actions in higher-level outcomes. We call for more process research for two reasons. 
Firstly, cognition is essentially a process – a process of attending, remembering and reasoning 
(Helfat & Peteraf, 2015). Much of the heterogeneity occurs through different stages of this 
process. For example, when it is documented that outcome history influences risk propensity, 
what dimension of performance managers attend to is less clear. The attention-based view 
points to the plurality of goals (Ocasio, 1997), and a variety of performance metrics are 
considered relevant by different managers (Richard, Devinney, Yip, & Johnson, 2009). 
Moreover, multiple realisation is possible – meaning that different combinations of two or more 
accounts can lead to the same organisation-level outcome (Greve, 2013). The positive 
relationship between experience and imitative behaviour may be due to ritualistic response, 
local search or performance-driven adaption (Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002; Zollo, 2009). Each 
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is an internally consistent account at the individual level. Experimental design is required to 
examine the competing explanations of risk-taking behaviour in FDI so as to identify how they 
interact and under what conditions any of them would prevail (Devinney, 2013). Secondly, 
aggregating individual-level cognition to group-level decisions requires in-depth investigations 
into the decision process. In cases lacking direct evidence of this process, the debate over the 
preferred level of analysis for behavioural strategies can never be settled (Greve, 2013). The 
process of social interaction within the decision-making group, of communicating the 
attribution of previous performance and of persuading other internal stakeholders is of much 
importance in and of itself, and can hardly be revealed by a correlational analysis. For instance, 
the shifting of attention among performance metrics has direct implications for risk propensity, 
and is a dynamic process to be captured only by longitudinal observations. 
 
3.6 Conclusions 
Explaining FDI has been the central inquiry of IB research for decades and risk and 
uncertainty are widely regarded as key determinants by researchers. In this chapter, we draw 
attention to the extant empirical studies and seek to provide an alternative theorisation. We 
conclude that a microfoundational perspective can advance the studies of international risk and 
contribute to the understanding of FDI. 
 
Taking up the call by previous researchers to reconsider risk and uncertainty for IB 
inquiries (Liesch, Welch, & Buckley, 2011), we review the way in which IB scholars use ex-
ante risk to explain FDI decisions. Two dominant approaches are identified – i.e. organisational 
risk-taking and managerial risk preference – through which the current knowledge on FDI risk-
taking is generated. The organisation-level approach suggests that MNEs’ responses to host 
country risk vary depending on their experience, which essentially reflects varying level of firm 
capability. This explanation dominates the current debate as to why EMNEs can internationalise 
in the absence of conventional firm-specific resources (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011). The individual-
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level approach suggests that managers’ traits and characteristics including personal history 
shape their cognition, which account for a significant portion of variance in the firms’ FDI 
decisions. Despite the numerous insights they yield, both approaches draw heavily on post hoc 
rationalisation of firms’ behaviour. The organisation-level account is open to many alternative 
explanations whereas the individual-level account does not unveil the theoretical mechanisms 
underlying the link between macro variables.  
 
In response, we draw upon the meta-framework of microfoundations to reformulate the 
theoretical relationship between firm experience and risk-taking. The first step is to recognise 
the importance of the managers as the most proximate cause of firm decisions. Despite some 
scholars’ persistent calls, individual-level research is still under-represented in IB (Aharoni, 
Tihanyi, & Connelly, 2011; Buckley, Devinney, & Louviere, 2007; Maitland & Sammartino, 
2015b). We argue that the individual-level account is particularly necessary in the studies of 
FDI risk-taking since country risk or political risk indicators do not account for the fact that 
managers hold heterogeneous probability distributions of future outcomes as a result of their 
divergent perceived ability to control the risk. Recent research on managerial mental 
representation has recognised the contribution of individual cognition to FDI decisions 
(Maitland & Sammartino, 2015b; Williams & Grégoire, 2015). However, theory is lacking in 
depicting the micro-level mechanism. To address this problem, we employ the concept of risk 
propensity to delineate how contextual variables and particularly experience influence 
individual managers’ risk-taking tendency. Cognition research has proposed competing theories 
and established valid evidence on the causal effect of experience on risk propensity. The effect 
is most significant when the experience involves performance feedback in the same decision 
context and the risk situation is subject to managerial control rather than being strictly 
exogenous (Bateman & Zeithaml, 1989; Osborn & Jackson, 1988; Sitkin & Weingart, 1995). 
Interpretation of prior experiences as to how effective the coping mechanisms used would be in 
a given institutional environment underpins the change in risk propensity and leads to the 
imitation of previous actions when entering a new country (Henisz, 2003; Tallman, 1992). 
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Individual-level overconfidence and erroneous generalisation of experience are well 
documented in the literature, and may serve as microfoundations for the observed regularity 
between organisation-level collectives, which so far has been accounted for by the capabilities 
paradigm at the macro-level. We also show that nesting the relationship between experience and 
risky FDI at the individual-level does not necessarily rule out EMNEs’ unique advantages 
compared to their developed country counterparts when investing abroad. 
 
Although behavioural decision theory provides much needed guidance for the inquiry 
into FDI risk-taking, it does not explicate to what extent and how managerial cognition 
contributes to firm-level strategic decisions. The microfoundational framework calls for a 
dedicated account as to how the lower-level account aggregates to higher-level outcome in a 
specific social context. Given the idiosyncratic experience at the individual-level, the simplest 
aggregation principle would be to weight each TMT member’s personal experience 
(Athanassiou & Nigh, 2002). Yet it begs the question why individuals are found to have all sorts 
of biases while the economic theory based on rationality seems still supported by the data. We 
seek to complete the logic chain from firm experience through managerial cognition to firm 
decisions by incorporating micro-macro transitional processes into our framework. For example, 
the power dynamics at the top management level determine the extent to which individual 
preferences and beliefs can transfer to the organisational decisions. In other words, group 
decision-making is not necessarily less biased. Even if group decision-making in the boardroom 
can effectively alleviate calculus flaw in the final decision, the information input to that calculus 
is often collected by frontline managers that carry cultural biases and self-interests motivations. 
This is particularly prevalent in MNEs’ decision-making since location evaluation would 
inevitably require travels and the travelling managers can intervene organisational decisions at 
the early stage by filtering out the locations they dislike (Schotter & Beamish, 2013). 
 
Early research explicitly recognises that internationalisation decision-making is as much 
of a behavioural process influenced by managers’ preferences and attitudes to risk-taking as it is 
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of rational calculation (Aharoni, Tihanyi, & Connelly, 2011; Reid, 1981). However, the 
resource-based view and the capabilities paradigm have directed researchers’ attention away 
from micro-level mechanisms. It is our hope that the recent cognition research on FDI and the 
microfoundations approach can ignite the interest in the managerial processes underlying MNEs’ 
global expansion. 
 
In the following chapter, we build upon our microfoundational framework and the 
associated theoretical mechanisms, and focus on the link between firm experience and 
managerial cognition. Specifically, we examine whether risk propensity can be tested 
empirically and improve our understanding of FDI location choice. Drawing upon discrete 
choice method, we elicit from a group of Chinese managers their preferences for controllable 
and non-controllable risks associated with potential investment locations. Particular attention is 
paid to the heterogeneity among managers in their risk propensity and to unveiling how 
contextual variables include domestic experience and firm characteristics account for this 
heterogeneity. The individual-level research methods allow us to provide the first evidence on 
the cognition based lower-level mechanism we have proposed in this chapter. 
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4 RISK PROPENSITY IN THE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
LOCATION DECISION 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Foreign direct investment is inherently risky because changes in the political, 
institutional, economic, and social environment in foreign countries may engender a loss of 
profits or assets (Cosset & Roy, 1991) and reduce the chance of survival (Mitchell, Shaver, & 
Yeung, 1992). Although previous research on entry strategy finds consistent evidence that 
MNEs tend to avoid the exposure to countries with significant international risk – particularly 
institution-related risk (Delios & Henisz, 2000; Delios & Henisz, 2003b), foreign investment 
into high-risk countries has been growing more rapidly than ever (Feinberg & Gupta, 2009). 
Nevertheless, conventional FDI theory is built on calculative, economic thinking that assumes 
managers are risk-neutral, and only comparative returns of location options matter (Buckley & 
Strange, 2011). FDI research has paid significantly more attention to location advantages, 
revolving around the economic implications of a range of host country environment attributes 
(Buckley, Devinney, & Louviere, 2007), while largely bypassing the study of international risk 
(Strange, Filatotchev, Lien, & Piesse, 2009). 
 
Recent literature on FDI shows a resurgent interest in explaining MNEs’ expansion into 
high-risk countries (Driffield, Jones, & Crotty, 2013). Firms with considerable experience in 
high-risk countries are shown to accommodate institution-related risks better in subsequent 
entries (Delios & Henisz, 2003a; Delios & Henisz, 2003b). Using the concept of “firm 
capability” and “organisational learning”, this literature has made important contributions to our 
understanding of the relationship between firm experience and FDI location choice (Jiménez, 
Luis-Rico, & Benito-Osorio, 2014; Lu, Liu, Wright, & Filatotchev, 2014). In particular, the 
expansion of EMNEs into high-risk countries has been attributed to the political capabilities 
nurtured in the home country where firms have to cope with underdeveloped institutions 
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(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Del Sol & Kogan, 2007; Holburn & 
Zelner, 2010). 
 
However, it is managers who ultimately make the strategic decisions while the firm-
level theorisation of high-risk location choice inevitably leaves little room for managers’ nature, 
abilities, propensities and heterogeneity – the microfoundation of firm strategy (Felin & Foss, 
2005). Both organisational learning theory and cognitive research argue that managers’ views 
on the applicability of previous experience and capability in the focal context play a role in the 
way they make strategic decisions (Gavetti, Levinthal, & Rivkin, 2005; Jones & Casulli, 2014; 
Williams & Grégoire, 2015). What also matters is how managerial preference evolve as a 
function of previous experience (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011; Garcia-Canal & Guillén, 2008; 
Maitland & Sammartino, 2015a; Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). Managers should therefore be seen as a 
source of variance in firms’ FDI decisions, rather than to “discuss the actions of firms without 
recourse to the vehicle by which those actions are decided” (Devinney, 2011: 64).  
 
The managerial role in extant internationalisation theories is primarily accounted for by 
a simplifying assumption about their risk preference. The Uppsala model of the 
internationalisation process claims that managers are risk-averse and have an inherently low 
level of maximum tolerable risk (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977), whilst international 
entrepreneurship (IE) researchers contend that managers of international new ventures are 
inherently risk-seekers (McDougall & Oviatt, 2000; Oviatt & McDougall, 1994). Both schools 
seem to infer the ex-ante influence of risk on foreign investment decision making from ex-post, 
after-equilibrium firm behaviour (Liesch, Welch, & Buckley, 2011). Hence, problems arise as 
managerial preference may not conform to the logic and structures that researchers impose on 
the observed strategies. To address the tension between IB scholars’ intrinsic interest in the role 
of risk in MNEs’ decision processes and the common ex-post measurement of risk (Belderbos, 
Tong, & Wu, 2014; Reuer & Leiblein, 2000; Tong & Reuer, 2007), we borrow the concept of 
risk propensity from behavioural decision research (Pablo, Sitkin, & Jemison, 1996; Sitkin & 
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Pablo, 1992; Sitkin & Weingart, 1995). Risk propensity refers to an individual’s current 
tendency to take specific risks as a function of previous experience and other contextual 
variables. Unlike dispositional risk preference, risk propensity reflects unobservable learning 
and cognitive process. Managers’ own interpretation of experiential learning induces them to 
deploy their knowledge in other host countries with similar characteristics and select investment 
locations that would appear unwarrantedly risky to the researchers (Perkins, 2014). In this 
chapter, we examine the heterogeneity of managers’ risk propensity in location choice using 
quasi-experimentation on top managers. To contrast with the existing literature on EMNEs’ 
domestic learning, we choose emerging country as the primary research setting and focus 
specifically on Chinese private manufacturing firms. 
 
We contribute to the literature on location choice in three respects. First, by delineating 
individual level variation among managers, we move beyond the calculative, rational-actor 
perspective assumed by economic theories (Devinney, 2011). Even when managers are assumed 
to be utility maximisers, there is latent preference heterogeneity unobservable in previous 
economic analyses based on singular models (Chung & Alcacer, 2002). Thus, we complement 
current location research with a theoretical mechanism of managerial preference (Schotter & 
Beamish, 2013), which channels the effect of economic and institutional factors (Kang & Jiang, 
2012; Staw, 1991). In addition, managers are found to place varying weights on controllable 
versus non-controllable environmental characteristics. The various aspects of international risk 
provide a distinct case for IB scholars to contribute back to the behavioural decision theory in 
which risk is mostly a monolithic concept (Pablo, Sitkin, & Jemison, 1996; Sitkin & Weingart, 
1995). 
 
Second, we address a neglected weakness in FDI theories. Current theories presume that 
individual managers hold a stable and unchanging attitude toward risk-taking (Buckley & 
Strange, 2011), and this static preference guides the way firms select investment locations given 
the external environment (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Oviatt & McDougall, 1994). While 
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previous studies made tentative inferences about the dynamic nature of managerial risk aversion 
(Garcia-Canal & Guillén, 2008), we extend this by directly examining managers’ ex-ante views 
on risk, i.e. risk propensity. We show that experimentation provides a unique method for testing 
risk propensity – as reflected in the utility parameter – to complement the ex-post downside risk 
measure (Miller & Leiblein, 1996; Mudambi & Swift, 2014). Our evidence suggests that 
perceived past success rather than the familiar notion of the stock of international experience 
leads to heterogeneity in managers’ risk propensity as regards FDI location choice. We 
complement the organisational learning literature on how managerial preference evolves as 
influenced by experience-based heuristics (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011; Maitland & 
Sammartino, 2015a). Further, the concept of risk propensity allows us to provide an alternative 
test for the effect of firm-level contextual variables such as slack on ex-ante risk-taking. We 
contribute to the slack literature by clarifying its facilitating role in taking on non-controllable 
risk as opposed to controllable risk. 
 
Third, we contribute to the growing literature on EMNEs’ foreign expansion. Extant 
research argues that EMNEs, having experienced weak institutions do not shy away from 
foreign countries with substantial institutional risks (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011; Cuervo-Cazurra & 
Genc, 2011; Holburn & Zelner, 2010). However, we find that managers view the institutional 
environment as composed of different aspects and the alleged learning effect derived from home 
country experience is not consistent across these aspects. Domestic learning may attenuate 
managers’ propensity to avoid one type of institutional risk but accentuate another, depending 
on the risk being controllable as against non-controllable. The finding extends previous studies 
that tend to overgeneralise the role of institutional embeddedness in propelling expansion to 
high-risk countries. The behavioural perspective we adopt enriches the extant research on the 
role of home country institutions in facilitating Chinese firms’ outward FDI, which has 
primarily revolved around government support (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Luo, Xue, & Han, 2010) or 
advancement in market-supporting formal rules (Sun, Peng, Lee, & Tan, 2014). Further, by 
distinguishing between controllable and non-controllable risk, we test the boundary of prospect 
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theory in the context of managerial decision making. As prospect theory was developed in such 
task settings that odds are exogenously given, the loss aversion thesis is more likely to hold 
when non-controllable, external threat is involved (Holmes, Bromiley, Devers, Holcomb, & 
McGuire, 2011). Conversely risky behaviour is more likely when managers perceive a sense of 
control over the risk in question (George, Chattopadhyay, Sitkin, & Barden, 2006).  
 
The next section summarises the theories that IB scholars employ to explain the effect 
of experience on high-risk FDI behaviour, and points out how the individual level theorisation 
can complement the firm-level, capability-based view by taking into account managers’ own 
interpretation of information and ex-ante view on risk. We then introduce the concept of risk 
propensity that can integrate the streams of individual level perspectives and establish the 
theoretical link between contextual variables and FDI risk-taking. On that basis, we hypothesise 
why managers may vary in their views on risk and attribute the latent heterogeneity to home 
country learning and the firm’s potential slack. The conclusion and discussion section 
emphasises how our study sheds new light on FDI location research. 
 
4.2 Literature Review 
4.2.1 Organisational learning theory 
Organisational learning theory proposes that experience is the primary source for 
acquiring new knowledge (Huber, 1991) and the key path through which capabilities can be 
developed (Fiol & Lyles, 1985). Direct experience confers on organisational members the 
knowledge of action-outcome relationships and of the environmental impact on this relationship 
(Duncan & Weiss, 1979). Drawing upon the learning perspective, IB scholars have developed 
the Uppsala model and the knowledge-based view to examine the interplay between experience, 
knowledge and internationalisation behaviour (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Kogut & Zander, 
1993). It is posited that international experience facilitates the acquisition of tacit knowledge 
about foreign markets and the process of cross-border operations, thereby reducing the 
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perceived risk of further expansions (Delios & Henisz, 2000). This argument provides the 
theoretical reasoning underlying the relationship between experience and high-risk FDI. 
However, it begs the question whether knowledge transfer is bounded by national borders 
(Nadolska & Barkema, 2007). The general international experience accumulated across 
countries is not always useful in subsequent investment (Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996). 
Eriksson, Johanson, Majkgard, and Sharma (1997) propose that different types of knowledge 
are sourced from different types of experience. An overarching premise is that learning 
effectiveness depends on the relevance of specific experiences (Delios & Henisz, 2003b; 
Maitland & Sammartino, 2015a; Perkins, 2014). In the FDI context, its relevance is often 
associated with cultural values as the perceived fungibility of experience is determined by the 
cultural similarity between home and host countries as well as between previous and the current 
focal host countries (Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996; Hong & Lee, 2015). 
 
Recent IB research has focused on the institutional environment since firms’ ability to 
grapple with weak institutions is considered an important ownership advantage for success in 
high-risk host countries (Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Liu, Voss, & Zheng, 2007; Henisz, 2003). The 
non-market capabilities sourced from experience arguably take shape based on the human 
capital, organisational structure and social capital developed to tackle institutional 
idiosyncrasies during previous operations in risky countries, and are assumed to be fungible 
across risky countries with similar institutional conditions (Feinberg & Gupta, 2009; Perkins, 
2014). Extending the cultural similarity logic, researchers propose that EMNEs enjoy a 
congenital edge in expanding into high-risk countries as they may have already fostered the 
skills and know-how of navigating institutional constraints through years of home country 
venturing (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2011; Driffield, Jones, & Crotty, 2013). Empirical research 
reveals that FDI from countries with high corruption levels is evidently clustered in other 
corrupt countries (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006), while firms from countries with organised crime 
problems proactively seek business opportunities in other countries with persistent organised 
crime (Ramos & Ashby, 2013). Experience in politically hazardous countries moderates the 
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negative effect of a host country’s political hazards on rates of FDI entry into that country 
(Delios & Henisz, 2003b). 
 
This literature does not directly examine what is learned from experience but rather 
attributes the relationship between experience and subsequent firm behaviour to unobserved 
capabilities (Bingham, Eisenhardt, & Furr, 2007). The inherited knowledge and home country 
imprint cannot always transfer to other similar markets (Giarratana & Torrisi, 2010), and 
experience of engaging with local stakeholders does not automatically lead to expertise in 
political hazard assessment (Maitland & Sammartino, 2015a), implying that simply gaining 
experience is not sufficient for learning (Haleblian, Kim, & Rajagopalan, 2006). Strategy 
research suggests that firms in fact learn from experience a set of “simple rules” heuristics, 
including where to locate value adding activities, as managers become cognitively sophisticated 
over time (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011). Insights into experiential learning are generated when 
researchers delve into the rules by which managers evaluate environments and select among 
alternative opportunities (Maitland & Sammartino, 2015a). Despite the growing body of IB 
literature from the learning perspective, the puzzle remains as to how experience in risky 
countries influences subsequent investment. 
 
4.2.2 Managerial perspective 
While organisational learning is by definition a firm-level process, some studies 
essentially treat it as a country level phenomenon where firms from one environment are 
compared against those from another on the inclination to invest in high-risk countries (Cuervo-
Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Driffield, Jones, & Crotty, 2013). The missing element is the role of 
managers who ultimately make the strategic decision as to where the firm locates its foreign 
subsidiaries (Schotter & Beamish, 2013). Early export research recognises that the 
internationalisation decision is as much a function of managerial behaviour as it is of firm and 
environmental characteristics (Dichtl, Koeglmayr, & Mueller, 1990). The influences of 
managers’ personal characteristics, experience, cognitive styles, managerial behaviour such as 
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expectations, aspirations and attitudes, and their country-of-origin (in which cultural norms and 
belief systems are rooted) are undeniable (Leonidou & Katsikeas, 1996). Much of the later 
discussions have been raised by IE scholars as to how managers’ personal experience, as a 
source of congenital knowledge (Huber, 1991), can compensate for the lack of ownership 
advantages (Luo, Zhao, Wang, & Xi, 2011). Within the IB field, however, little attention has 
been paid to individual level research (Aharoni, Tihanyi, & Connelly, 2011). One exception is 
Schotter and Beamish (2013: 529) who find that “personal managerial preferences play a 
significant role in MNE location decisions”. 
 
Two recent developments may fill the theoretical gap and revive the focus on the 
individual. First, researchers have drawn upon the cognitive theory to explain why some 
experiences matter and others do not. Evidence suggests that experience could prompt 
internationalisation as managers overestimate the efficacy of prior strategies and fall prey to 
competency trap (O'Grady & Lane, 1996; Petersen, Pedersen, & Lyles, 2008; Zeng, Shenkar, 
Lee, & Song, 2013; Zollo, 2009), as well as inhibiting internationalisation as they lack trust in 
the applicability of previous knowledge and capabilities in dealing with the presenting 
environmental hazards (Duanmu, 2012; Hong & Lee, 2015). Whether prior experience is of 
value depends on managers’ interpretation of the acquired information and knowledge (Huber, 
1991) and how they understand new investment contexts (Lamb, Sandberg, & Liesch, 2011; 
O'Grady & Lane, 1996). There are a range of contextual signals from which managers can infer 
their capabilities and obtain the sense of confidence (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011). Even 
within the same organisation, managers do not necessarily share the same cognitive map about 
the causal relationship between actions and outcomes (Fiol & Huff, 1992; Maitland & 
Sammartino, 2015a). Some are more inclined to attribute past success to their own ability than 
to the environment or luck (Clapham & Schwenk, 1991), and others may overweight the 
positive signals of efficacy while ignoring negative performance indicators (Chatterjee & 
Hambrick, 2011). Unlike gambling or laboratory experiments, there is scope for managers to 
establish their own estimations of future events. Although commonly employing analogical 
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reasoning to appraise the new task, managers may differ in their assessments about the surface 
and structural similarity between previous contexts and the focal one (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 
1999; Williams & Grégoire, 2015), and in the extent to which they are able to reconfigure the 
existing resources to adapt to the new environment (Jones & Casulli, 2014). The information 
top managers receive may have already been coloured by the travelling managers who interpret 
the raw information based on their own experience (Schotter & Beamish, 2013). An observed 
firm decision is thus the outcome of the complex processes of managers identifying potential 
hazards, interpreting external environmental cues and acting on that interpretation (Rodriguez, 
Uhlenbruck, & Eden, 2005). 
 
Second, the individual level perspective has complemented firm-level theories in 
explaining why MNEs vary in risk-taking. Previous treatment of managerial risk in FDI theories 
centred on risk preference (Filatotchev, Strange, Piesse, & Lien, 2007; George, Wiklund, & 
Zahra, 2005; Strange, Filatotchev, Lien, & Piesse, 2009). Managers are assumed to be risk-
neutral, risk-averse or risk-seeking in internalisation theory (Buckley & Strange, 2011), the 
Uppsala model (Figueira-de-Lemos, Johanson, & Vahlne, 2011; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) and 
IE research (McDougall & Oviatt, 2000; Oviatt & McDougall, 1994) respectively. These 
assumptive views contain two problems. Firstly, researchers tend to impose risk measures on 
managers and derive their risk preference from post hoc rationalisation of actual investment 
(Liesch, Welch, & Buckley, 2011). In the Uppsala model, risk aversion is reflected in the 
foreign entry sequence taken by the firm where psychically distant countries are defined as 
riskier compared to neighbouring countries (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). Likewise, IE 
researchers derive entrepreneurs’ propensity and capacity to withstand substantial risks from the 
“entrepreneurial” actions of their firms, often in terms of internationalisation speed and scope 
(Freeman, Edwards, & Schroder, 2006). However, evidence in entrepreneurship and IE research 
implies that managers could be erroneously classified as risk-seeking according to ungrounded 
criteria for decision “riskiness”. While researchers assume entrepreneurs as risk-seekers based 
on the assumption that business venturing poses greater financial risk than employment 
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(Busenitz, 1999), it is found that entrepreneurs do not have an intrinsic preference for risk but 
instead perceive venture formation to be well under control, possibly due to ignorance and 
overconfidence (Miner & Raju, 2004; Simon, Houghton, & Aquino, 2000). Rather than 
knowingly take risks as researchers assume, entrepreneurs tend to label business situations as 
opportunities as opposed to threats (Palich & Bagby, 1995). Female entrepreneurs are 
particularly reluctant to identify themselves as risk-takers, and stress that the apparently risky 
internationalisation is little more than calculated, cautious move (Welch, Welch, & Hewerdine, 
2008). Likewise, while rapid foreign entry of small and medium sised enterprises (SMEs) and 
born-global firms is viewed by researchers as risk-taking (George, Wiklund, & Zahra, 2005), 
managers are found to employ a number of relational and portfolio strategies to keep the overall 
risk tolerable, pointing to a risk averse tendency (Freeman, Edwards, & Schroder, 2006; Shrader, 
Oviatt, & McDougall, 2000). Secondly, risk preference is viewed exclusively as a dispositional 
trait that holds constant across contexts for the convenience of theory building (Buckley & 
Strange, 2011; Oviatt & McDougall, 2005a). This convention leaves little room in the extant 
theories for the dynamics and heterogeneity of managers’ risk-taking tendency.  
 
4.2.3 Behavioural decision theory and risk propensity 
Built upon cognitive psychology, behavioural decision theory studies the “human 
factors” that cause individual decision makers to vary in risk-taking behaviours (Shapira, 1995). 
The application of the theory in the strategic decision context is driven by the researchers’ belief 
that only when taking into account managers’ own perspectives would the study of risk bear 
fruit (March & Shapira, 1987).  
 
Behavioural decision theorists argue that individual risk-taking may be driven by two 
main forces. First, according to applied psychologists, different managers have different 
dispositional preference for risk as a manifestation of their personality (Stewart & Roth, 2001), 
and there is a spectrum from risk-averse through risk-neutral to risk-seeking along which any 
individual has an own place (Jackson, Hourany, & Vidmar, 1972; MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 
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1990). Some are fundamentally more inclined to take risk in many life domains (Weber, Blais, 
& Betz, 2002), while others only become risk-seeking in chasing business opportunities 
(Busenitz & Barney, 1997). The Uppsala model, explicitly assuming managerial risk aversion, 
does not rule out the possibility that there are inherently risk-willing managers who consistently 
view uncertain foreign markets as unknown yet promising opportunities (Johanson & Vahlne, 
2006). 
 
Second, behavioural theorists stress the importance of contextual influences in shaping 
individuals’ risk-taking tendencies (Weber & Milliman, 1997). Prospect theory posits that the 
contextual framing of the risk may convert an inherently risk-averse individual to a risk-seeking 
one (Schoemaker, 1990). The behavioural theory of the firm proposes that managerial risk-
taking is affected by such firm characteristics as resource slack, organisational decline and 
attainment discrepancy (March & Shapira, 1992; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). In addition, 
owner-managers of small firms are predisposed to avoiding risk as their personal wealth is 
substantially exposed to the possible financial distress associated with the potential investments, 
whereas managers of large firms can bear risk and pursue investment return or other strategic 
goals on behalf of the shareholders for whom the firm is part of a well-diversified portfolio 
(Liesch, Welch, & Buckley, 2011). Managers’ compensation arrangements also influence risk-
taking by mitigating the monetary consequence of risky strategic decisions, as suggested by the 
behavioural agency model (Gray & Cannella, 1997). These contextual influences prompt 
behaviourists to attribute apparent risk-taking to managers’ risk propensity – i.e. the current, 
variable tendency to take a specific risk – as opposed to dispositional risk preference (George, 
Chattopadhyay, Sitkin, & Barden, 2006; Sitkin & Pablo, 1992; Sitkin & Weingart, 1995). 
 
The strongest contextual influence, however, arises from the outcome history of prior 
experience (Osborn & Jackson, 1988; Sitkin & Weingart, 1995). On the one hand, managers 
with unfavourable experience may amplify the external factors leading to asset loss or negative 
performance, and overestimate the eventuality of those factors, whilst continuous success in the 
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past leads to a biased representation of the reality and thereby distorted estimation of the 
distribution of future outcomes and the impacts on business operations (Levinthal & March, 
1993; Martins & Kambil, 1999). On the other hand, past performance provides important 
feedback to managers about their ability to enact the environment in their own favour (Haleblian, 
Kim, & Rajagopalan, 2006; March & Shapira, 1987) and the effectiveness of the coping 
strategies they have employed in controlling the risks, thus directing future firm behaviour (Lant, 
Milliken, & Batra, 1992; Levitt & March, 1988). Successful experience may further enhance 
managers’ self-confidence in tackling similar high-risk tasks in the future (Zollo, 2009). 
 
4.2.4 Risk Propensity and Managerial Decision Making 
C Conventional IB theory rests upon the assumption of dispositional risk preference in 
the sense that managers’ intrinsic proclivity for risk guides the way in which they respond to 
potential host country environmental risk when making location and entry mode choices 
(Buckley & Strange, 2011; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). It implies that managerial risk 
preference intervenes between the environment and the organisational decisions. However, 
research suggests that dispositional trait is not a reliable predictor of individuals’ risk-taking 
tendencies in business tasks (Simon, Houghton, & Aquino, 2000), partly because it contains 
insufficient variation among top managers given the selection processes for corporate leaders 
(Hitt & Tyler, 1991) and partly because of the complex context of organisations (Shimizu, 2007; 
Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). It is observed that the appetite for risk for a given individual 
could vary depending on the decision domain, suggesting the importance of situational 
differences (Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002). As an alternative concept, risk propensity 
incorporates the influence of both trait and the context. If managers’ responses to environmental 
risk are indeed found to be affected by firm level and individual level contextual variables as 
behavioural theory posits, we argue that risk preference is not the only contributor to one’s 
current tendency to take risk. This circumvents the debate on managers being risk averse vs. risk 
seeking, and allows for comparison across managers on the extent of risk-taking tendency 
regarding a particular task. The concept is also well aligned with the heuristics view in the 
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organisational learning literature because managerial preference regarding risk-taking 
constitutes a coherent cognitive structure for dealing with a range of similar problems without 
reference to the details of any specific ones (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011). Thus risk 
propensity conjoins the information interpretation research and managerial perspective on risk-
taking, and provides an alternative theoretical explanation for the heterogeneity in FDI decisions. 
 
Nevertheless, the lack of empirical testing has inhibited the development of risk 
propensity perspective. Unlike risk preference which can be explicitly measured by 
psychometric scales, risk propensity cannot be captured independent of individuals’ behaviour. 
Rarely is objective criterion available for gauging the riskiness of a business option (Baird & 
Thomas, 1985), and, as shown, researchers’ post hoc rationalisation of firm behaviour may not 
well represent the ex-ante role of risk in strategic decision making. Conventional methods thus 
fail the study of risk propensity in the organisational context. Our study offers a unique method 
to operationalise risk propensity, which is then linked with contextual variables. 
 
4.3 Development of Hypotheses 
Our focus on the concept of risk propensity leads the hypotheses to discuss why some 
are less averse to a given risk than others. The various aspects of international risk provide a 
distinct case for studying managerial heterogeneity in risk propensity. In this section, 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 highlight the difference between managers with particular regard to inter-
person variation in the perceived importance of a given aspect and intra-person variation in the 
perceived importance of controllable versus non-controllable aspects. Support of these two 
hypotheses serves as the precondition for Hypothesis 3 and 4 by which we examine whether the 
heterogeneity is attributable to firm level and individual level contextual influences. 
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4.3.1 Heterogeneous risk propensity in location choice 
Although the trait approach and behavioural theory provide well-grounded accounts of 
managerial risk propensity, they apparently assume its monolithic nature in that managers are 
presumably more or less averse to environmental risk as a whole. Given the complexity of 
foreign investment, IB literature not only recognises the magnitude of international risk but also 
specifies its variety of aspects. Miller (1992) proposes a comprehensive consideration of 
international risk, including general environment, industry and firm specific aspects. When 
making location choices, MNE managers trade off one aspect of international risk against 
another while keeping the overall risk profile under control. This framework provides a natural 
context in which risk propensity can be fine-sliced to a number of specific aspects. 
 
Behavioural decision research observes that different managers pay attention to 
different aspects of the information provided when evaluating the riskiness of a given decision 
option (Weber & Milliman, 1997). Very few managers engage a calculative thinking and most 
instead rely on “gut feeling” in FDI decision making (Calof, 1993). Gut feeling in fact 
represents a complex, implicitly rational process that draws upon managers’ knowledge and 
experience, and is underpinned by analogical and heuristic reasoning (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 
2011; Jones & Casulli, 2014). The extent to which analogical reasoning can be applied 
effectively depends on the structural similarity between previous experience and the focal 
context (Perkins, 2014; Williams & Grégoire, 2015). Experiential learning regarding, for 
instance, tackling contractual disputes with local suppliers, bears little relation to coping with 
operational disruption resulting from political turbulence and abrupt policy changes in the host 
country. Regardless of the relative importance of different aspects of international risk, some 
managers may be more averse to one and less averse to another – as a function of their context-
specific experience – rather than displaying a monolithic risk-averse or risk-seeking disposition 
as suggested by the trait approach. Likewise, contextual influences other than experience may 
have a similar effect. The “house money” effect originally observed in a gambling context may 
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be primarily associated with such risk that has an exogenous given odds. Therefore, we suggest 
an inter-person variation in risk propensity regarding a given aspect of international risk. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Managers vary in their risk propensity in FDI location decisions, such 
that one can be simultaneously more averse and less averse to risk than another manager, 
depending on the specific aspects of international risk being discussed. 
 
The decision models developed by Devinney, Midgley, and Venaik (2003) suggests that 
managers hold distinct views on the basic value of one aspect of risk relative to another, 
independent of their subjective assessment about the level of each aspect of risks with regard to 
any specific market. Such views represent the dominant logic through which managers scan 
external conditions and diagnose environmental constraints (Thomas, Clark, & Gioia, 1993), 
regardless of whether they over-, under- or mis-estimate the importance of any particular 
aspects (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982). One reason underlying the varying importance of different 
risks may be managerial control. Unlike gamblers, managers believe that riskiness of a choice in 
managerial situations can be controlled by their skills, talents and capabilities (March & Shapira, 
1987). Risk propensity is essentially reflective of managers’ self-assessed ability to control the 
risk in the particular decision context based on performance feedback and experiential learning 
(Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011). The extent to which a risk is controllable vis-à-vis exogenously 
given influences managers’ tendency to avoid the risk. Controllable risk is risk of which the 
probability and impact can be decreased by managerial actions. Positive experience with and 
familiarity of controllable risk increase the likelihood of subsequent entry (Delios & Henisz, 
2003b; Holburn & Zelner, 2010). Non-controllable risk, however, can hardly be manipulated by 
the firms or managers, and is predominantly resolved by the passage of time (Cuypers & Martin, 
2009). Besides, magnitude of potential loss is viewed as the dominant element of risk associated 
with a strategic decision (March & Shapira, 1987). Insofar as managers can control some 
specific aspects of international risk – for instance mitigating contractual hazard through 
designed coping mechanisms and routines, these risks could be reduced to a level that is 
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acceptable to even risk-averse managers. Conversely, the impact of non-controllable risks on 
firms’ foreign operations and subsidiary survival is mostly determined independently of firms or 
managers’ capabilities, and may pose a greater threat, both psychologically and substantively. 
Therefore, we suggest an intra-person variation in the perceived importance of different types of 
risk. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Managers exhibit a stronger aversion to non-controllable risk than 
controllable risk.  
 
4.3.2 Home country learning 
Subnational regions across a country feature cultural and social diversity, leading to 
considerable differences in consumer behaviour (O'Grady & Lane, 1996). Entering unfamiliar 
territory carries risks for MNEs due to informational disadvantages relative to local counterparts 
(Zaheer, 1995). The same argument holds for domestic venturing. Setting up new operations in 
geographically distant markets within the home border offers managers direct learning 
opportunities regarding what cues are extracted from an unfamiliar environment and how to 
interpret these (Cuervo-Cazurra, Maloney, & Manrakhan, 2007). Investing in other subnational 
regions introduces more productive capacity to the local production base or takes up market 
share enjoyed by incumbents (Chen, 2008). Head-on competition creates a learning 
environment where the managers are required to accommodate various local interest groups 
(Jiménez, Luis-Rico, & Benito-Osorio, 2014). Such experience shapes managers’ domestic 
mindsets about resource exploitation and helps firms to overcome psychic distance to unfamiliar 
foreign territories (Nadkarni, Herrmann, & Perez, 2011; Nadkarni & Perez, 2007). Successful 
inter-regional operation within the home country can foster managers’ positive attitude toward 
foreign expansion (Wiedersheim-Paul, Olson, & Welch, 1978). The literature on EMNEs argues 
that the ownership advantages firms exploit overseas are a path-dependent outcome of 
engagement in the home context (Tan & Meyer, 2010), which gestates the organisational 
knowledge, structures and routines necessary for coordinating dispersed operations across 
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geographical regions (Eriksson, Johanson, Majkgard, & Sharma, 1997). Research reveals that 
EMNEs’ domestic diversification has a positive effect on their international diversification (Lu, 
Liu, Filatotchev, & Wright, 2014). 
 
Despite the “home country learning” argument being intuitively appealing, domestic 
experience alone may not necessarily lead to high-risk strategic decision making. Firstly, the 
impact of outcome history on risk propensity observed by behavioural decision theorists is 
confined strictly to the same task setting (Osborn & Jackson, 1988; Sitkin & Weingart, 1995; 
Taylor, Hall, Cosier, & Goodwin, 1996; Thaler & Johnson, 1990). Organisational learning 
theorists argue that it is less likely to observe positive learning when the task frequency is low 
and its heterogeneity high (Zollo, 2009), such as strategic decisions where managers are 
overwhelmed by outcome and causal ambiguity (Zollo & Winter, 2002). The gap in task 
features between domestic and international venturing could be wide enough to prevent 
managers from generalising the efficacy of their capability gained from the former to the latter 
context (Gavetti, Levinthal, & Rivkin, 2005; Nadolska & Barkema, 2007). 
 
Secondly, the stock of home country experience per se is not enough to induce risk-
taking (Haleblian, Kim, & Rajagopalan, 2006). Behavioural decision theory posits that it is 
positive outcome history that increases managers’ risk propensity (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992; Sitkin 
& Weingart, 1995). For strategic decisions, the history of decision quality may not necessarily 
derive from objective performance indicators (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011). The effect of 
experiential learning is based on managers’ own interpretation of previous outcomes when they 
make strategic decisions that produce fuzzy performance feedback (Zollo, 2009) and involve 
different dimensions on which performance can be evaluated (Richard, Devinney, Yip, & 
Johnson, 2009). Such interpretations contain the constructed “reality” about the cause-effect 
relations and managers’ coping abilities based on subjective cues (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982). 
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These concerns do not preclude the transferability of home country experience, but 
require a more nuanced understanding. Due to limited cognitive and attentive capacity, top 
managers often employ a simplifying strategy to develop mental representation of the problem 
to be handled (Castellaneta & Zollo, 2014; Gavetti, Levinthal, & Rivkin, 2005). Specifically, 
they tend to single out and direct attention to the critical aspects of the environment while 
ignoring the others (Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985; Lampel, Shamsie, & Shapira, 2009). The 
relationship between subjective evaluation of home country experience and managerial risk 
propensity in foreign location choice may be contingent upon the nature of the aspects of 
international risk being discussed. 
 
The experience of dealing with controllable risk like contractual hazard is one of 
capability cues. Managers’ cognitive resources and sophistication are conditioned by the 
institutional context in which the firm operates (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011). When the domestic 
environment does not provide the institutional infrastructure to curb corruption, managers have 
to learn how to grow business in the absence of market-supporting institutions or even commit 
to corruptive activities in exchange for critical resources and preferential treatments (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2006). Successful domestic experience provides feedback on EMNE managers’ ability 
to control institutional risks, and positive self-evaluation boosts their confidence in coping with 
institution-related constraints through remedial actions should the adverse scenarios come about. 
The increased risk propensity of managers may be inferred from the fact that EMNEs seek out 
high-risk host environment compatible with the home country cognitive imprint (Holburn & 
Zelner, 2010). Therefore, perceived past success in the home country may convince managers 
that their risk-coping strategies and execution heuristics will work in other markets with similar 
institutional characteristics, and to take further risk in subsequent decisions. 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Perceived success in domestic sub-national operation increases EMNE 
managers’ risk propensity regarding controllable risk in FDI location decisions. 
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The experience of dealing with non-controllable risk like political turbulence may 
amplify its perceived negative impact. If the home environment suffers with political instability, 
managers may gradually nurture an awareness of understanding the conditions that predispose 
the political actors to intervene in operations of specific firms (Makhija, 1993). The awareness 
does not change managers’ ability to influence its occurrence or significance, but may become 
extra alert to the potential consequence of entering a high-political-risk country. In addition, 
prospect theory predicts that individuals tend to be loss-averse when they have accumulated 
gains, and therefore unwilling to take further risks (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). A common 
reference point in decision making is the status quo. Managers who perceive themselves to be 
achieving good performance in the home country may be preoccupied with defending current 
gains (Osborn & Jackson, 1988; Thaler & Johnson, 1990), and thus shy away from unfamiliar 
and risky foreign markets, especially those with political and civil unrest that could incur asset 
and personnel losses beyond managers’ own control. Therefore, managers who are satisfied 
with their performance at home will be more averse to non-controllable risk than those without 
positive home country experience. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Perceived success in domestic sub-national operation reduces EMNE 
managers’ risk propensity regarding non-controllable risk in FDI location decisions. 
 
4.3.3 Potential slack 
Organisational slack is defined as a “cushion of actual or potential resources which 
allows an organisation to adapt successfully to internal pressures for adjustment or to external 
pressures for change in policy as well as to initiate changes in strategy with respect to the 
external environment” (Bourgeois, 1981: 30). We focus on potential slack such as borrowing 
capacity that has received less attention in the literature but bears a close relation to strategic 
investment including FDI.  
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The behavioural theory of the firm suggests that slack influences risk-taking in two 
ways (Singh, 1986; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996). First, slack acts as a buffering mechanism to 
absorb environmental shocks, and allows firms to persist with risky strategies without the need 
for structural change (Cyert & March, 1963). Second, slack justifies risky strategies that are 
otherwise unacceptable, and thus increases the range of options open to managerial choice 
(Cheng & Kesner, 1997). Sufficient slack resources direct managers’ attention away from 
attaining the performance target toward the upside potential of greater variability in search of 
extra returns (March & Shapira, 1992). IB research follows this view and argues that slack 
serves to buffer firms from political risk and contribute to the resource base for experimenting 
with new strategies, thereby enhancing firms’ ability to exploit foreign market opportunities 
(Tseng, Tansuhaj, Hallagan, & McCullough, 2007). Calof and Beamish (1995) suggest that 
sufficient slack resources prompt managers to skip intermediate stages of internationalisation. 
Tseng, Tansuhaj, Hallagan, and McCullough (2007) find that an adequate level of slack is 
positively associated with foreign sales growth. 
 
Despite the fact that the psychological role of slack in risky decisions and 
internationalisation decisions is well argued, empirical research – with particular regard to 
potential slack – has provided inconclusive findings (Rhee & Cheng, 2002). Singh (1986) finds 
that excess uncommitted resources have no effect on firms’ orientation toward risk-taking, 
while Lin, Cheng, and Liu (2009) reports that potential slack is positively associated with a 
firm’s international expansion. When an investment registers poor performance, firms with 
abundant potential resources can afford delaying the decision to divest and bet on the future 
recovery (Shimizu, 2007). This effect is particularly evident when loss is relatively large 
(Shimizu, 2007). As managers are most likely to prefer less risky alternatives in the face of large 
possible losses (Laughhunn, Payne, & Crum, 1980), potential slack plays a crucial role in 
decision-making when the investment involves significant risk over which managers have little 
control (March & Shapira, 1987). One of such risk emanates from host country’s political 
environment. Political risk may cause appropriation of assets or disrupt firms’ operations due to 
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societal unrest (Miller, 1992). It is unlikely for foreign firms to exert any meaningful influence 
over the high-level political game or power handover that breeds various political hazards 
(Maitland & Sammartino, 2015a). Potential slack alleviates managers’ concern over the 
consequence of non-controllable risk since additional borrowing capacity insures that foreign 
market turbulence will not jeopardies the firm’s overall financial position and its core business 
(Lin, Cheng, & Liu, 2009). Financial resource is of particular importance to private firms that 
have less of other buffering mechanisms in place, such as governmental backing, compared to 
state-owned enterprises (Voss et al., 2010). 
 
The slack-as-resource literature focuses much theoretical discussion on slack’s 
buffering role against external environmental shocks. It is reasonable to assume that slack is 
particularly helpful in the face of non-controllable risks. Rarely is it argued or tested as to 
whether potential slack prompts managers to take controllable risk as well. Nevertheless, there 
is no a priori reason to suggest that slack cannot shield firms from controllable risks given that 
it is often of less severity than non-controllable risk. Thus we hypothesise that potential slack 
increases managers’ tendency to take both controllable and non-controllable risks when making 
FDI location choices. 
 
Hypothesis 4a: Potential slack increases EMNE managers’ risk propensity regarding 
controllable risk in FDI location decisions. 
 
Hypothesis 4b: Potential slack increases EMNE managers’ risk propensity regarding 
non-controllable risk in FDI location decisions. 
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4.4 Methodology 
4.4.1 Research setting and sample 
We test our hypotheses on Chinese private firms. In emerging countries like China, the 
domestic market is fragmented by provincial protectionism and institutional disparities across 
subnational regions (Boisot & Meyer, 2008). Firms face varying explanation and execution 
across provinces for the same nationwide policy issued by the central government (Shi, Sun, & 
Peng, 2012). Domestic venturing in other provinces provides important learning opportunities 
for Chinese firms to tackle policy risk and legal risk associated with the region-specific 
enforcement of formal rules (Chan, Makino, & Isobe, 2010; Sun, Peng, Lee, & Tan, 2014). 
While previous studies have found an interactive relationship between home country risk and 
host country risk (Delios & Henisz, 2003b; Holburn & Zelner, 2010), single home country 
context makes managers’ sub-national experience comparable.  
 
We choose private firms because they are more likely to be influenced than state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) by the experience, competence and prejudice of top management when it 
comes to internationalisation decisions (Ji & Dimitratos, 2013). Compared to SOEs that 
dominate the aggregate Chinese OFDI data (Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Liu, Voss, & Zheng, 2007), 
Chinese private firms share with MNEs from other countries similar characteristics of market 
orientation and advantage exploitation, which enhances the external validity of the study and 
allows for generalisation of the findings to other emerging countries (Ramasamy, Yeung, & 
Laforet, 2012). 
 
Our sample consists of 60 top executives of Chinese private manufacturing firms that 
either have foreign subsidiaries, or have expressed a strong intention to engage in cross-border 
investment. Considering the lengthy and highly structured task we ask managers to complete, 
we employ purposeful sampling that enables us to a) recruit top managers as respondents, and b) 
establish a balanced sample with a good coverage of international versus non-international 
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experience as well as developed versus developing country operations. As different industry 
sectors are characterised by varying levels of tangible versus intangible resource commitment 
with implications for risk exposure, we intentionally restrict the sample to manufacturers. 
Sampled managers are approached in aid of contacts from two leading Chinese business schools 
and from a municipal governmental department, and to a lesser extent, through personal 
contacts. All firms are headquartered in Beijing, Shanghai or Zhejiang province (see Table 4).   
 
Table 4 Sample descriptive characteristics 
 Percent of 
Sample 
Average number 
of countries in 
which subsidiaries 
operate 
Average number 
of years of 
foreign 
operation 
Have FDI 
experience 
Firm sise (employees)     
Small (<300) 60.00%    
Medium (300-2000) 28.33%    
Large (>2000) 11.67%    
Chairman or CEO 26.67%    
VP or Investment 
Manager 73.33%    
Province of origin     
Beijing 16.67% 0.90 2.30 30% 
Shanghai 56.66% 1.32 3.32 77% 
Zhejiang 26.67% 1.19 4.71 75% 
Full sample 100.00% 1.22 3.52 68% 
 
 
4.4.2 Discrete choice method 
To study managers’ views on risk, we employ the discrete choice method (DCM) that 
has been widely used in marketing, transport, health economics and recently IB research 
(Anderson, Coltman, Devinney, & Keating, 2011; Buckley, Devinney, & Louviere, 2007), to 
model managers’ preference based on stated preference data. Compared to other preference 
elicitation approaches such as policy capturing and conjoint analysis, DCM is theoretically 
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grounded on random utility theory (RUT) and rests on the assumption of utility maximisation 
(Louviere, Hensher, & Swait, 2000). This assumption holds in our theorisation that, despite 
being boundedly rational, managers make intendedly rational choice to maximise the chance of 
achieving a predetermined objective, irrespective of its substantive nature (Buckley & Casson, 
2009; Chung & Alcacer, 2002; Gavetti, Levinthal, & Rivkin, 2005). The utility manager n 
obtains from choosing alternative j is given by: 
 !"# = %&"# + ("#  
 
where &"# is a vector of observed attributes for alternative ), and % is a vector of 
weighting coefficients that reflect managers’ preferences. %&"# represents the systematic 
component of utility whilst ("* describes an unknown, random component that is mostly 
reflective of preference heterogeneity (Manski, 1977). RUT is based on the notion of 
compensatory behaviour in that gains in one attribute can compensate for losses in another. 
Managers are assumed to consciously or intuitively compare the alternatives and make a choice 
that delivers the highest utility based on the trade-offs among the attribute levels. The quasi-
experiment offers three important advantages. First, the marginal utility parameters extracted 
from managers’ own behaviour effectively indicate their ex-ante views on location attributes 
including risk, which substitute for imposing the researchers’ criteria ex post. Second, a variety 
of specific aspects of international risk can be added into the analysis as observable attributes of 
the hypothetical location options. The analysis of managers’ marginal preference for each risk 
can reveal the relative perceived importance of one another. Third, we are able to examine 
managers’ current tendencies to take specific risks without reference to any particular context – 
i.e. host country – thereby eliminating the contamination of idiosyncratic risk perceptions. 
 
We explicitly draw upon Buckley, Devinney, and Louviere (2007) to develop the 
attributes and levels. Their design is derived from an extensive review of the location choice 
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literature. We further reduce the variable list to the attributes having the most significant and 
consistent effect as per their experimental results. Definition and dimensionality of the attributes 
are determined based on a review of academic literature and professional reports including 
Worldwide Governance Indicators by World Bank and World Investment and Political Risk by 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). We pre-tested the face validity of the 
attributes and the realism of the task through in-depth interviews with academics and ten 
Chinese state-owned or private MNE managers. Modifications are made particularly to the 
attribute definitions, and new attributes are added to suit the research question. Table 5 presents 
the definitions of the final ten location attributes and the associated levels. 
 
We employ D-optimal fractional factorial design to maximise statistical efficiency 
while reducing the number of choice sets that each manager completes (Kuhfeld, 2006). Each 
respondent is presented with the same 32 pairs of hypothetical investment locations where the 
levels of 10 location attributes are varied according to the underlying optimal design. By 
manipulating the levels, we force managers to make trade-offs between risk and return as well 
as between one aspect of risk and another. We also specify that the investment being made 
would require 30% of the firm’s total cash available for investment for the next three years. 
Respondents have the option to choose location 1, location 2 or a no-go decision across 32 
choice sets. Table 6 provides a sample of choice task. 
 
We use political instability – a function of high-level political game (Maitland & 
Sammartino, 2015a) – to represent non-controllable risk, and legal protection – which mostly 
bears on partners’ opportunism and contractual disputes – to represent controllable risk. Similar 
distinction has been made in the real option literature (Cuypers & Martin, 2009; Xu, Zhou, & 
Phan, 2010). The parameters of risk variables reflect the marginal utility to managers, and can 
be used to test Hypothesis 1 through between-class comparison and Hypothesis 2 through 
within-class comparison. With regard to Hypotheses 3 and 4, we further collect demographic 
and firm information to examine the influence of covariates on managers’ preference structure. 
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Home country experience refers to managers’ experience of orchestrating operations in sub-
national areas other than the home province. Following Zollo (2009), we employ a perceptual 
measure (0=no sub-national experience, 1=extremely dissatisfied, 9=extremely satisfied) for 
respondents’ interpretation of the experience quality regarding home country venturing. As our 
DCM task specified the percent of cash reserve to be invested, we effectively controlled for 
available slack, i.e. excess liquidity, and thus direct attention to potential slack (Bourgeois & 
Singh, 1983). For potential slack to influence strategic decision-making, it “must be visible to 
the manager and employable in the future” (Sharfman, Wolf, Chase, & Tansik, 1988: 602). We 
measure potential slack on a five-point scale by asking respondents’ perceived easiness of 
acquiring bank loan in the home country (Tan & Peng, 2003). This measure captures the 
theoretical essence of the commonly used equity-to-debt ratio. Given the contention that the 
stock of international experience may affect managers’ risk-taking (Carpenter, Pollock, & Leary, 
2003), we include it in the model as measured by the number of years since a firm’s first foreign 
investment.  
 
Table 5 Investment attributes and levels 
Investment attributes Levels 
The cost of operations – Choosing a specific 
location can lead to higher or lower costs of 
operation across the value chain 
Decrease 20%, Decrease 10%, Increase 
10%, Increase 20%  
Return on investment (ROI) – Describes the rate of 
return expected from the investment 
Significantly less than home market, 
Same as home market, Significantly 
greater than home market 
Access to new resources, assets and technologies – 
Choosing a specific location can lead to greater 
competences being developed in the firm, through 
access to physical resources, organisational assets, or 
new technologies 
No new access, Access 
 
Potential market sise Large relative to home market, Same as 
home market, Small relative to home 
market 
Growth – The rate of sales increase in the market Decline, No growth, Low growth, 
Strong growth 
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Political Instability – Denotes the likelihood of 
political and civil unrest, and the extent of policy 
disruption due to either political transition or lack of 
institutional constraints on the policy making 
authority. 
Unstable, Stable 
Local stakeholders – Indicates the influence of local 
interest groups, such as community, producers, 
labour union, NGOs and the like.  
Powerful, Non-existent 
Line of business – Denotes whether the new 
investment is in an existing, related or new line of 
business  
Same line of business, Related line of 
business, Completely new line of 
business 
Local competition – Indicates the level of 
competition within the local industry the firm is to 
enter. 
Weak, Intense 
Legal protection – Denotes whether legal structures 
are effective for the protection of both physical and 
intellectual assets, the settlement of investment 
disputes, and the control of corruption.  
No protection, Strong/adequate 
protection 
 
Table 6 Example of an investment choice task 
Instructions: Your organisation is considering directly investing in operations in this foreign 
location and the investment being made represents 30% of the total cash available for 
investment for the next three years. Please note each pair of options is independent of one 
another and compare only between two options in one pair.   
 Option A Option B 
Cost of operations Decrease 10% Increase 20% 
Return on investment Same as home market Significantly less than home 
market 
Access to new resources, 
assets and technologies 
Access No new access 
Potential market sise Large relative to home market Same as home market 
Growth Strong growth Low growth 
Political Instability Stable Unstable 
Local stakeholders Powerful Powerful 
Local competition Weak Intense 
Line of business Related line of business Completely new line of 
business 
Legal protection Strong/adequate protection No protection 
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If the investment option 
described above were 
available to your organisation, 
which would you undertake 
instead of or in addition to 
other currently available 
investments (Tick ONE box 
only)? 
□ A □ B 
□ Neither 
 
4.4.3 Estimation 
In line with previous studies (Anderson, Coltman, Devinney, & Keating, 2011; Chung 
& Alcacer, 2002), we first use conditional logit model (CL) as a starting point to examine 
managers’ location decisions (McFadden, 1974). The result of CL shows the marginal 
contribution of each attribute level to managers’ utilities, which as a whole reflects the 
underlying preference structure. It provides a clear indication of the validity of the experiment 
and the seriousness with which the respondents take the task. However, CL has been criticised 
for its strong assumption about individuals having the same preference structure. Given the 
hypothesised managerial heterogeneity, systematic preference variability could be conflated 
with response error. We therefore employ latent class logit model (LCL) – a semiparametric 
extension of CL that specifies heterogeneity by approximating parameter variation with a finite 
number of distributions across individuals. Table 7 presents the empirical justification for 
relaxing restrictions on parameter variation based on information criteria. LCL achieves a lower 
value for Akaike information criterion (AIC), Bayesian information criterion (BIC) and 
consistent Akaike information criterion (CAIC) than CL, indicating that LCL fits the data better 
than CL. Individual behaviour now depends on both observable attributes in the experiment and 
latent heterogeneity that varies with unobserved characteristics (Greene & Hensher, 2003). 
Specifically, LCL assigns different coefficient values to discrete classes that together constitute 
the population, and simultaneously solves for, via Expectation-Maximisation (EM) algorithm, 
both the choice probabilities conditional on class membership and the posterior probability of 
each individual being assigned to each class. We use the EM estimates as the starting values for 
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standard, gradient-based maximisation to obtain class specific standard errors and class 
membership parameters (Bhat, 1997). 
 
To test further for latent heterogeneity, we use a mixed logit model (MXL) in which all 
of the parameters are allowed to vary across individuals along independent normal distributions 
(Chung & Alcacer, 2002). Table 7 indicates that MXL achieves a lower value of AIC and BIC 
but a higher value of CAIC than CL. We perform a log likelihood ratio test (LRT) to address the 
mixed messages as the two models are nested. LRT confirms that MXL is preferred over CL (χ 
²(17) = 72.07, p<0.0001) due to improved model fit. Alongside the comparison between CL and 
LCL, the results support our premise of managerial heterogeneity since models allowing for 
varied preference structures, irrespective of the distribution of heterogeneity, fit the data better 
than one with fixed parameters. Moreover, information criteria prefer two-class and three-class 
LCL models to MXL, supporting our adoption of finite mixture specification. 
 
4.4.4 Results 
Aggregate model. Table 8 provides the results of the CL analysis. Coefficients are 
indicative of marginal utilities of the corresponding attribute levels where positive sign suggests 
positive preference and negative sign suggests an avoidance attitude. For risk attributes, the 
results are all highly significant and aligned with the risk-averse assumption, except that 
managers do not consider powerful local stakeholder a hindrance to investment. As a rationalist 
might expect, managers are deterred by political instability (non-controllable risk), intense 
competition and lack of legal protection (controllable risk). In addition, they prefer familiar 
environment evidenced by the positive and statistically significant parameter for staying with 
the same line of business. 
 
Table 7 Model fit and information criteria for the competing models 
 CL MXL Latent Class 
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2-class 3-class 4-class 5-class 
Log likelihood -1738.9  -1698.7 -1677.2 -1649.9 -1623.1 -1607.4 
AIC 3511.8 3465.4 3424.4 3405.8 3388.2 3392.8 
BIC 3547.4 3536.6 3497.6 3516.7 3537.0 3579.3 
CAIC 3564.4 3570.6 3532.7 3569.8 3607.9 3668.2 
N. param. 17.0 34.0 35.0 53.0 71.0 89.0 
Note: Bold item indicates best model fit. 
 
The results associated with the return attributes show that managers take production 
cost into consideration as expected. Yet we do not witness a monotonic effect as the lowest 
cost-of-production is not appreciated. Unlike Buckley, Devinney, and Louviere (2007), we find 
a clear-cut, monotonic effect of return on investment (ROI) on investment decisions. Managers 
penalise lower-than-home ROI and are attracted to higher-than-home ROI, conforming to 
economics based thinking. Access to new resources and technologies matters yet only to a 
marginal extent. The effect of growth is less than perfectly clear-cut. Nevertheless it is without 
doubt that managers react positively to locations featuring high growth. The results bear out the 
validity of DCM as managers behave by and large the way theory suggests as regards the return 
variables.  
 
 Given the results of CL, the conclusion that managers are uniformly taking a risk-averse 
stance when making FDI location decisions seems justified. However, we have contended that 
the randomness of the model is not just in the error term but is also attributable to the variability 
in individual preference distribution. Table 8 also provides the results of MXL, which are not 
qualitatively different from those of CL. This suggests, in accordance with Table 7, that 
continuous mixture specification of the preference heterogeneity may not be supported by the 
data. The following latent class analysis offers a more refined view.  
 
Table 8 Conditional logit and mixed logit models 
 CLa MXLb 
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The cost of operations   
Cost decline by 20%  0.152 0.147 
Cost decline by 10% 0.450*** 0.498*** 
Cost increase by 10% -0.167* -0.173* 
Cost increase by 20% -0.436*** -0.472*** 
Return on investment   
Significantly lower than home 
market -0.449*** -0.483*** 
Same as home market -0.082 0.080 
Significantly higher than home 
market 0.531*** 0.563*** 
Access to new resources 0.078 0.085* 
Potential market sise   
Smaller than home country -0.009 -0.017 
Same as home country -0.123* -0.141* 
Larger than home country 0.131** 0.158** 
Growth   
Declining -0.124 -0.120 
No growth -0.109 -0.112 
Low growth -0.131* -0.148* 
High growth 0.365*** 0.380*** 
Local stakeholder non-existent 0.005 0.004 
Weak local competition 0.242*** 0.262*** 
Line of business   
Existing 0.171** 0.191** 
Related -0.140* -0.157* 
Completely new -0.031 -0.034 
Non-controllable risk -0.790*** -0.860*** 
Controllable risk -0.547*** -0.587*** 
Sig. codes:  <0.001 ‘***’, <0.01 ‘**’, <0.05 ‘*’  
a Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 
b Random coefficients are assumed to be independently normally distributed. 
 
Latent class logit models. Following conventional procedure (e.g., Greene & Hensher, 
2003; Train, 2008), we determine the appropriate number of classes in the LCL based on 
information criteria. CAIC and BIC penalise more heavily the increasing number of parameters 
than AIC to control for overfitting and thus should be the preferred indicator. Table 7 suggest 
that the two-class model registers the best model fit according to both BIC and CAIC. In 
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addition, we calculate the average of the highest posterior probability of class membership 
across all individuals to measure how well the two-class model performs in differentiating the 
underlying preference structures. The average is around 0.98, confirming the appropriateness of 
two-class model.  
 
The resulting class scores for each attribute level, Wald test of between-class coefficient 
equality, and covariate analysis are presented in Table 9. While the managers from both classes 
uniformly seek markets with high ROI and growth rate and penalise low investment return, we 
notice a few important differences that tease them apart. For instance, Class 1 managers take 
strong avoidance to a 20% decrease in production cost. Surprising as it may seem, it is not 
unseen among previous choice modelling analyses as for some managers a big drop in cost 
signals potential problems in an area uncaptured by the attribute levels of the experiment and 
apparently considered undesirable  (Anderson, Coltman, Devinney, & Keating, 2011). 
Conversely, Class 2 – the majority group – exhibit a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between the lowest cost and investment decision, and indeed show a monotonic 
effect of cost. This clearly indicates that heterogeneity is disguised in the insignificant 
coefficient in aggregate CL analysis. Another example is that Class 2 managers seek new 
resources from foreign markets whereas Class 1 do not. CL only reports a marginally significant 
(p<0.051) influence of resource and knowledge acquisition and fails to discover the difference 
in the investment motivations underlying managers’ decisions (Chung & Alcacer, 2002). Other 
between-class differences include a significant yet divergent attitude toward negative market 
growth and small market sise. 
 
An examination of risk attributes reveals what matter to managers belonging to different 
classes and to what extent they matter. Class 1 managers tend to avoid all risks featured in the 
experiment – they avoid unstable political environment (non-controllable risk), powerful local 
stakeholders, intense industrial competition, and poorly developed legal institutions 
(controllable risk). These managers also prefer to stay in the same line of business when 
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venturing abroad. In stark contrast, Class 2 are not deterred by the presence of stakeholders like 
labour unions, and feel indifferent to industrial diversification in a foreign market.  
 
As Wald statistics suggest that Class 1 and Class 2 managers differ in the extent of 
aversion to political and legal risk, we further compare their effects sise between two classes. 
Given the identification problem with logit models, the absolute values of the estimated 
parameter cannot be compared straightaway (Greene & Hensher, 2003). We therefore calculate 
the willingness-to-pay ratio for the two risk factors by recoding ROI as a continuous variable 
and dividing each parameter of the risk factors by the parameter of ROI of the same class 
(Louviere, Hensher, & Swait, 2000). The ratio is indicative of how much investment return the 
managers are willing to sacrifice in order to avoid the specific risk. Table 10 reveals that Class 1 
managers are less concerned with legal risk but more avoidant to political risk, compared to 
Class 2. In addition, the parameters for competition risk do not differ significantly between the 
two classes. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported. It is also clear that for both classes, political risk – 
a non-controllable type of international risk – has a stronger negative effect than the more 
controllable legal risk. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is supported. 
 
Table 9 Latent class model with covariates 
 Class 1 Class 2 Wald 
The cost of operations    
Cost decline by 20%  -0.993*** 0.616*** 33.02*** 
Cost decline by 10% 0.961*** 0.238** 15.43*** 
Cost increase by 10% 0.068 -0.271** 3.36 
Cost increase by 20% -0.036 -0.583*** 6.39* 
Return on investment    
Significantly lower than home 
market -0.862*** -0.377*** 8.70** 
Same as home market 0.123 -0.123 3.32 
Significantly higher than home 
market 0.739*** 0.500*** 2.58 
Access to new resources 0.070 0.148** 4.45* 
Potential market sise    
Smaller than home country 0.220* -0.136 6.59* 
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Same as home country -0.480*** -0.050 9.16** 
Larger than home country 0.260* 0.186** 0.26 
Growth    
Declining 0.393** -0.324*** 15.33*** 
No growth -0.277* -0.015 2.54 
Low growth -0.606*** -0.008 9.17** 
High growth 0.490*** 0.347*** 0.57 
Local stakeholder non-existent 0.216* -0.056 7.23** 
Intense local competition -0.327*** -0.244*** 0.65 
Line of business    
Existing 0.555*** 0.064 10.98*** 
Related -0.710*** 0.021 18.86*** 
Completely new 0.155 -0.085 3.25 
Non-controllable risk -1.485*** -0.548*** 40.77*** 
Controllable risk -0.800*** -0.513*** 5.10* 
Covariates    
Domestic experience 0.627* Fixed  
Potential slack -2.223** Fixed  
Foreign experience -0.262 Fixed  
Class sise 0.415 0.585  
Sig. codes:  <0.001 ‘***’, <0.01 ‘**’, <0.05 ‘*’  
Note: Class 2 is taken as reference group in covariate analysis. 
 
Table 10 Willingness-to-pay (WTP) ratio for risk variables 
 Class 1 WTP Class 2 WTP 
Non-controllable risk -1.861 -1.220 
Controllable risk -1.000 -1.155 
 
On top of class allocation, LCL offers an appealing feature that can relate class 
membership to a set of covariates (Bandeen-Roche, Miglioretti, Zeger, & Rathouz, 1997). 
Influences of covariates on individuals are completely reflected in their posterior class 
membership. We find that managers who believe they perform better in the domestic market are 
more likely to belong in Class 1. One might argue that in general Class 1 managers are more 
risk-averse than Class 2 managers, who do not respond negatively to the presence of powerful 
stakeholder and changing line of business. Nevertheless, a closer look at the institutional risks 
suggests that managers with successful home country experience are relatively less deterred by 
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controllable risk yet have a stronger aversion to non-controllable risk, compared to those 
without successful domestic cross-regional operations. Therefore Hypothesis 3a and 3b are 
supported. Conversely, firms’ potential slack is positively associated with managers’ 
membership in Class 2, which are less averse to non-controllable risk and more averse to 
controllable risk than Class 1, thereby confirming Hypothesis 4b but rejecting 4a. Firm’s 
international experience is only marginally significantly associated with class membership 
(p<0.057). It is not surprising as research suggests that the lack of prior international experience 
may no longer be a significant constraint for risk-taking in Chinese MNEs’ FDI location choices 
(Lu, Liu, Wright, & Filatotchev, 2014). 
 
4.5 Discussion and Implications 
This study revisits IB theorising on the relationship between experience and risky FDI 
location decisions, and provides an individual level explanation from risk propensity 
perspective to complement the firm-level research. Empirical tests also confirm managerial risk 
propensity being influenced by firm-level contextual variables, as opposed to representing 
constant personality traits. Unlike previous studies focusing on policy risk or regulated 
industries with unique characteristics (Delios & Henisz, 2003b; Garcia-Canal & Guillén, 2008; 
Holburn & Zelner, 2010; Makhija, 1993), we have constructed and tested arguments that can 
inform the general location choice literature. 
 
Our experimental analysis presents two key findings. First, we show that managers hold 
different views on international risks. When it appears that one group of managers are more risk 
averse than another – as current theories assume, a closer look suggests more nuanced patterns. 
Managers not only display heterogeneous risk propensity to a given aspect of international risk, 
but also tend to be more averse to non-controllable risks and less averse to more controllable 
risks, providing a more informed view than the overall risk-seeking/risk-averse bifurcation. 
Second, the conceptualisation of risk propensity allows us to examine the reasons underlying 
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the heterogeneity other than simplistically attributing it to personality trait. Our finding reveals 
that managers’ risk propensity varies with the perceived success of home country experience. 
Firms’ potential slack also influences managerial risk propensity regarding the non-controllable 
political risk. To summarise, managers are indeed different in risk attitude as expected, but what 
matters is the context and the nature of risk under analysis. 
 
Our empirical results have important implications for theorising about FDI decision in 
general and location choice in particular. Firstly, previous theorisation about MNEs’ risky FDI 
largely relies on firm-level explanations (Delios & Henisz, 2003a; Delios & Henisz, 2003b; 
Henisz & Delios, 2001; Jiménez, Luis-Rico, & Benito-Osorio, 2014) and barely considers the 
role of managers who make strategic choices in response to the configuration of firm 
capabilities, environmental characteristics and personal preferences (Child, 1972; Schotter & 
Beamish, 2013). Our findings suggest that risk propensity rather than dispositional risk 
preference determines managers’ risk-taking behaviour, and latent heterogeneity in risk-taking 
can be explained by subjective performance feedback and objective firm characteristics. Thus, 
managers’ interpretation of prior experience rather than the experience or resources per se 
influences the decisions they subsequently make, raising the question to what extent the 
deterministic models can explain FDI decisions without recourse to individual cognitive 
processes (Bourgeois, 1984; Hitt & Tyler, 1991). Accounting for the mediating role of 
managerial preference and cognition may reconcile the mixed findings of firm-level risk 
research, especially regarding whether EMNEs are constrained by international risk (Duanmu, 
2012; Kang & Jiang, 2012; Quer, Claver, & Rienda, 2012; Ramasamy, Yeung, & Laforet, 2012). 
 
Secondly, despite the fact that “institution” consists of a number of dimensions 
including rule of law, quality of judicial system and quality of public goods (Peng, Wang, & 
Jiang, 2008), the current IB literature tends to arbitrarily generalise the effect observed on one 
dimension to the “institution” as a whole. However, we find that the effect of institution-related 
risk may vary depending on the specific dimension being considered. Knowledge and cognitive 
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resources about how to operate in corrupt countries can only induce managers to invest in 
corrupt foreign countries but not necessarily in politically unstable countries (Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2006; Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008), although both fall in the category of “weak institutions”. 
We cannot take for granted that EMNEs are more likely to expand to and survive in other 
developing countries owing to previous exposure to weak institutions (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 
2011). Whether EMNEs have a strong propensity to invest or enjoy an advantage in other 
countries depends on the institutional characteristics analysed (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008). 
Some countries boast a well-developed democratic political system as a legacy of colonialism 
but suffer from an ineffective legal system against organised crime or corruption (Henisz, 2000). 
The final decision is determined by the weights managers place on each aspect of international 
risk, which are associated with their relevant experiences (Delios & Henisz, 2003b; Perkins, 
2014) and performance history (Sitkin & Weingart, 1995). This poses question about the 
boundary of assuming managers as monolithically risk-averse or risk-seeking, as is seen in 
behavioural decision research. 
 
Thirdly, our focus on the role of experience enriches the current understanding of the 
theoretical link between experience and location decisions (Coeurderoy & Murray, 2008; 
Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Driffield, Jones, & Crotty, 2013; Ramos & Ashby, 2013). 
Extant literature on EMNEs has devoted much discussion to the proposed home-country based 
advantages (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011). Our finding suggests that the learning effect derived from 
sub-national venturing is contingent on the aspects of institutional risk being considered, and 
could indeed prevent them from leveraging the unique, institution-based advantages (Cuervo-
Cazurra & Genc, 2008). Thus the simplistic classification of advanced as opposed to weak 
institutions based on gross aggregations has masked the unique effects of different sub-
dimensions of institutions. In contrast to the home country learning argument, we find that 
managers with successful domestic experience are particularly averse to political risk, 
conforming to the loss-aversion thesis. This evidence points to the boundary of prospect theory 
given that loss aversion is only observed when managers face non-controllable, external threat. 
 113 
 
Further, the insignificant effect of international experience vis-à-vis the significant effect of 
domestic experience may suggest that Chinese managers still rely on domestic mindsets when 
expanding abroad (Nadkarni & Perez, 2007). This is also implied in the FDI research 
convention that the country of origin is predominantly used to measure distance to the host 
country (Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996; Kogut & Singh, 1988). 
 
Lastly, our results regarding the relationship between firm’s potential slack and risk 
propensity not only confirm that managers’ tendency to take risk can be influenced by 
contextual variables, but also contribute to the slack literature. Behavioural theory has long 
posited the effect of slack on risk-taking, yet the direction of this effect is still unsettled, not 
least in the context of internationalisation (Rhee & Cheng, 2002). Previous research pays 
relatively little attention to potential slack because the popular financial measure is usually 
highly correlated with another common control variable, i.e. firm sise (Rhee and Cheng, 2002). 
Very little evidence is found on the relationship between potential slack and ex-ante risk-taking 
as opposed to ex-post income stream uncertainty (Singh, 1986). Our results suggest that 
potential slack generally reduces managers’ avoidance to risk related locational attributes, 
lending support to the slack-as-resource argument where slack is viewed as facilitating strategic 
behaviour (Singh, 1986). This contrasts with Wiseman and Bromiley’s (1996) finding of 
“hunger-driven” view where low potential slack triggers problemistic search and risk-taking. 
One explanation lies in the difference between income stream uncertainty as examined by 
Wiseman and Bromiley (1996) and our focus on ex-ante managerial risk-taking. The untested 
applicability of previous conclusions based on income stream uncertainty in the context of 
strategic decision making offers opportunity for future research (Bromiley, 1991). Further, we 
only find support for the link between potential slack and non-controllable risk. While it is 
reasonable to infer from the literature that slack is helpful in dealing with non-controllable risk, 
its usefulness in the face of controllable risk is often assumed rather than tested. Our findings of 
the varying influence of slack on controllable vs. non-controllable risks merit further theoretical 
development regarding the mechanism of slack. 
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In addition, our unique methods provide some distinct advantages. First, previous firm-
level research capitalises on secondary data and reveals only average trends in location choices 
by lumping all firms into an undifferentiated group. Extant primary research, on the other hand, 
may find the data contaminated with managers’ retrospective biases and instead reveal 
“espoused theories of action” (Hitt & Tyler, 1991). While there are exceptions comparing the 
varying ways in which MNEs value location attributes as a function of ownership type 
(Ramasamy, Yeung, & Laforet, 2012) or knowledge-seeking motivation (Chung & Alcacer, 
2002), little attention has been paid from within the IB community to managerial preference 
heterogeneity (Buckley, Devinney, & Louviere, 2007). Our experimental investigation using 
finite mixture specification provides a finer-grained account of managers’ tendency to take risk 
than the simplistic bifurcation between risk-seeking and risk-averse actors. 
 
Second, behavioural strategists tend to push the argument to the point that managers are 
cognitively biased when evaluating external risk vis-à-vis their capability of controlling risk 
(Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Kiss, Williams, & Houghton, 2013; Simon, Houghton, & Aquino, 
2000), whilst economists do not subscribe to the assumption that managers are irrational by 
character and attribute the empirical anomalies to bounded rationality (March, 1978). Our 
methods allow us to circumvent the philosophical debate and control for informational 
constraints. Specific risks are presented in a stylised manner in the experiment so that the 
preferences revealed do not conflate with managers’ subjective evaluation of the riskiness of 
any specific location options, but rather reflect the general views on the relative importance of 
each risk involved in foreign investment.  
 
Third, the adoption of the experimental method allows for an examination of the 
relative importance of one aspect of international risk against another. It remedies the imperfect 
ability of secondary data research arising from the multicollinearity problem (Feinberg & Gupta, 
2009; Globerman & Shapiro, 2003; Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010). Without experimental 
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manipulation, it is hardly possible to tease apart the effect of political and legal risks since 
secondary data would show a high correlation. Applying experimentation to the context of 
international risk reveals fine-grained risk propensity associated with each specific aspect, 
contributing to the behavioural decision theory that focuses on a lumpy individual-level risk 
propensity. Our results also suggest that political risk and legal system are consistently regarded 
by managers as the most critical dimensions of environment in shaping organisation 
performance abroad. One implication is that the lack of predictability of country risk indicators 
may be due to a mismatch between the risk factors captured in these measures and those 
considered by managers (Kiss, Williams, & Houghton, 2013; Oetzel, Bettis, & Zenner, 2001). 
This caveat generalises to a whole range of institutional studies as the predictability of 
governance quality indicators may depend on the specificity of the dimensions being assessed. 
 
In the following chapter, we generalise our framework from Chapter 3 and the findings 
of Chapter 4 to the wider context. Specifically, we seek to examine, based on a secondary 
sample of Chinese MNEs, whether the cognition based explanation holds when extended to 
international experience in general and to firm level of analysis. We argue that a theoretical 
understanding of the risk concepts can help to explain the boundary of the organisational 
learning mechanism. Our findings regarding the varying effect of experience on mitigating 
different types of risks and regarding the residual heterogeneity in MNEs’ responses to risks 
lend support to our framework. In addition, we drawing upon signalling theory to examine 
whether firms’ responses to external investment assurance substitutes for internal learning. The 
empirical analysis underpins our contention that the framework we proposed in Chapter 3 
provides a much needed complement to the dominant capabilities paradigm. 
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5 THE ROLE OF EXPERIENCE IN FDI LOCATION CHOICE: 
CONTROLLABLE RISK, NON-CONTROLLABLE RISK, AND HIGH-
LEVEL GOVERNMENT VISITS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 International business research has shown an enduring interest in how experience 
influences firms’ foreign direct investment behaviour (Martin & Salomon, 2003). However, this 
theoretical relationship has not been adequately specified (Padmanabhan & Cho, 1999). One 
prominent example lies in the international risk literature. Evidence suggests that firms’ 
experience with high-risk countries can moderate the negative effect of risk on subsequent 
entries into other countries (Del Sol & Kogan, 2007; Delios & Henisz, 2003b; Holburn & 
Zelner, 2010). Yet this literature is almost exclusively focused on “political constraint” as a 
source of risk, and whether its theoretical ground can be generalised is less known.  
 
This gap in the literature has important implications. If the moderating effect is rightly 
rooted in the organisational learning theory as previous studies contend, we might need to 
caution the generalisability of the conclusion outside its theoretical boundary and establish the 
conditions under which firm experience can confer ownership advantages driving foreign 
expansion. Recent research has attempted to close this gap by comparing the effect of different 
types of risks. Garcia-Canal and Guillén (2008) find that firms from regulated industries 
respond to macroeconomic risk and policy instability in opposite ways. Oetzel and Oh (2014) 
view political risk as continuous, and natural disaster, technological disaster and terrorist attack 
as discontinuous risk. They show that experience is not a source of ownership advantage for 
firms to overcome discontinuous risk when entering foreign markets. This is in contrast to the 
received wisdom based on the analysis of political risk. Maitland and Sammartino (2015a) 
propose that political risk may come in different forms under two power settings – “status quo” 
and “change in status quo”, which may have varying theoretical implications. 
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Embracing the tension between the economic and behavioural point of view as to how 
risk should be conceptualised we draw a distinction between controllable and non-controllable 
risk. It is best manifest in March and Shapira (1987) who contrast gambling which involves 
predetermined odds with managerial risk-taking where managers believe they can exert a certain 
degree of control over the outcomes. Accordingly, we define non-controllable risk as 
determined fully by the external environment, and controllable risk can be influenced by firms 
and managers. To compare with previous findings, we discuss both aspects within the category 
of political risk. Under the “status quo” setting, political institutions literature suggests that 
political risk is an controllable variable as MNEs have “the ability to block adverse and/or 
promote favourable policy change” within the given political structure (Henisz, 2003: 181). But 
there are other types of political risk such as societal turmoil, ethnic conflict and civil warfare, 
which result from the high-level political game between various branches of the government 
(Dai, Eden, & Beamish, 2013; Henisz, 2003). Unlike the “status-quo” setting, MNEs have little 
ability to forestall the occurrence of violence under turbulent circumstances and have to take the 
risk as given. Empirical evidence indicates that political instability is not closely tied to policy 
change and should be treated separately (Brewer, 1983). Despite the important distinction 
between controllable and non-controllable political risk, previous studies tend to conflate them 
and generalise the conclusion from one aspect to the other. 
 
To be sure, one can draw a spectrum where one end is pure controllable risk and the 
other pure non-controllable risk. Any risk is a mix of both with varying weights. Nevertheless, 
drawing this conceptual distinction may help us understand the contradictory effect of 
experience as observed by previous studies. In addition, we extend the argument to the process 
of learning, and shed light on the residual, unobserved heterogeneity in firms’ responses to 
controllable versus non-controllable risk by reference to the organisational learning theory. 
Finally, despite the equivocal findings of experiential learning, the experience-as-learning 
argument is much researched. We further examine an alternative, unattended role of experience 
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in FDI location choice, which attenuates the signal strength of a governmental investment 
assurance initiative, that is, commerce ministerial visits from the home country to the host 
country. Our hypotheses are tested on a sample of Chinese listed manufacturing firms over 
2008-2012. 
 
We make three contributions to the literature. First, we reconcile the contradictory 
findings as to whether experience can mitigate the negative impact of risk on entry. We show 
that the received conclusion derived from the studies of political institutions cannot be 
generalised to all types of risks, not even to other types of political risk. There is a boundary for 
experiential learning beyond which experienced firms no longer enjoy advantages over their less 
experienced counterparts. Political risk is not a lumpy phenomenon as scholars have assumed. 
Literature sees a whole host of terms being used and different typologies established to describe 
country risk. Yet little attention has been paid to the nature of risk per se. We show that a revisit 
to the concept of risk itself and a theory-based approach to understanding risk-taking may yield 
important insights into FDI decisions. 
 
Second, we extend the learning literature by discussing unobserved heterogeneity in 
MNEs’ location strategies. Previous studies attribute the link between experience and FDI 
decisions to learning and capability. However, experience alone is not a sufficient condition for 
learning. A missing link in this relationship is cognition. We find a significant variation in the 
responses to controllable risk among MNEs originated from the same home country. This is not 
evident with regard to non-controllable risk. We ascribe the inter-firm variation to the 
unobservable role of subjective performance feedback and the way in which managers interpret 
the efficacy of prior strategies in a new context. Unobserved heterogeneity is unaddressed by 
previous studies using firm level data and singular models, and calls for further research on 
behavioural strategy. 
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Third, we examine an unconventional role of experience in decision making, in addition 
to the familiar experience-as-learning argument. International experience is viewed as 
moderating the effect of home country investment assurance signal on MNEs’ location choice. 
Signal fit and signalling effectiveness decline for experienced firms, whose information search 
and opportunity assessment behaviour tends to be driven by routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982). 
We also extend the application of the signalling theory in management research. Previous 
discussion of information asymmetry primarily revolves around the communication of 
organisational characteristics, and much of the research focuses exclusively on financial 
structure and managerial incentive as signals and on stakeholders and financial investors as 
signal receivers (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011). We contribute to this literature by 
viewing home country government as signaller who intend to alleviate information asymmetry 
regarding host country business environment and convey its institutional support for home 
country investors by organising high-level government visits to the potential host country. Our 
findings suggest that not a ministerial visit per se but the right type of visit has an encouraging 
effect. The interaction between signal and firm experience also has practical implications for 
host countries wishing to attract established foreign firms through investment promotion 
initiatives. 
 
Next we explain the conceptual differences between controllable and non-controllable 
risk as rooted in two distinct theoretical traditions, and revisit the argument about the effect of 
experience on high-risk entry, which varies depending on the nature of the risk. Our theorisation 
moves on to the process of learning where inter-firm variations arise, and concerns how 
experienced vis-à-vis less experienced firms scan and interpret the signal conveyed by business-
oriented high-level government visits. Then we present the empirics where particular attention 
is paid to observed and unobserved heterogeneity among MNEs. Discussion and implications 
follow.  
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5.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
5.2.1 Non-controllable risk and controllable risk 
Research across economics, finance, marketing and strategy, that discusses risk in 
theory either traces back to Knight’s (1921) definition or takes it for granted as the received 
conceptual base for risk. Knight conceives of risk as measurable probabilities of alternative 
outcome states, and uses statistical probability to gauge risk when possible outcome states can 
be classified into classes and empirical data be obtained to indicate the frequency of those 
classes. Because the underlying, true probability distribution of the outcomes is presumably 
stationary, more confidence can be placed on the statistical probability as empirical data 
accumulates over time. This conceptualisation has a lasting influence particularly on 
neoclassical economics (Miller, 2009), upon which the mainstream IB theory is established 
(Buckley & Casson, 2009). 
 
Risk can be dealt with through hedging and insurance and is thus considered an 
insignificant issue (Meltzer, 1982). Whenever risk cannot be fully hedged in insurance markets, 
as in cross-border investments (Henisz, 2003), firms are assumed to take it as given and adjust 
resource allocation to align with the environmental prospects (Brouthers, 1995; Miller & 
Friesen, 1980). For sure, firms’ responses to risk may vary depending on their subjective 
understanding of risk. But to Knight and his followers, the subjectivity is lodged in the 
differential judgmental ability to classify events in order to depict distributions rather than in the 
interplay between decision makers and the environment (Miller, 2007). In other words, risk is 
treated as a non-controllable element of the external environment. Political risk in this case 
refers to the instability of political conditions, including change of regime, civil war and societal 
unrest, which may incur monetary and other losses to MNEs (Aharoni, 1966; Miller, 1993). 
This understanding of risk is particularly evident in the country level studies of FDI where 
political risk is assumed to be entirely exogenous to MNEs, which respond only passively to the 
environmental characteristics of the host country (Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Liu, Voss, & Zheng, 
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2007; Fatehi & Safizadeh, 1994; Globerman & Shapiro, 2003; Loree & Guisinger, 1995; Sethi, 
Guisinger, Phelan, & Berg, 2003). 
 
On the other hand, behavioural decision theory challenges this mechanist view on risk. 
Behaviourist scholars suggest that unlike gamblers faced with predetermined odds, managers 
believe that the riskiness of a choice in managerial situations can be controlled and reduced to 
an acceptable level thanks to their skills, talents and capabilities (March & Shapira, 1987; 
McCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986). Managers are found to infuse this belief into the decision 
making process regarding high-risk, strategic investments (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011). This 
conceptualisation of risk is echoed by other behavioural perspectives such as organisational 
learning theory, and is also well received in the IB literature. 
 
IB scholars suggest that country risk, and even political risk alone, has multiple distinct 
aspects and these concepts need to accommodate a whole host of risk factors (Brown, Cavusgil, 
& Lord, 2015; Fitzpatrick, 1983; Lessard & Lucea, 2009; Miller, 1992; Simon, 1982). Both 
political institutions literature and non-market strategy research focus on a particular aspect of 
political risk which is a function of the political constraints upon the authorities’ discretionary 
behaviour, and over which firms enjoy a certain degree of control (Bonardi, Hillman, & Keim, 
2005; Henisz, 2000). Henisz and Zelner (2010: 91) state clearly that “insurance offers limited 
protection against policy risk because a firm’s exposure is largely determined by its own ability 
to manage the policy-making process”. Such political capabilities allow firms to interact with 
the host country authorities in pursuit of preferential treatment, and to preempt or block adverse 
policy changes (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Hillman & Hitt, 1999), creating a potential 
ownership advantage of MNEs (Henisz, 2003). Empirical evidence suggests that proactive 
management of the relationship with the host country government is a common strategy for 
MNEs to enter industries with strong government involvement and countries with unpredictable 
policy environment (Bonardi, 2004; Garcia-Canal & Guillén, 2008; Holburn & Zelner, 2010; 
Lawton, Rajwani, & Doh, 2013). Differential lobbying skills to engage local actors as surrogate 
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may lead the identical location to pose varying level of risk to two otherwise similar MNEs. 
Rather than passively assessing the environment per se, MNE managers take into consideration 
their own ability to enact a favourable firm-environment relationship and develop FDI entry 
strategies in accordance (Ring et al., 1990). 
 
While Henisz and his coauthors have tried to avoid using “risk” and instead introduce 
terms as varied as policy uncertainty, political hazard, political constraint and institutional 
idiosyncrasy, many tend to merge this research with the broad literature examining the effect of 
risk and uncertainty on FDI decision and expansion (Henisz & Zelner, 2010). Problem arises 
when the theoretical underpinning of this literature does not generalise to other aspects of 
political risk. For instance, political knowledge and capability cannot address the inherent 
instability of a host country’s regime. These risks arise when the power handover is contested 
via uprising by those who seek to challenge the political status quo (Maitland & Sammartino, 
2015a). The resulting society-wide unrest may always bring MNEs the threat of disruptions and 
losses where lobbying and negotiation skills are to little avail. In management theory, there are 
notable distinctions between non-controllable environment that cannot be influenced by firms, 
and controllable environment that in part results from firms’ own behaviour (Weick, 1979). One 
example is the received bifurcation between endogenous and exogenous uncertainty in the real 
option literature (Cuypers & Martin, 2009; Folta, 1998). Following this tradition, we define 
non-controllable risk as determined fully by the external environment, and controllable risk as 
that can be influenced by firms and managers. While any risk in reality is a mix of both, 
lumping together the two distinct aspects of political risk may deprive researchers of the 
opportunity to examine their different theoretical implications and lead to confusing conclusions. 
 
5.2.2 Risk, experience and FDI entry 
 There is a sizable body of literature on the relationship between host country risk and 
firms’ foreign entry. Both survey and secondary data research at the firm level reach a general 
conclusion that MNEs tend to avoid investing in countries with high risk and reduce the level of 
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resource commitment should they choose to enter (Delios & Beamish, 1999; Delios & Henisz, 
2000; Delios & Henisz, 2003a; Delios & Henisz, 2003b; Garcia-Canal & Guillén, 2008; Henisz 
& Delios, 2004, 2001; Holburn & Zelner, 2010; Oetzel & Oh, 2014; Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 
2010). This literature follows from the new institutional economics that explains how firms’ 
behaviour is affected by the administrative context in which they operate (North, 1990). Much 
of the discussion about risk has been centred on the host government’s discretionary 
policymaking capacities and lack of credible commitment to the rules of the game. 
 
Further, political institutions literature finds additional evidence that firms are not 
equally affected by host country risk. Some are less deterred, and some even proactively search 
for marketplace where the authorities’ monopoly control over formal rules is unchecked so as to 
negotiate preferential treatment relative to the competitors (Garcia-Canal & Guillén, 2008). A 
prominent explanation for this heterogeneity in entry behaviour is firms’ different stock of 
experience in the same or similar environment – at home or abroad (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011; 
Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2011; Del Sol & Kogan, 2007; Delios & Henisz, 2000; Delios & 
Henisz, 2003b; Holburn & Zelner, 2010). Experienced firms can to some extent overcome the 
threat of host country political risk, as evidenced by their spatial choice and ownership stake. 
 
Previous studies attribute this pattern to organisational learning since experience is an 
important channel through which capabilities can be built (Zollo & Winter, 2002). Learning 
theory suggests that economic agents gain informational advantages that can be redeployed in 
the neighbourhood of their past courses of action (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011; Cuervo-Cazurra & 
Genc, 2008). In the context of FDI, experiential learning develops knowledge about the extent 
to which an institutional configuration would pose threat to foreign investors, and help 
managers create firm-specific coping mechanisms through which they can exercise control over 
the policy environment in other countries (Henisz, 2003). Such mechanisms include forming 
political network for acquiring insider information and engaging in back-stage activities for 
obtaining desirable regulatory conditions, among others (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). More 
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importantly, experiential knowledge as to which coping mechanism is best suited to tackle a 
political situation would be eventually transformed to mental models and “selection heuristics” 
in particular, which influence the way in which managers evaluate the attractiveness of location 
alternatives in subsequent foreign investments (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011; Maitland & 
Sammartino, 2015a). Repeated exposure to the same risk may convince managers that they can 
rely on the coping mechanisms to contain the effect of adversity and condition the odds 
suggested by the external information (Oetzel & Oh, 2014). While the effectiveness of the 
coping mechanisms largely depends on the relevance of previous experiences to the current 
context (Delios & Henisz, 2003b; Maitland & Sammartino, 2015a; Perkins, 2014), it does not 
necessarily require context-specific experience for a firm to enter a risky country. General 
international experience nurtures firm-specific internationalization knowledge and routines for 
sensing and seizing overseas opportunities (Eriksson, Johanson, Majkgard, & Sharma, 1997). In 
particularly, the breadth and heterogeneity of previous experience enriches firms’ cognitive 
resources for identifying power structure dynamics, and can compensate for the lack of 
experience in the focal country (Jiménez, Luis-Rico, & Benito-Osorio, 2014; Maitland & 
Sammartino, 2015a; Powell & Rhee, 2015).  
 
The well-received conclusion that experience can moderate the negative effect of risk 
on entry is predicated on two assumptions. First, organisational learning can help firms enact an 
operating environment that is less risky so that the decision to exploit ownership advantages in a 
foreign market can be justified. Second, firms take into account this competence in decision 
making and evaluate political risk against their own competence (Jiménez, Luis-Rico, & Benito-
Osorio, 2014). The second assumption is underpinned by behavioural decision research (March 
& Shapira, 1987). The first assumption fits well with risk being controllable, which by its nature 
can be influenced by managerial efforts. Yet it does not hold when the environmental risk is less 
controllable. In such cases, risk can no longer be reduced in any significant sense and firms do 
not enjoy any substantial advantage of lower risk over others, regardless of their experience. 
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Prominent examples of non-controllable risk occurring in the wider operating 
environment include political turmoil, natural disasters and terrorist attacks, which are difficult 
to anticipate and could have a tremendous impact on firms’ performance and survival. Under 
these threats, firms can do little beyond developing reactive strategies and business continuity 
plans. Some firms may be better prepared than others in the sense that they can swiftly evacuate 
personnel, switch to alternative supply chains and acquire recovery assistance from the host 
country and the representatives of the home country (Webb, Tierney, & Dahlhamer, 2002). Yet 
such preparedness requires experience specifically related to suffering or managing very similar 
risks, and even repeated experience of that kind (Oetzel & Oh, 2014). Given the singular and 
idiosyncratic nature of these risks, this is often not the case for many MNEs, not least EMNEs 
which have just started international expansion. Even if they had such experience, the risk they 
face would be not substantially different to that faced by inexperienced firms. Empirical 
evidence confirms that experience with high-impact terrorist attacks as well as natural and 
technological disasters has no effect on entry into other countries suffering similar conditions 
(Oetzel and Oh, 2014). The same argument holds for political turmoil. Precautionary strategies 
can neither prevent riots-induced nationalisation or destruction of corporate property, nor can it 
reduce anti-foreigner sentiment among the citisens during power reshuffles. As experience 
offers little advantage now, an entry is more difficult to justify, ceteris paribus. 
 
  Consensus has been reached in the literature that both policy and socio-political 
instability reduce the likelihood of entry by foreign firms in general (Buckley & Casson, 1998; 
Henisz & Delios, 2001). But how experience affects this relationship depending on the nature of 
the risks is less well understood. We argue that international experience is useful for firms to 
tackle controllable risk rather than non-controllable risk and thus hypothesise: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: MNEs that have more international experience are less deterred by host 
country controllable risk than those with less experience. 
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Hypothesis 1b: International experience does not affect firms’ responses to host 
country non-controllable risk.  
 
5.2.3 Unobserved heterogeneity in risk-taking 
Employing behavioural theory enables us to establish a relationship between observed 
heterogeneity in firms’ responses to controllable vs. non-controllable risks. This does not yet 
explain, however, the residual unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
Organisational learning theory suggests that experiential learning not only gives specific 
guidance for behaviour but also develops mental models for future decision making. Given the 
complexity of strategic decisions, managers commonly utilise simplifying mental models to 
economise on limited cognitive capacity (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000). In the case of risk 
assessment, mental models concern what informational cues are indicative of risk, where to find 
that information, and what constitute the evaluation criteria for interpreting the information 
(Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011; Bingham, Eisenhardt, & Furr, 2007). Assessing controllable risk 
requires an additional mental model. For instance, firms face such an eventuality in the ex-post 
policy environment that the favourable terms negotiated at the time of entry may be altered by 
the host country government in an obsolescing bargaining scenario. Thus managers need to 
factor into the entry decision their ability to guard against the overturning, alteration or 
reinterpretation of policy commitments (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Delios & Henisz, 2003a). 
When managers evaluate an entry opportunity, a biased overestimation of their own ability is 
often preferred to the external, unbiased performance distribution in a market (Wu & Knott, 
2006). Hence it is conceivable that controllable risk would trigger a particular mental model that 
concerns the efficacy of the knowledge and ability possessed at the point of entry. 
 
Undoubtedly, developing this mental model involves experiential learning. Yet there are 
two factors that are often unobservable from firm level data but play an important role in 
affecting the mental model. First is the performance feedback from previous experience that 
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provides direct information to shape this mental model (Bateman & Zeithaml, 1989; Chatterjee 
& Hambrick, 2011; Osborn & Jackson, 1988; Sitkin & Weingart, 1995; Thaler & Johnson, 
1990). The outcome history of forestalling the occurrence of unfavourable scenarios presents 
strong evidence to managers on the extent to which their skills, talents and capabilities can help 
control the risk in this particular task (March & Shapira, 1987). Under what circumstances the 
coping mechanisms have succeeded or failed may be translated into managers’ stereotypes and 
provide them with a frame of reference for evaluating new situations (Garud & Rappa, 1994). 
When the environmental change fits the specific pattern that firms have encountered in the past, 
this frame of reference contributes to the understanding of the causal relationship and provides 
guidance for commitment decisions. If the outcomes are inconsistent with expectation, firms 
acquire new knowledge as to how the boundary of this mental model is conditioned by context-
specific characteristics. A critical but often unaccounted factor in this process is that 
performance feedback is based on managers’ subjective evaluation as to whether the coping 
mechanisms are considered to have succeeded or failed (Zollo, 2009). 
 
Second is the interpretation of previous experience by firms without international 
experience. Those from the same home country supposedly share a similar mental model on 
how to enact the regulatory environment for their own favour since the institutional context 
conditions the way firms have operated and shapes the categories of behaviour that managers 
accept as legitimate (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008). The most 
informative source of capability cues is now experience in the home country. It is documented 
that adjusting the mental models for the structural differences between previous experience and 
the current context can enhance performance in the new context (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; 
Williams & Grégoire, 2015). Yet the structural differences between home and foreign 
environments are masked with substantial uncertainty and difficult for inexperienced firms to 
discern (Gavetti, Levinthal, & Rivkin, 2005). Firms are unlikely to distinguish the structural 
similarity from the surface one, and may fill the details of the situation with default assumptions 
consistent with the existing mental model. On the one hand, the perceived legitimacy of the 
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current practices tends to remain unchallenged without exposing to institutional pressures 
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). On the other hand, the absence of a concept in the home 
environment can leave firms unable to comprehend how regulatory, normative and cognitive 
institutions work in other countries. The lack of relevant experience limits firms’ ability to 
update the mental models and may lead some to “superstitious learning” (Levitt & March, 1988). 
They may well place varying degree of confidence on the extent to which the coping 
mechanisms they have successfully employed in the home country can bear fruit in foreign 
environments (Zollo, 2009). 
 
Therefore, we expect unobserved variation in firms’ responses to controllable risk after 
their international experience is accounted for. For experienced firms, this may be attributed to 
the role of managers’ subjective performance feedback in shaping mental models regarding 
taking these risks. For inexperienced firms, this may be because of managers’ varying 
perception of the applicability of home country strategies in foreign markets. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: There is unobserved variation in MNEs’ responses to host country 
controllable risk. 
 
We have argued that firms that have more experience with foreign operations do not 
possess an advantage of reduced non-controllable risk over the less experienced firms. Even 
though firms are unlikely to think they can secure an environment more favourable than others 
regarding non-controllable risk, it does not rule out the possibility that they may vary in their 
predictions of risk and therefore still display differential propensities to enter high-risk countries. 
Case research suggests that some managers and firms employ more complex evaluation 
heuristics and may achieve more accurate assessment of non-controllable risk than others 
(Maitland & Sammartino, 2015a). But the economic perspective contends that the quality of 
prediction does not depend on experiential learning. “Commitment decisions are based on 
several kinds of knowledge” (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977: 24), and objective knowledge may 
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confer equally important value as experiential knowledge in the assessment of non-controllable 
risk. Thus we do not expect that firms have any noticeable reasons to differ systematically in the 
prediction of non-controllable risk. 
 
Specifically, one does not need insider or private information to evaluate the likelihood 
of upcoming societal unrest and violence, which is a function of high-level political game 
(Henisz, 2003). While each country’s political game involves a unique mix of actors and 
interrelationships, there is a persistent structure among institutions that always allows firms to 
identify the triggers and magnitude of potential political turmoil by understanding the broad 
institutional fabric and the specific historical evolution (North, 1990). Organisational learning 
theory suggests that useful information regarding risk assessment includes to what extent the 
outbreak of non-controllable risks affects incumbent firms of similar characteristics including 
sise, industry and country-of-origin, and whether the affected firms managed to mitigate the 
magnitude of loss in any replicable ways (Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002). The consequence of 
political turmoil and instability is public knowledge to all potential entrants and often brought 
under spotlight by the media (Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, Brown, Emel, Goble, Kasperson, & 
Ratick, 1988). As opposed to creeping expropriation and other unseen disruptions, non-
controllable risk leads to visible impact and salient outcomes that have disproportionate 
signalling effect to potential entrants (March, Sproull, & Tamuz, 1991). Such signals lead firms 
to avoid allocating resources to high-risk countries according to the incumbents’ outcomes, or 
otherwise replicate their mitigating practices that have proved effective. The vicarious learning 
benefit may help reduce the exposure to disaster (Madsen, 2008) and is closely related to the so-
called “second-mover advantage” (Teece, 1986). 
 
On the other hand, developing sophisticated predictive models is often outside firms’ 
core area of expertise so that there is only minor gap between skilful and less skilful firms. By 
gathering more publicly available data on the triggers and conditions underlying the outbreak of 
past political events, less skilful firms can improve the understanding of the outcome 
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distribution and close the gap in predictive ability. Alternatively, firms can always resort to 
commercial risk rating agencies particularly specialised in assessing countries’ political 
instability for foreign investors. These agencies maintain large database for a range of countries 
and gather predictive opinions from experts who have a superior ability to classify recent events 
relative to MNEs (Meltzer, 1982). As opposed to the case where the firm-specific nature of 
controllable risk renders experiential knowledge particularly crucial (Henisz & Zelner, 2010), 
external information now becomes an equally if not more important input to managers’ 
subjective impressions about the non-controllable risk in the host environment (Kobrin, Basek, 
Blank, & Palombara, 1980; Pahud de Mortanges & Allers, 1996). 
 
Handing over part of the responsibility of managing non-controllable risk to insurers is 
also feasible. Unlike the case of controllable risk, insuring against non-controllable risk does not 
qualitatively differ from using financial instruments to hedge against volatile exchange rates, as 
opposed to the case of controllable risk (Henisz & Zelner, 2010). Incumbents rarely possess an 
informational advantage in their ability to mitigate the magnitude of externally determined risks 
over the insurers so that insurers can use the baseline risk premiums associated with the 
incumbents to price a policy for new entrants (Henisz, 2003). Therefore, we have no a priori 
reason to suggest that firms vary in the non-controllable risk they face when entering a given 
host country and in the way they perceive such risks. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: There is no unobserved variation in MNEs’ responses to host country 
non-controllable risk. 
 
5.2.4 High-level visit and experience 
 In addition to the experience-as-learning argument, experience assumes another 
important role in decision making as suggested by the signalling theory. Signalling theory 
follows from information economics that focuses on information asymmetries, which exist 
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when one party in the transaction holds private information unavailable to the other party who 
could make better decisions should they have it (Stiglitz, 2002). 
 
Spence’s (1973) seminal work formulates the signalling function of education that 
allows potential employers to distinguish between high-quality and low-quality candidates in 
the job market. “Quality” in the signalling theory broadly refers to any unobservable 
characteristic of the signaller that would be considered desirable by an outsider receiving the 
signal. A signal is formed when the signaller intentionally conveys the positive characteristic to 
the outsider who thus tends to choose the signaller from its alternatives, given that the outsider 
benefits from the resolution of informational uncertainty. Nevertheless, for an informative 
action taken by the signaller to count as an efficacious signal and to be able to resolve 
information asymmetry, it needs to be both observable to the outsiders and costly to the 
signallers (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011).  
 
One efficacious signal in the context of international business is business-oriented high-
level government visit, which provides a credible and notable signal as to home country 
government’s intention to encourage and support trade and investment relations with the 
potential host country. Given that states face resource constraints in diplomacy, some host 
countries are in a better position than others to receive high-level visits from a given home 
country as a result of long-term diplomatic engagement (Lebovic & Saunders, 2015). On the 
home side, choosing one country than another to reinforce diplomatic tie is driven by the 
desirability of bilateral trade growth (Nitsch, 2007; Pollins, 1989). Whether to extend this tie is 
also conditioned on cues from the host partner and by the home state’s overall strategic interests 
(Kinne, 2014). 
 
Informational uncertainty around the host country’s environment is considered a 
stumbling block to foreign investment by the internationalisation theory (Johanson & Vahlne, 
1977). An array of information sources has been examined in the literature, including firms’ 
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own international experience and peer organisations’ entry behaviours and outcomes, which 
inform the focal firm of its organisational legitimacy and economic feasibility (Belderbos, 
Olffen, & Zou, 2011; Chan, Makino, & Isobe, 2006). In addition to the firms’ own efforts to 
mitigate informational uncertainty, home country government can proactively signal the 
diplomatic, political and financial support for its companies to invest in a particular country 
rather than elsewhere. Formal ministerial visits with a clear business orientation are indicative 
of the government’s recognition and endorsement of a host country’s institutional and business 
environment. Investors who would have known little about the host country are made aware of 
their organisational legitimacy and economic feasibility being positive in that country when 
receiving this signal. As this information feeds into the decision function, high-level visits 
would lead to a higher likelihood of entry.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Business-oriented high-level government visit encourages MNEs’ entry 
to that host country. 
 
 Signalling theory posits that the same signal may have varying strength depending on 
the characteristics of the receiver. We discuss two specific behaviours – information search and 
assessment of opportunity – by experienced and less experienced firms. First, the link between a 
signal and the underlying quality is defined as signal fit, which determines the amount of 
attention potential receivers give to a given signal (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011). 
Business-oriented high-level government visits convey the message that there are business 
opportunities to be explored in the host country, and such opportunities fit with the general 
strategies and capabilities of firms from the focal home country. This signal may be particularly 
strong for less experienced firms, which are less knowledgeable about where to find relevant 
information to alleviate environmental uncertainty regarding potential investment destinations. 
As firms step into foreign territories, their own international experience becomes a more 
effective way to close the knowledge gap (Petersen, Pedersen, & Lyles, 2008) and relegates 
other sources of knowledge to a subordinate position (Bruneel, Yli-Renko, & Clarysse, 2010; Li, 
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Qian, & Yao, 2015). Experienced firms understand that the signal does not necessarily reflect 
the unobservable quality it is intended to unveil, and organisational routines tend to align 
information search efforts with the firm’s specific strategic trajectory (Betsch, Haberstroh, 
Glöckner, Haar, & Fiedler, 2001). The more experience a firm has, the more likely it is to 
maintain the routine of environment scan – aiming at the fit between the environment and firms-
specific advantages rather than identifying emerging opportunities that trigger investment waves. 
Further, experienced firms may have established firm-specific networks connecting with an 
array of foreign stakeholders. It is conceivable that they would rely more heavily on those 
networks than publicly available information since the private information the networks provide 
serves as a source of ownership advantage (Eriksson, Johanson, Majkgard, & Sharma, 1997). 
Therefore, less experienced firm are more attentive to high-level visit as a signal than more 
experienced firms. 
 
Second, the way in which receivers interpret the signal influences signalling 
effectiveness (Branzei, Ursacki-Bryant, Vertinsky, & Zhang, 2004). There are an array of 
environmental distortions from inside and outside the organisation (Lester, Certo, Dalton, 
Dalton, & Cannella, 2006). Less experienced firms are more likely to be affected by 
environmental distortion and particularly the influence of other signal receivers. The way less 
experienced firms assess an opportunity may be dependent on peer organisations’ responses to 
that signal. In contrast, experienced firms show more consistent mental models regarding 
investment evaluation, and follow routinised process of opportunity assessment in strategic 
decision making (Buckley, Devinney, & Louviere, 2007). They are thus less likely to pursue 
early mover advantages or respond to bandwagon pressures when detecting a promotion signal 
(McNamara, Haleblian, & Bernadine Johnson, 2008). 
 
Hypothesis 4: Compared to more experienced MNEs, those with less international 
experience are more encouraged by business-oriented high-level government visits to the host 
country. 
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5.3 Methods 
5.3.1 Sample and data 
 We test our hypotheses on listed Chinese MNEs’ FDI location choices over 2008-2012. 
We intentionally focus on the immediate aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis as MNEs in 
general are faced with heightened political and macroeconomic risk in this period, which have 
evidently affected their entry and expansion strategy in foreign territories (MIGA, 2014). A 
single home-country design allows us to control for the variation in the domestic mindset, which 
is shaped by the institutional environment in which the firms operate. We drew the sample of 
foreign investment from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) Directory of Foreign 
Investment Enterprises, and matched the firm list with those traded on the domestic stock 
exchanges provided by China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). We cross-checked 
the foreign investment activities with the CSMAR database – a widely-used source of parent 
firm data on Chinese listed companies. Complementary data were retrieved from firms’ annual 
reports, which provide further details on those investments made through the foreign 
subsidiaries rather than by the parent firms. We excluded the investment projects located in 
three major offshore tax havens for Chinese companies – Cayman Islands, British Virgin Island 
and Hong Kong (Buckley, Sutherland, Voss, & El-Gohari, 2015) – as well as those in Macau. In 
order to control for the broad industry effect, we restricted the sample to manufacturing firms 
according to the two-digit industry classification of listed firms by CSRC. We combined the 
information from MOFCOM with firm annual reports to obtain the data on firms’ international 
experience. Host country location-specific indicators were collected from various sources (see 
Table 11). After taking one-year lag and deleting observations with missing host country data, 
we obtained a sample of 506 location choices made by 212 firms among 59 countries (see Table 
12). The inclusiveness of our sample are further checked upon with the Bureau van Dijk (BvD) 
Osiris database.  
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5.3.2 Measurement 
Dependent variable. Our dependent variable Y,-. is a binary measure taking a value of 
one if firm ) invested in country / in year 0, and zero otherwise. In the cases where a firm makes 
multiple investments in a given country in a single year, they are counted as one location choice 
and the dependent variable coded as one regardless of the number of entries (Lu, Liu, Wright, & 
Filatotchev, 2014). 
 
Independent variables. Previous studies of FDI decisions have employed a range of 
broad country risk indicators as well as focused indicators denoting institution-related risks. As 
the moderating effect of experience on the relationship between country risk and location choice 
is most consistent and robust in respect of political or policy risk, we intentionally focus on 
institution-related risks to test our hypotheses and contrast with previous findings. Among the 
whole host of institutional risk measures, the World Governance Indicators (WGI) published by 
the World Bank are employed. WGI depict six dimensions of the institutions by which authority 
in a country is exercised. Previous research has used the WGI to study MNEs’ location choice 
(Lu, Liu, Wright, & Filatotchev, 2014; Ramasamy, Yeung, & Laforet, 2012), entry mode 
(Slangen & van Tulder, 2009), amount of activities (Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010) and 
divestment (Oh & Oetzel, 2011). One advantage of the WGI is that they summarise information 
from 32 existing data sources published by 30 institutes using statistical aggregation method so 
as to alleviate measurement errors associated with any single indicator (Kaufmann, Kraay, & 
Mastruzzi, 2010). However, previous studies rely primarily on the WGI’s “Political Stability 
and Absence of Violence” dimension to examine the impact of political risk (Oh & Oetzel, 2011; 
Ramasamy, Yeung, & Laforet, 2012). Others aggregate all six dimensions to a composite 
indicator and lose potentially important theoretical implications of different dimensions 
(Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010; Slangen & van Tulder, 2009). Although the dimensions are 
highly correlated with one another and factor analysis suggests that above 80 per cent of the 
variances are loaded on one factor, not all of them can be used as appropriate proxy for host 
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country risk. Risk measures need to be able to reflect the likelihood of unexpected changes that 
may incur losses, as opposed to “cost”, “challenge” and the current level of institutional 
development. We delve into the underlying questions that make up these dimensions and 
identify two appropriate institutional risk proxies. Specifically, “Political Stability and Absence 
of Violence” reflects agents’ perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or 
politically motivated violence, and particularly the extent to which internal and external conflict 
and terrorism affect businesses. “Rule of Law” measures the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, particularly regarding expropriation, observance 
and enforceability of contracts, property right protection, judicial check on government 
regulations, judicial independence from political interference, and crime. Both dimensions are 
consistently rated as the most concerning investment risks by MNE managers (MIGA, 2014). 
Despite being commonly featured in previous FDI studies, these two are often conflated under 
the general term “political instability” or “political risk”. We distinguish between non-
controllable and controllable risk by comparing the underlying questions used to construct each 
dimension with our definition set out earlier. “Political Stability and Absence of Violence” 
captures a range of events which mostly result from the historical engagement among politically 
active groups in the regime and over which firms can hardly exert any meaningful influence to 
prevent them from occuring. “Rule of Law”, in contrast, captures those elements of the 
institutional environment that MNEs can, or may actively, influence in their own favour by 
negotiating with local partners or engaging political strategies (Henisz & Zelner, 2010). While 
neither measure lies perfectly on one end of the controllability spectrum, each is clearly leaned 
toward one end than the other. In our specifications, we define non-controllable risk and 
controllable risk for host country / in year 0 as 1213214567*8 = −1	×	=>?)0)@A?	5BC0AD)?)0E	ABF	GDCHB@H	>I	J)>?HB@H*8,  3214567*K = −1	×	4L?H	>I	MAN*8. 
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Table 11 Data sources and descriptive statistics of the location attributes 
Variable Source Measurement N* Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CONRISK World Governance 
Indicators 
Reverse of the “Rule of Law” dimension; high 
values indicate higher risk. 
29,854 -0.36507 1.021521 -1.99964 1.668911 
NONCONRISK World Governance 
Indicators 
Reverse of the “Political Stability and Absence 
of Violence” dimension; high values indicate 
higher risk. 
29,854 0.03109 1.000188 -1.51389 2.811578 
BUS-VISIT This study Dummy variable takes the value 1 if minister 
and/or vice minister of commerce visit the host 
country alongside China trade and investment 
promotion delegation, and 0 otherwise 
29,854 0.148422 0.355524 0 1 
POL-VISIT This study Dummy variable takes the value 1 if minister 
and/or vice minister of commerce visit the host 
country alongside a member of China Politburo 
Standing Committee, and 0 otherwise 
29,854 0.323809 0.467936 0 1 
GDP World Bank The natural log of the GDP in current US$ 29,854 5.617177 1.58777 1.313589 9.649749 
GDP per capita World Bank The natural log of the GDP per head in current 
US$ 
29,854 9.121958 1.52254 5.50124 11.64166 
Unemployment International 
Labour 
Organisation 
Total employment, % of total labour force 29,854 7.358162 3.944614 0.7 24.7 
FDI openness IMF The ratio of to FDI net inflows over GDP 29,854 6.05849 31.75019 -57.4297 430.6407 
Patent WIPO The natural log of the total patent grants by 
applicants’ origin 
29,854 6.085881 3.220031 0 12.62697 
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Natural resource World Bank Total natural resources rents, % of GDP 29,854 7.583544 10.13142 0 64.07019 
Tax World Bank Total tax rate, % of commercial profits 29,854 44.53056 17.31182 14.1 112.9 
Trade MOFCOM The natural log of Chinese exports to the host 
country plus Chinese imports from the host 
country 
29,854 9.421588 1.541664 5.08246 13.00938 
Rules of FDI Global 
Competitiveness 
Report 
“Business Impact of Rules on FDI” item 29,854 4.809506 0.749501 1.9 6.7 
Culture Ronen and Shenkar 
(2013) 
Ordinal ranking of cultural blocks relative to 
China 
29,854 4.1 1.946824 1 7 
*N = 506 × 59 
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Table 12 Location distribution of investments by Chinese listed firms, 2008-2012 
Argentina 1 Israel 1 South Africa 10 
Australia 24 Italy 21 South Korea 5 
Austria 2 Japan 21 Spain 7 
Bangladesh 2 Kenya 2 Sri Lanka 1 
Belgium 3 Luxembourg 6 Sweden 3 
Brazil 16 Malaysia 5 Switzerland 7 
Bulgaria 5 Mali 1 Tajikistan 3 
Canada 18 Mexico 3 Tanzania 1 
Czech Republic 2 Morocco 2 Thailand 9 
Denmark 3 Netherlands 19 Tunisia 1 
Egypt 4 New Zealand 1 Turkey 2 
Ethiopia 2 Nigeria 3 Ukraine 1 
Finland 2 Pakistan 1 United Arab 
Emirates 
8 
France 9 Philippines 2 United Kingdom 8 
Germany 47 Poland 5 United States 100 
Ghana 6 Romania 4 Uruguay 1 
Hungary 1 Russia 15 Venezuela 1 
India 22 Saudi Arabia 3 Vietnam 11 
Indonesia 16 Singapore 23 Zambia 2 
Iran 1 Slovak Republic 1     
 
 We use “BUS-VISIT” to represent visits by the minister, or a vice minister, of 
MOFCOM accompanied by China Trade and Investment Promotion Delegation, which is 
organised by MOFCOM and consists typically of top executives from large state-owned 
enterprises and selected privately owned Chinese firms. To contrast with business-oriented 
high-level government visits, we also include “POL-VISIT” that indicates the visits by the 
minister or a vice minister of MOFCOM alongside a China Politburo Standing Committee 
member but not with the China Trade and Investment Promotion Delegation. Using high-level 
visits rather than lower-level but more frequent visits follows Nitsch (2007) and Lebovic and 
Saunders (2015) who argue that the high-level is of greater relevance for strategic decisions and 
support. Both “BUS-VISIT” and “POL-VISIT” take the value one when they visit the host 
country in a given year once or more, and zero otherwise respectively. We hand-collected the 
information for 59 host countries mainly from the MOFCOM website with complementary data 
from the websites of Chinese embassies, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and China’s 
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Central People Government. We take two-year lag which registers better overall model fit than 
one-year lagged data. A low correlation of 0.14 is observed between “BUS-VISIT” and “POL-
VISIT”. 
 
Control variables. Building upon the extant location choice studies, we control for a 
number of commonly featured host country attributes that may influence MNEs’ location 
choices. To account for market seeking investment, we measure market sise by the natural log 
of GDP and market attractiveness by the natural log of GDP per capita (Duanmu, 2014). To 
account for efficiency seeking investment, we use the percentage of total unemployment 
(Duanmu, 2014). To account for asset seeking investment, we measure sought-after resources 
by the natural log of one plus the number of patent granted to residents in the host country 
(Alcantara & Mitsuhashi, 2012; Chung & Alcacer, 2002). To account for resource seeking 
investment, we factor in the total resource rents as indicated by the differences between the 
value of natural resources at world prices and the total costs of production in the host country, 
as a percentage of GDP (Alcantara & Mitsuhashi, 2012). FDI openness is measured by the ratio 
of a country’s net FDI inflow to its GDP (Henisz & Delios, 2001). Trade relation reflects 
bilateral economic ties as denoted by the natural log of Chinese exports to the host country plus 
Chinese imports from the host country (Quer, Claver, & Rienda, 2012). Although we removed 
the investments in tax havens from our sample, tax rate is still regarded as one of the main 
location advantages by foreign investors. We measure it with the corporate marginal tax rate of 
a host country (Duanmu, 2012). Given that host country institutions are shown to influence 
MNEs’ entry rate, we take into account the immediate institutional environment regarding FDI 
using the “Business Impact of Rules on FDI” item in the Global Competitiveness Index. As part 
of the World Economic Forum’s annual survey, it reflects the extensive opinions of business 
leaders around the world on the extent to what rules and regulations encourage or discourage 
foreign direct investment in their countries. Finally, we control for the influence of culture using 
the cultural block distance (Delios & Henisz, 2003b). Following Barkema, Bell, and Pennings 
(1996), we establish an ordinal ranking of cultural blocks in terms of their comparative distance 
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from China (Ronen & Shenkar, 2013). The same block as China is scored one, the most 
proximate two and so on. Descriptive statistics of the host country attributes and their 
measurement are shown in Table 11. 
 
 We also include firms’ international experience as moderator and covariate in our 
analyses. Previous research suggests that experience breath has a stronger learning effect on FDI 
decision making than experience depth (Maitland & Sammartino, 2015a). We thus focus on 
the breadth of the experience and measure it by the natural log of one plus the number of foreign 
countries in which the focal firm has established one or more subsidiaries. Alternative measures 
will be discussed in the robustness test. 
 
5.3.4 Estimation methods 
 Consistent with previous studies (Buckley, Devinney, & Louviere, 2007; Chung & 
Alcacer, 2002), we model the location choices within the random utility framework. The utility 
of firm ! for location " in choice occasion # is: 
 $%&' = )%*%&' + ,%&' 
 
where *%&' is a vector of observed location specific attributes; )% is a vector of firm-
specific preference parameters or marginal utilities yet unobserved for each !; and ,%&' is the 
random component. 
 
Logit model is employed given the dichotomous dependent variable. To include both 
firm-specific experience and location-specific attributes for testing moderation, we use the 
unconditional fixed-effects logit with a dummy variable for each location choice instead of the 
conditional estimator (Holburn & Zelner, 2010). Standard errors are clustered by firm to control 
for serial correlation. A fixed-effects logit model with both firm and year dummies is also 
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estimated for robustness check. Unlike in a linear model, the coefficient on the interaction term 
in limited dependent variable models does not indicate the cross-partial derivative (Ai & Norton, 
2003). We calculate the true interaction effect and follow the interpretation format suggested by 
Wiersema and Bowen (2009). 
 
Our hypotheses also address how the attractiveness of location attributes varies by firm. 
To accommodate preference heterogeneity, we adopt mixed logit (MIXL) model that allows all 
parameters to be different across ! (Train, 2009). )% varies in the population as per the 
continuous density - )% .  where . defines the distribution, and this distribution in theory can 
take any shape. For the ease of estimation, we assume the random parameters to be 
independently normally distributed. Normal distribution is by far the most popular specification 
in previous applications of the MIXL (e.g., Chung & Alcacer, 2002). Arguably, having to 
choose the mixing distribution a priori is an inherent drawback of continuous segmentation 
models and potentially runs the risk of biased estimation. Nevertheless, normal distribution 
allows for both positive and negative values and stands as a useful assumption when no prior 
information is available. The parameter vector )% can be expressed as: 
 )% = ) + /% 
 
where /%~1 0, 45 . The influence of firm-specific characteristics is reflected in )% and 
particularly in the deviation term /%. We further accommodate observed preference 
heterogeneity in the model by introducing firm-specific covariates. Thus )% can be rewritten as: 
 )% = ) + Π7% + /% 
  
where 7% is a selection of characteristics of firm ! that influence the mean of the random 
preference parameters, and /% is the residual variation. In our application, 7% refers to firms’ 
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international experience. Given that the choice probability is an integral over the mixing 
distribution so that it cannot be calculated analytically, we use 3000 Halton draws from the 
distribution - )% .  to approximate each firm’s unconditional probability density (Train, 2009), 
and then maximise the simulated log-likelihood function (Revelt & Train, 1998). 
 
 While one might question the appropriateness of imposing a priori a mixing 
distribution on the preference parameters, MIXL has the advantage of revealing unobserved 
heterogeneity. It provides estimates for both the mean and standard deviation of the preference 
parameters so as to reveal whether and which location attributes are valued differently across 
the population (Chung & Alcacer, 2002). An additional advantage is that MIXL allows us to 
account for and test observed heterogeneity simultaneously, and relax conditional logit’s 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption. 
 
5.3.5 Results 
 Table 13 reports the coefficient and marginal effect for the unconditional logit model. 
When the estimated model coefficient on the interaction variable is significant, we calculate the 
values of the true interaction effect (Wiersema & Bowen, 2009). As expected, both controllable 
and non-controllable risks have negative effect on location choice. Commerce ministerial visits 
alongside a business delegation attract Chinese investment while those with a political leader do 
not influence location choice. The coefficient on the interaction between international 
experience and controllable risk is significant. So is the true interaction effect at the variable 
means. Conversely, the interaction between international experience and non-controllable risk 
has an insignificant coefficient. Following Wiersema and Bowen (2009), we present the value 
and significance of CONRISK’s marginal effect at a low (one standard deviation below mean), 
mean and high value (one standard deviation above mean) of international experience, holding 
all other model variables at sample mean. Table 14 shows that the marginal effect of 
controllable risk on the probability of entry is less negative at higher values of international 
experience. The same analysis is conducted for the interaction between BUS-VISIT and 
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international experience given the significant coefficient on the interaction variable. Table 15 
shows that as international experience increases, the marginal effect of business-oriented high-
level visit on entry becomes smaller. At the high value of international experience, the 
moderation renders the marginal effect insignificant. 
 
Given our hypothesis on unobserved heterogeneity, we allow all the parameters to be 
random and examine which of the location attributes are valued differently across the firms. 
Table 16 provides the estimates of the means and standard deviations of )% for the baseline 
specification. We contrast the mixed logit model with its fixed-effects equivalent, i.e. 
alternative-specific conditional logit. Although only three standard deviations are significant in 
model 6 and two in model 8, the log-likelihood ratio tests clearly prefer the mixed logit model. 
In particular, Column 6b and 8b suggest that firms respond to controllable risk differently, but 
are equally deterred by non-controllable risk, lending further support to the adoption of the 
random parameter specification. 
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Table 13 Determinants of location choice by Chinese listed firms, 2008-2012 
 Model 1 Mode 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Logit Marginal 
Effect a 
Logit Marginal 
Effect a 
Logit Marginal 
Effect a 
Logit Marginal 
Effect a 
         
CONRISK -0.7488*** -0.00722*** -0.8175*** -0.00787***     
 (0.211)  (0.217)      
NONCONRISK     -0.4932*** -0.00469*** -0.5491*** -0.00523*** 
     (0.119)  (0.127)  
BUS-VISIT 0.2932* 0.00283* 0.4013** 0.00386** 0.3246** 0.00309* 0.4502** 0.00429** 
 (0.124)  (0.147)  (0.119)  (0.143)  
POL-VISIT -0.0797 -0.00077 -0.0747 -0.00072 -0.1065 -0.00101 -0.1067 -0.00102 
 (0.100)  (0.114)  (0.099)  (0.114)  
         
Int. experience -0.0393*** -0.00038*** -0.0141 -0.00014 -0.0304*** -0.00029*** -0.0184 -0.00017 
 (0.006)  (0.0155)  (0.006)  (0.012)  
GDP 0.3650*** 0.00352*** 0.3678*** 0.00354*** 0.5242*** 0.00498*** 0.5285*** 0.00504*** 
 (0.089)  (0.089)  (0.103)  (0.104)  
GDP per capita -0.3688** -0.00356** -0.3713** -0.00357** -0.3098** -0.00295** -0.3150** -0.00300** 
 (0.125)  (0.125)  (0.104)  (0.104)  
Unemployment -0.0069 -0.00007 -0.0077 -0.00007 -0.0026 -0.00003 -0.0033 -0.00003 
 (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.016)  
FDI openness 0.0080*** 0.00008*** 0.0080*** 0.00008*** 0.0069*** 0.00007*** 0.0069*** 0.00007*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Patent -0.1849*** -0.00178*** -0.1844*** -0.00178*** -0.1149** -0.00109** -0.1144** -0.00109** 
 (0.051)  (0.050)  (0.039)  (0.039)  
Natural resource -0.0080 -0.00008 -0.0082 -0.00008 -0.0101 -0.00010 -0.0101 -0.00010 
 (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)  
Tax -0.0059 -0.00006 -0.0060 -0.00006 -0.0065 -0.00006 -0.0065 -0.00006 
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  
Trade relation 0.7280*** 0.00702*** 0.7289*** 0.00702*** 0.5198*** 0.00494*** 0.5200*** 0.00495*** 
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 (0.116)  (0.116)  (0.110)  (0.110)  
Rules of FDI -0.2290 -0.00221 -0.2217 -0.00213 0.0658 0.00063 0.0667 0.00064 
 (0.139)  (0.139)  (0.101)  (0.102)  
Culture 0.1005* 0.00097* 0.1019* 0.00098* 0.0272 0.00026 0.0284 0.00027 
 (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.046)  (0.047)  
         
Int. experience × 
CONRISK 
  0.0227* 
(0.011) 
0.00038**     
         
Int. experience × 
NONCONRISK 
      0.0167 
(0.010) 
 
         
Int. experience × 
BUS-VISIT 
  -0.0405* 
(0.019) 
-0.00044*   -0.0463* 
(0.021) 
-0.00051* 
         
Int. experience × 
POL-VISIT 
  0.0004 
(0.023) 
   0.0011 
(0.023) 
 
         
Constant -8.2011***  -8.3179***  -8.9496***  -8.9672***  
 (1.428)  (1.443)  (1.288)  (1.301)  
Group dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 29,854 29,854 29,854 29,854 
Log-likelihood -2250.2 -2245.3 -2250.0 -2246.9 
Robust standard errors clustered by firm below coefficients. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
a Computed at sample mean. 
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Table 14 The marginal effect of CONRISK at varying experience levels 
 Value of experience Marginal effect of CONRISKa z-statistic 
Model 2 Low -0.00933* -4.19 
 Mean -0.00721* -3.87 
 High -0.00543* -3.29 
* p < 0.05 
a Computed at sample mean. 
 
 
Table 15 The marginal effect of BUS-VISIT at varying experience levels 
 Value of experience Marginal effect of 
BUS-VISITa 
z-statistic 
Model 2 Low 0.00516* 2.56 
 Mean 0.00268* 2.18 
 High 0.00062 0.58 
    
Model 4 Low 0.00590* 2.92 
 Mean 0.00295* 2.52 
 High 0.00061 0.55 
* p < 0.05 
a Computed at sample mean. 
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Table 16 Conditional logit (CL) vs. mixed logit models (MIXL) 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 Conditional logit 
Means 
(6a) 
Std. Dev. 
(6b) 
Conditional 
logit 
Means 
(8a) 
Std. Dev. 
(8b) 
       
CONRISK -0.7210*** -0.6337** 0.4973**    
 (0.205) (0.206) (0.182)    
NONCONRISK    -0.4741*** -0.3459** 0.0219 
    (0.116) (0.111) (0.283) 
BUS-VISIT 0.2537* 0.1870 0.0002 0.2851* 0.2121 0.0014 
 (0.118) (0.129) (0.279) (0.113) (0.128) (0.272) 
POL-VISIT -0.0722 -0.0615 0.0181 -0.0963 -0.0785 0.0036 
 (0.095) (0.099) (0.323) (0.094) (0.098) (0.319) 
       
GDP 0.3394*** 0.2407** 0.0095 0.4940*** 0.3503*** 0.0108 
 (0.086) (0.091) (0.165) (0.100) (0.097) (0.169) 
GDP per capita -0.3552** -0.1106 0.5685*** -0.2984** 0.0453 0.6930*** 
 (0.121) (0.159) (0.130) (0.102) (0.131) (0.110) 
Unemployment -0.0072 -0.0004 0.0381 -0.0032 0.0073 0.0276 
 (0.017) (0.023) (0.034) (0.016) (0.021) (0.039) 
FDI openness 0.0077*** 0.0060** 0.0001 0.0066*** 0.0052** 0.0000 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Patent -0.1770*** -0.1658*** (0.0503) -0.1099** -0.1295** 0.0073 
 (0.049) (0.048) (0.111) (0.038) (0.040) (0.097) 
Natural resource -0.0076 -0.0073 0.0030 -0.0098 -0.0083 0.0021 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.019) (0.008) (0.008) (0.022) 
Tax -0.0055 -0.0044 0.0002 -0.0061 -0.0055 0.0002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) 
Trade relation 0.7101*** 0.9651*** 0.3370*** 0.5098*** 0.8232*** 0.3170*** 
 (0.113) (0.126) (0.071) (0.107) (0.121) (0.070) 
Rules of FDI -0.2142 -0.0649 0.0198 0.0700 0.0755 0.0075 
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 (0.135) (0.137) (0.267) (0.099) (0.112) (0.244) 
Culture 0.1004* 0.1430** 0.0874 0.0308 0.0982* 0.0919 
 (0.049) (0.048) (0.081) (0.045) (0.046) (0.071) 
       
Observations 29,854 29,854 29,854 29,854 
Group 506 506 506 506 
LRT MIXL vs. CL -1758.0 -1721.0*** -1757.8 -1721.0*** 
Robust standard errors clustered by firm below coefficients. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05  
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In Table 17, we include international experience as firm-specific covariate that may 
influence the mean of the risk and high-level visit parameters. It is shown that international 
experience breadth increases the mean of the controllable risk parameter. On average, more 
experienced firms respond less negatively to controllable risk when making FDI location 
choices than their less experienced counterparts. Conversely, international experience does not 
significantly influence the mean of the non-controllable risk parameter. This result, combined 
with Table 13 and Table 14, confirm Hypothesis 1a and 1b. After the influence of experience on 
risk-taking is accounted for, there is still residual variation in the controllable risk parameter, as 
evidenced by its significant standard deviation. Firms respond to controllable risk differently 
due to unobserved heterogeneity. In contrast, non-controllable risk affects firms’ location 
choices in a negative and uniform way. This supports our theorisation that explicitly 
distinguishes between controllable risk and non-controllable risk, and confirms Hypothesis 2a 
and 2b. It should be noted that under the normal distribution assumption, even though some 
firms may be less deterred by controllable risk than others, the z-scores would suggest that they 
are unlikely to prefer risky locations to less risky ones. With regard to high-level government 
visits, BUS-VISIT has a positive effect on the likelihood of market entry for both models. Again, 
the signalling effect only applies to commerce ministerial visits with a business orientation since 
the direct effect of POL-VISIT does not register significant estimate. Thus Hypothesis 3 is 
supported. Firms’ international experience breadth negatively moderates the signalling effect by 
reducing the mean of the BUS-VISIT parameter, such that more experienced firms are less 
receptive to the signal conveyed by business-oriented high-level visits. This result, alongside 
Table 15, confirms Hypothesis 4. International experience does not affect the mean parameter of 
POL-VISIT, as was also denoted by Table 15. 
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Table 17 Mixed logit models 
  Model 9 Model 10 
 
 
Means 
(10a) 
Std. Dev. 
(10b) 
Means 
(10a) 
Std. Dev. 
(10b) 
H2a CONRISK -0.8650*** 
(0.213) 
0.4906** 
(0.174)   
H2b NONCONRISK 
  
-0.4414*** 
(0.132) 
0.0099 
(0.260) 
H3 BUS-VISIT 0.3722* 
(0.158) 
0.0236 
(0.257) 
0.4208** 
(0.156) 
0.0164 
(0.258) 
 POL-VISIT -0.0687 
(0.124) 
0.0265 
(0.329) 
-0.1006 
(0.123) 
0.0146 
(0.320) 
      
 GDP 0.2525** 
(0.092) 
0.0057 
(0.137) 
0.3620*** 
(0.099) 
0.0184 
(0.125) 
 GDP per capita -0.1618 
(0.141) 
0.5428*** 
(0.110) 
-0.0033 
(0.131) 
0.6625*** 
(0.108) 
 Unemployment -0.0096 
(0.024) 
0.0510 
(0.028) 
0.0008 
(0.023) 
0.0379 
(0.034) 
 FDI openness 0.0062** 
(0.002) 
0.0001 
(0.002) 
0.0053** 
(0.002) 
0.0002 
(0.002) 
 Patent -0.1682*** 
(0.047) 
0.0448 
(0.091) 
-0.1246** 
(0.041) 
0.0223 
(0.079) 
 Natural resource -0.0094 
(0.010) 
0.0125 
(0.018) 
-0.0085 
(0.008) 
0.0036 
(0.028) 
 Tax -0.0043 
(0.005) 
0.0004 
(0.008) 
-0.0055 
(0.005) 
0.0003 
(0.008) 
 Trade relation 0.9369*** 
(0.124) 
0.3131*** 
(0.072) 
0.7983*** 
(0.122) 
0.3003*** 
(0.071) 
 Rules of FDI -0.0700 
(0.137) 
0.0528 
(0.256) 
0.0767 
(0.113) 
0.0003 
(0.241) 
 Culture 0.1410** 
(0.047) 
0.0931 
(0.073) 
0.0964* 
(0.046) 
0.0959 
(0.067) 
      
H1a Int. experience × 
CONRISK 
0.3845** 
(0.121) 
   
H1b Int. experience × 
NONCONRISK 
  0.1323 
(0.095) 
 
      
H4 Int. experience × 
BUS-VISIT 
-0.3147* 
(0.160) 
 -0.3620* 
(0.160) 
 
 Int. experience × 
POL-VISIT 
0.0341 
(0.117) 
 0.0496 
(0.116) 
 
    
 Observations 29,854 29,854 
 Groups 506 506 
 Log-likelihood -1713.0 -1717.3 
Robust standard errors clustered by firm below coefficients. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05   
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5.3.6 Robustness test 
We test the robustness of our results in four respects. Firstly, in order to align with the 
comparison between conditional logit and mixed logit, we have chosen to add group dummy in 
the logit models (Table 13). When choice sets contain many alternatives, i.e. host countries in 
this case, unconditional estimator may produce biased results (Katz, 2001). Nevertheless, 
previous studies of location choice find only trivial differences in control variables when 
comparing the results of conditional and unconditional models (Holburn & Zelner, 2010; Oetzel 
& Oh, 2014). To eliminate this concern, we also estimate conditional logit and unconditional 
fixed-effects logit with firm and year dummies on the baseline specification. The results are 
qualitatively identical. 
 
Secondly, there are cases where a firm made more than one location choice and chose 
more than one country among the same group of countries in a single firm-investment year. 
This data structure may potentially violate the utility maximisation assumption underlying the 
random utility theory. In our main specifications, we treat the cases with multiple positive 
outcomes as different choices and ensure that the correlation between successive market entries 
by the same firm is accounted for in estimation. To test the robustness our results, we construct 
an alternative sample that eliminates the problem of multiple location choices in any firm-year. 
We do so by randomly selecting an investment observation from each firm-year that has 
multiple location choices and obtain 336 location choices, in which 191 are invested by firms 
with international experience and 145 by inexperienced firms among 51 host countries. We 
estimate our models on this sample and compare the results with those of the main specification. 
Despite the reduced statistical power, the variables of interest remain significant and thus the 
conclusions hold. 
 
Thirdly, we test the hypotheses using alternative measures of international experience. 
From both the MOFCOM Directory of Foreign Investment Enterprises and BvD Osiris, we 
collected data on a) the number of years since first foreign investment, and b) the number of 
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foreign subsidiaries firms have for each firm-year. The results show that log-transformed 
measures provide lower p-value than the raw measures but all results remain qualitatively the 
same regardless. 
 
Lastly, while we attribute the residual variation in MNEs’ responses to controllable risk 
to the unobserved process of learning, EMNE literature points to an alternative source of 
heterogeneity in that state ownership reduces firms’ concerns over host country risk (Duanmu, 
2012, 2014; Ramasamy, Yeung, & Laforet, 2012). To control for this effect, we add in model 9 
a dummy variable for state control. The results suggest that state ownership indeed increases the 
mean parameter of controllable risk as expected but the residual variation remains significant. 
 
5.4 Discussions and Future Research 
 There is a sizable body of literature as to whether and how MNEs can benefit from 
experiential learning in foreign expansion. Experience is regarded as an important source of 
firm capability. This explains why some firms are less deterred by host country risk than others 
and thus can exploit the economic growth and cost advantages in emerging countries (Feinberg 
& Gupta, 2009). Yet the conclusion so far remains unsettled as the boundaries of experiential 
learning are not fully understood. Moreover, extant research has paid less attention to the role 
experience plays other than learning in FDI decision-making. 
 
To reconcile the contradictory conclusions of the previous studies (Oetzel & Oh, 2014), 
we draw a distinction between controllable and non-controllable risk. Controllable risk is 
specific to the firm or individual while non-controllable risk has uniform impact on the 
population (Henisz & Zelner, 2010; Wu & Knott, 2006). This distinction has evolved from how 
economics and behavioural theory conceptualise managerial risk respectively. To test the 
validity of this approach, we intentionally focus our discussion on the variety of political risk, 
which has been assumed to be controllable to MNEs in the political institutions literature 
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(Henisz & Zelner, 2010). We argue that the familiar indicators of policy instability as measured 
by the separation of power in the government are not posed to capture the non-controllable 
aspect of political risk – for instance the social unrest and civil violence across Ukraine in 
relation to the presidential elections in 2004 and 2014. 
 
This distinction proves meaningful as we find that international experience does not 
confer an advantage in dealing with non-controllable risk. The organisational learning argument 
is corroborated in the sense that only under circumstances where risk can be reduced by firms’ 
own capability would experiential learning become beneficial. Previous studies have drawn this 
conclusion from the industry sectors that are either highly regulated by the government or 
recently open to private ownership (Henisz & Zelner, 2001; Holburn & Zelner, 2010; Jiménez, 
Luis-Rico, & Benito-Osorio, 2014; Lawton, Rajwani, & Doh, 2013). These industries are 
particularly exposed to government’s discretionary regulations (Henisz, 2000) where political 
capabilities are of crucial importance (Bonardi, 2004). Our study shows that even manufacturing 
firms – which seem less likely to possess political capabilities and less subject to government 
intervention – seek to influence the political environment in their favour. The breadth of 
previous experience across different foreign countries may enhance firms’ routines and 
capabilities regarding the management of regulatory environment, contractual dispute, and 
expropriation of intellectual properties. In previous studies, the importance and creation of 
general internationalisation knowledge and routines is less examined than is context-specific 
knowledge (Eriksson, Johanson, Majkgard, & Sharma, 1997). Our finding implies that the 
political institutions literature may have broader theoretical implications than have been 
explored, and can link up with the vast capabilities paradigm. The fact that some risks 
universally scare off foreign investors while others invite well-established MNEs also provides 
policy implications for the government of least developed countries. 
 
Experience alone is sufficient for learning. Organisational learning literature has 
extensively discussed the process of learning in relation to performance feedback and 
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knowledge transferability. Firms align entry strategy with the capability they have, which is no 
doubt a function of experience. Yet two unobserved factors add complex to this relationship. 
First, performance feedback that enters the decision function is often a matter of subjective 
evaluation (Levitt & March, 1988; Zollo, 2009). Second, when the new environment is 
sufficiently complex and uncertain so that managers are unable to discern structural differences 
between the old and the new (Gavetti, Levinthal, & Rivkin, 2005), firms may vary in the 
perceived efficacy and legitimacy of the home-based mental models in foreign markets 
(Nadkarni, Herrmann, & Perez, 2011). These two factors would increase variance around the 
risk estimates in a singular, deterministic model. Our random parameter model shows varying 
preferences for controllable risk among Chinese investors after the observed moderating effect 
of international experience is accounted for. While we have shown that international experience 
does not moderate the deterring effect of non-controllable risk on FDI entry, there is also no 
other unknown sources of variation in MNEs’ responses to non-controllable risk.  
 
 In addition to the experience-as-learning argument commonly featured in the FDI 
literature, we also examine an alternative role experience plays in decision-making. We find that 
experienced firms are not as responsive to investment assurance initiatives as their less 
experienced counterparts. This is because the institutionalisation of learning as a function of 
experience renders the signal weak and ineffective (McNamara, Haleblian, & Bernadine 
Johnson, 2008). Experienced firms are less attentive to the signal in information search and tend 
to employ consistent, proven decision models regardless of bandwagon pressures in sensing and 
seizing emerging opportunities. Whether to invest in a country depends more on its ability to 
meet the firm’s routinised threshold rather than the apparent locational advantages suggested by 
the home country government. This suggests that, despite government’s effort to convey its 
intended institutional support to potential investors, it may only appeal to less established firms, 
which have limited ability to survive in unfamiliar territories. Although investment promotion is 
a lasting phenomenon of particular interest to practitioners, it is under-researched by IB scholars. 
We add to the literature by linking the signalling theory to an important type of home country 
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investment promotion. This extends the application of signalling theory in management research 
and directs attention from stakeholders’ behaviour to firms’ strategy. One might want to 
examine the interaction between signalling theory and the vicarious learning thesis. 
 
 Our study raises some important questions for future research. First, if the distinction 
between controllable and non-controllable risk matters – as we have shown, how does it matter? 
In the entrepreneurship literature, Wu and Knott (2006) disentangle demand uncertainty and 
ability uncertainty as involved in market entry decisions. Entrepreneurs are found to display risk 
aversion to uncertain prospect of market demand and “apparent risk-seeking” to the uncertainty 
around their own entrepreneurial ability. Thus entrepreneurs may be viewed as having different 
risk profiles depending on the way in which the researchers look at them. An interesting point 
discussed in the IB literature is that managers employ different evaluation criteria at different 
stages of decision making (Benito, Petersen, & Welch, 2009; Buckley, Devinney, & Louviere, 
2007). One might argue that managerial attention is paid to non-controllable environment at a 
different stage from it is to controllable environment. Examining the decision making process 
from different point in stage may draw different conclusions on managers’/firms’ risk-taking 
tendencies. Nevertheless, in the empirical location research, the common practice of restricting 
the choice set in the analyses to those already-chosen locations in the sample may have 
constrained researchers’ ability to examine the differences across decision stages. Some risk 
factors that managers do take into account in the consideration stage may appear irrelevant in 
the final location choices as they only serve to winnow out the undesirable ones so that the 
chosen locations are roughly equal in those respects (Mudambi & Navarra, 2003). Therefore we 
call for more process, individual level research on FDI decision making that would lead to a 
nuanced understanding of how and to what extent managers’ own views come into play in 
organisation level decisions (Schotter & Beamish, 2013; Williams & Grégoire, 2015).  
 
One promising line of individual level inquiry centres on the different roles controlled 
attention processing vs. automatic attention processing (Castellaneta & Zollo, 2014) play in 
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evaluating environmental characteristics. One might reason that managers devote considerable 
resources into the assessment of market-related risks which essentially require diligent, in-house 
efforts to understand the specific impacts of demand and competition contingencies on the focal 
project and meanwhile rely on stereotyping heuristics to screen out certain host countries with 
substantial political risk as highlighted by recent political turbulence or due to sheer anxiety 
induced by a lack of knowledge. The way in which managers engage attention processing may 
have theoretical implications for the behavioural learning perspective. 
 
 Lastly, as the globalisation unfolds and the interdependence of world economies is ever 
increasing, future research needs to think beyond using host country as the unit of analysis for 
risk studies (Bremmer, 2005). Chinese investment in Africa, for instance, may be as much 
influenced by the host country’s underlying political structure as it is by China’s strategic 
decisions. A new political risk measure may be needed that operates at the dyadic level in order 
to capture the role of government relations in facilitating or hampering FDI. Rather than 
combining trend and structure indicators, researchers can construct separate measures to account 
for their different natures; an absolute level of instability, and a dyadic, relative level of political 
constraint using Mahalanobis distance specification (Perkins, 2014). The dyadic perspective is 
also attuned with the recent discussion about the legitimacy theory of political risk (Stevens, Xie, 
& Peng, 2015). 
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6 GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 
It seems beyond question that international business provides a distinct context for 
scholars to study the role of risk and uncertainty in strategic decision making. However, despite 
the numerous insights generated by decades of research on this particular topic, confusions 
remain as to what we mean by risk and what we mean by uncertainty. This is counterintuitive 
since construct clarity is usually considered the fundamental building block underlying any 
stream of research. We believe that synthesising the extant body of literature and using new 
concepts to explain the old phenomenon may help this topic to regain traction. Among the 
necessary steps are thorough review of the existing research and novel empirical methods. 
 
Firstly, we tease apart the conceptualisations of risk and uncertainty by reference to the 
seminal works in economics, management and probability theory. We show clearly that both 
risk and uncertainty have different meanings. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to 
clarify the confusing understanding the literature has long presented. Each category of 
conceptualisations is well grounded in a specific school of thought. We demonstrate that each 
conceptualisation has its distinct value and has spawned an array of streams of strategy, 
entrepreneurship and international business research. A pattern emerges that the disciplines are 
biased toward on one or two particular conceptualisations of risk and uncertainty. This may be 
because of the different phenomena the disciplines focus upon. But one might also question if it 
is possible to knock off the disciplinary traditions in order to ignite new research agendas based 
on alternative conceptualisations of risk and uncertainty. We also show that there is a tendency 
among researchers to employ different conceptualisations when examining the same research 
question. This may be the reason behind the mixed findings regarding some of the most 
fundamental questions in entrepreneurship and strategy research. 
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Secondly, we focus on one particular conceptualisation of risk – “risk as propensity” – 
in the context of foreign direct investment. We bring to light the tension in the literature 
between organisation-level and individual-level accounts of FDI risk-taking. Organization-level 
research relies heavily on post hoc rationalisation while individual-level research only ascribes 
the heterogeneity to personal histories and characteristics. We propose a microfoundational 
framework to account for the nature of the risk in foreign investment. Two points are worth 
mentioning. First, the risk involved in FDI decision making is subjective as dependent on 
managers’ mental models and the way in which they construct the choice sets. Second, 
controllable vs. non-controllable risk arises under different conditions, and has different 
theoretical implications. Drawing upon the behavioural decision theory, we introduce the 
integrating concept of risk propensity that can well accommodate our proposed understanding 
of risk. The conceptual distinctiveness of risk propensity is highlighted, and its empirical 
evidence from different disciplinary literatures presented. The usefulness of this concept lies in 
providing a lower-level theoretical mechanism underlying the empirical regularity between firm 
experience and FDI decision making. Our framework also highlights the importance of 
embedding the cognition based mechanism into the social context of strategic decision making. 
 
Thirdly, we test the usefulness of risk propensity in a quasi-experimental, location 
choice task. This section is motivated by the observation that existing studies tend to attribute 
the empirical regularity between experience and FDI to unobservable capability. We draw upon 
our conceptualisation of risk propensity to build up a managerial level argument for this 
phenomenon. Discrete choice method proves to be an effective approach to eliminating 
individual idiosyncrasies in the responses to perceptual measures and to teasing out managerial 
preference for location attributes. It becomes more powerful when combined with finite mixture 
latent class modelling. We find that perceived success in regional venturing within the home 
country border increases managers’ sensitivities to non-controllable risk and decrease their 
sensitivities to controllable risk. This is strong evidence for the contextual nature of risk 
propensity, as opposed to the conventional, static assumption of managerial preference in theory 
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building. Further, we show that managerial risk propensity is also influenced by firm 
characteristics. The availability of potential slack, for instance, reduces managers’ sensitivities 
to non-controllable risk as expected. Nevertheless, the slack-as-resource argument does not 
apply to controllable risk, suggesting further investigation into the mechanism of slack. Without 
quasi-experiment and finite mixture modelling, these important findings would be hardly 
observable. 
 
 Lastly, we focus exclusively on the role of experience in location choice. Combining 
the arguments from previous chapters, we suggest that experience only moderates the deterring 
effect of controllable risk as opposed to non-controllable risk. This suggests that the well-
established learning mechanism depends on the nature of the risk being discussed. To further 
explore the difference between controllable and non-controllable risk, we cast spotlight on 
residual heterogeneity in MNEs’ responses to risks after the effect of experience is accounted 
for. We find significant variation only in the case of controllable risk. This is attributable to the 
unobserved process of learning, in addition to the stock of experience. The way in which 
managers evaluate past performance and interpret the efficacy of prior strategies may give rise 
to this inter-firm variation, which is a neglected phenomenon meriting future research. 
Moreover, apart from the familiar facilitating role, we propose that experience may play a 
negative part in decision making. We find that high-level ministerial visits with a particular 
commercial focus send a signal about home country’s institutional support and endorsement of 
the host country business environment to potential investing firms. International experience 
moderates signal strength such that more experienced firms are less responsive to this 
investment assurance initiative than less experienced firms. 
 
Overall, this thesis contributes to the FDI literature by inviting reconsideration of the 
conventional theory in the light of the findings regarding risk propensity and experience. 
Practioners and policy makers may also find this thesis useful. It can be inferred from our 
research that home country government to some extent can manipulate the spatial distribution of 
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domestic firms’ global expansion through the allocation of financial support. Bank loans need to 
be granted to light manufacturing firms should Chinese government choose to continue the 
transfer of domestic productive capacity to African countries that are politically unstable but 
boast cheap labour. For Chinese government, it is necessary to re-consider its investment 
promotion strategy should the aim is to avoid encouraging inexperienced firms to venture into 
unfamiliar territories. Similarly, host countries need to take into account the effectiveness of 
various investment promotion activities. Establishing close trade and investment ties with China 
may only attract internationally inexperienced Chinese firms, bringing limited spillover to the 
local economy. 
 
6.1 Limitations 
 It is conceivable that one might cast doubt on the prescriptive value of examining 
location choice only. We admit that it may be more meaningful if the focus is set on investment 
outcome rather than the decision to invest. A key theoretical issue is thereby left unaddressed – 
that is, whether managers’ choices and responses to risk are truly justified by the outcomes, or 
are guided by incorrect mental models. Before the analogical reasoning can adapt to 
performance feedback, managers may initially make unwarrantedly risky decisions based on 
erroneous assumptions about the usefulness of experience in other contexts (Nadolska & 
Barkema, 2007; Petersen, Pedersen, & Lyles, 2008; Zeng, Shenkar, Lee, & Song, 2013). This is 
ever increasingly likely under the legitimacy-based view on political risk, which argues that 
political risk is not entirely dependent on the bargaining power dynamic between the host 
government and the foreign investor or on the degree of political constraint on the host 
government’s discretionary behaviour (Stevens, Xie, & Peng, 2015). Whether the host 
government and host society perceive the MNE as legitimate determines the level of political 
risk it faces. The socially constructed nature of legitimacy involves a complex interplay between 
host government, host society and home government. Successful experience in one country may 
even increase the political risk the firm would face in another country. The fact that MNEs 
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misconceive their legitimacy and engage in unreasonable investments will be thus of greater 
theoretical and empirical salience.  
 
Future research may benefit from the parallel development of two lines of inquiry. On 
the one hand, we need a descriptive account of how and why firms take risk in FDI decisions, as 
a complement to prediction by the conventional FDI theories. On the other hand, we need to 
continue the investigation as to when political risk or other country risk may arise, in addition to 
the traditional bargaining power approach and political institutions approach (Stevens, Xie, & 
Peng, 2015). These two lines in combination provide a prescriptive account of the performance 
implications of certain FDI decisions. Only when the decision-making perspective matches with 
the performance perspective can we truly conclude that the contextual influence does confer on 
firms a distinct source of competitive advantage. Otherwise, the inferred “capability” may mask 
the mismatch between competence and confidence. Evidence has been found on superstitious 
learning and confidence trap in strategic and entrepreneurial decision-making (Miller, 2012; 
Perlow, Okhuysen, & Nelson, 2002; Zollo, 2009), and not least in foreign investment (O'Grady 
& Lane, 1996; Petersen, Pedersen, & Lyles, 2008; Zeng, Shenkar, Lee, & Song, 2013). In the 
light of the emerging forms of risk such as cyber attack and social legitimacy, it is reasonable to 
conceive that MNEs are more likely than ever to misplace confidence in their ability to control 
the risks using conventional practices. These insights are yet to be incorporated in this thesis, 
which is biased toward the descriptive account, despite the fact that it has provided the first 
attempt to solve such an important question. 
 
 Moreover, our empirical studies focus on the link between firm experience and 
managerial cognition, and on attributing the heterogeneity in firms’ risk-taking to the cognitive 
processes. It is left unattended how individual managers’ cognitive processes aggregate to 
organisational actions and outcomes. Data availability has deprived us of the opportunity to test 
empirically the aggregation principles, which could have strengthened the firm-level analysis 
providing inferred support for our framework. As our microfoundational framework suggests, a 
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comprehensive understanding of FDI risk-taking requires taking into account the social context 
in which strategic decisions are generated and implemented. Although top managers may well 
account for a significant portion of variation in firms’ behaviour, political dynamics within the 
corporate elite and corporate governance structures serve as a distinct context from general 
group decision making. The context may confer considerable potential on IB and strategy 
research to contribute back to the cognition literature. This is, nevertheless, not fully attainable 
without rich data on the processes of interaction among the CEO, top managers, the board and 
major shareholders. We hope future research rises to this challenge. 
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8 APPENDIX 
Author(s) Level Key variable(s) Definition Measures Data Method Major findings 
1) Acedo and 
Florin (2006) 
Individual Risk perception Not defined Managers’ evaluation of the 
level of risk associated with 
internationalisation, adapted 
from Sitkin and Weingart 
(1995) 
Small and medium 
sise Spanish firms 
from seven 
industries 
Survey CEOs’ perceptions of risk 
mediate the effect of firm age, 
sise and scope of national 
operations and the effect of 
individual international posture 
on the degree of 
internationalisation. 
2) Acedo and 
Jones (2007) 
Individual Risk perception Not defined Managers’ evaluation of the 
level of risk associated with 
internationalisation, adapted 
from Sitkin and Weingart 
(1995) 
216 top managers of 
small and medium 
sised enterprises 
(SMEs) 
Survey Managers’ risk perception is 
negatively associated with speed 
of internationalisation. 
3) Agarwal and 
Ramaswami 
(1992) 
Firm Investment risk; 
Contractual risk 
Uncertainty over the 
continuation of environmental 
factors which are critical to the 
survival and profitability of a 
firm’s operations in that 
country; 
Difficulties of writing and 
enforcing contracts that specify 
every eventuality due to 
external uncertainty 
Managers’ perceptions about 
environmental stability and 
host government’s policies 
toward profit repatriation and 
asset expropriation; 
Perceptions about costs of 
making and enforcing 
contracts, risk of knowledge 
dissipation and risk of quality 
deterioration 
97 US equipment 
leasing firms 
Survey Investment risk reduces the 
likelihood of investment while 
contractual risk increases the 
likelihood of choosing investment 
mode over exporting.  
4) Agarwal 
(1994) 
Firm Country risk The volatility of a host 
country's political and market 
conditions 
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
148 foreign 
investment of US 
manufacturing firms 
over the period 
1985-1989 
Secondary Country risk does not moderate 
the relationship between socio-
cultural distance and choice of 
joint venture. 
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Author(s) Level Key variable(s) Definition Measures Data Method Major findings 
5) Ahmed, 
Mohamad, 
Tan, and 
Johnson 
(2002) 
Firm Risk perception The predictive accuracy on a 
changing event that might lead 
to negative organisational 
outcomes 
Managers’ perceptions of the 
differences between home and 
host country, and the level of 
predictability of a range of 
environmental dimensions 
69 Malaysian public 
firms 
Survey Low risk perception leads to high 
ownership entry mode. 
6) Alcantara and 
Mitsuhashi 
(2012) 
Firm Market 
opportunity 
risk; 
Political risk 
Unpredictability of business 
prospects and institutional 
conditions that may affect 
business operations in the host 
country 
Number of home country 
buyers or rivals; 
Political Constraints Index 
(POLCON) 
FDI entries of 
Japanese auto parts 
manufacturers over 
the period 1978-
2000 
Secondary Intense competition in home 
country induces MNEs to invest 
in foreign countries with high 
market opportunity risk and high 
political risk. 
7) Amariuta, 
Rutenberg, 
and Staelin 
(1979) 
Individual Risk perception Not defined Three-item scale capturing 
perception of expropriation 
risk, attitude toward 
communist regime and 
perception of political risk 
120 executives (VP-
international) from 
120 US firms 
Survey Increased knowledge about East 
Europe lowers managers’ 
perception of political risk and 
raises perceived inconvenience of 
dealing with those countries. 
8) Asiedu (2002) Country Political risk Not defined Average number of 
assassinations and revolutions 
FDI into 71 African 
countries from 1988 
to 1997 
Secondary Political risk is not significant to 
FDI. 
9) Bekaert, 
Harvey, 
Lundblad, and 
Siegel (2014) 
Country Political risk The risk that the government’s 
actions or imperfections of the 
host country’s institutions 
adversely affect the value of an 
investment in that country 
Political risk spread based on 
ICRG 
FDI inflows to 30+ 
countries from 1994 
to 2009 
Secondary FDI is negatively related to 
political risk, and is much more 
sensitive to political risk than to 
economic outlook.  
10) Brouthers 
(1995) 
Firm Risk perception Not explicitly defined but with 
reference to Miller’s (1992) 
framework 
Managers’ perceptions about 
control risk including cultural 
difference and managerial 
experience, and market 
complexity risk including 
political risk and competitive 
rivalry, all adapted from 
Miller (1992) 
125 US MNEs from 
computer software 
industry 
Survey Greater control risk and market 
complexity lead to greater 
likelihood of independent entry 
mode like licensing. 
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Author(s) Level Key variable(s) Definition Measures Data Method Major findings 
11) Brouthers, 
Brouthers, 
and Werner 
(2000) 
Firm Perceived 
environmental 
uncertainty 
Not defined Perceived Environmental 
Uncertainty 2 (PEU2) by 
Werner et al. (1996), a 
perceptual measure on the 
unpredictability of 28 
environmental factors 
95 of 500 largest 
firms based in 
European Union 
nations 
Survey Satisfaction with performance is 
increased when firms take into 
account environmental 
uncertainty in entry mode choice. 
12) Brouthers and 
Brouthers 
(2001) 
Firm Investment risk Not defined Investment risk measure by 
Agarwal and Ramaswami 
(1992) 
231 Dutch, German, 
British and US 
firms doing 
business in 5 
Central and Eastern 
European countries 
Survey The relationship between cultural 
distance and entry mode is 
contingent on the level of 
investment risk in the host 
country. 
13) Brouthers 
(2002) 
Firm Investment risk Note defined Perceptual question: (1) the 
risk of converting and 
repatriating profits, (2) 
nationalisation risks, (3) 
cultural similarity, and (4) the 
stability of the political, social 
and economic conditions in 
the target market 
178 entries of large 
European firms in 
27 countries 
Survey Investment risk influences mode 
choice, which in turn affects 
financial and non-financial 
performance. 
14) Brouthers, 
Brouthers, 
and Werner 
(2002) 
Firm International 
risk perception 
Not defined Perceived Environmental 
Uncertainty 2 (PEU2) 
95 of 500 largest 
firms based in 
European Union 
nations 
Survey Service and manufacturing firms 
respond similarly to some 
dimensions of international risk 
but differ with the others 
regarding entry mode choices.  
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Author(s) Level Key variable(s) Definition Measures Data Method Major findings 
15) Brouthers and 
Brouthers 
(2003) 
Firm Environmental 
uncertainty; 
Behavioural 
uncertainty; 
Risk propensity 
Environmental threat to the 
stability of business operation; 
Inability of the parent firm to 
monitor and control the 
performance of foreign 
subsidiary; 
Managers’ tendency to take risk 
that varies with national culture 
Investment risk by Agarwal 
and Ramaswami (1992); 
Contractual risk by Agarwal 
and Ramaswami (1992); 
Hofstede’s (1980) uncertainty 
avoidance 
227 European firms 
that have operations 
in Central and East 
European countries 
Survey High environmental uncertainty 
induces service firms to choose 
wholly owned entry mode while 
high behavioural uncertainty 
induces them to choose joint 
venture. For manufacturing firms, 
the effects are opposite. 
Manufacturing firms from home 
countries with low risk propensity 
cultures prefer joint venture 
modes. 
16) Brouthers, 
Brouthers, 
and Werner 
(2008) 
Firm Country risk Not defined, but is regarded as 
one component of the formal 
institutional environment with 
particular regard to 
governmental or political 
actions 
Euromoney Country Risk 232 Dutch, Greek, 
German, and U.S. 
firms that have 
operations in the 
Central and Eastern 
Europe 
Survey Country risk distance moderates 
the relationship between firm-
specific resources and entry mode 
choice as well as dynamic 
learning capabilities and entry 
mode choice. 
17) Buckley, 
Clegg, Cross, 
Liu, Voss, 
and Zheng 
(2007) 
Country Political risk Not defined ICRG Approved Chinese 
FDI to 49 countries 
from 1984 to 2001 
Secondary Chinese outward FDI prefer less 
developed and risky host 
countries between 1982 and 1991. 
18) Coeurderoy 
and Murray 
(2008) 
Firm Political risk Not defined “Political risk” from 
Institutional Investor 
First five foreign 
market entries of 
each of the 241new-
technology-based 
firms in the UK and 
134 in Germany 
Survey Political risk is highly significant 
for both entry choice and the 
ranking of entry preferences. 
Large firms are more cautious of 
political risk.  
19) Cui and Jiang 
(2009) 
Firm Country risk The perceived discontinuity or 
unpredictability of the political 
and economic environment of a 
host country 
Six-item scale questions 
adapted from Brouthers 
(2002), Agarwal (1994) and 
Bell (1996) 
FDI entries of 138 
Chinese firms from 
across 8 provincial 
areas 
Survey Country risk does not have 
significant impact on FDI entry 
mode choice of Chinese firms. 
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Author(s) Level Key variable(s) Definition Measures Data Method Major findings 
20) Cuypers and 
Martin (2009) 
Firm Exogenous 
uncertainty; 
Endogenous 
uncertainty 
Uncertainty of which the 
resolution is unaffected by the 
actions of the firm; 
Uncertainty that is resolved (at 
least in part) by the actions of 
the firm itself over time 
Economic uncertainty 
(Euromoney Country Risk), 
institutional uncertainty 
(Special Economic Zones or 
Coastal regions), exchange 
rate uncertainty (parallel 
market premium); 
Cultural uncertainty (Kogut 
and Singh), uncertainty about 
development capabilities 
(involvement of development 
activities), scope-related 
uncertainty (the number of 
activities performed) 
6472 Sino-foreign 
joint ventures (JVs) 
Secondary Conventional real options logic is 
applicable when uncertainty is 
resolved exogenously, but not 
when it is resolved endogenously. 
21) Datta, 
Musteen, and 
Basuil (2015) 
Firm Downside risk; 
Political risk 
Not defined; 
The likelihood of political and 
social events in a country 
inﬂuencing the business climate 
in a way that negatively impacts 
investors 
Greenfield investment, as 
compared to acquisition; 
ICRG 
291 cross-border 
acquisitions and 105 
greenﬁeld start-ups 
by non-diversiﬁed 
US manufacturing 
ﬁrms 
Secondary Managerial equity ownership and 
the proportion of contingent pay 
in key managers’ compensation 
structures increase the likelihood 
of cross-border acquisitions over 
greenﬁeld investments. Host 
country political risk positively 
moderates this relationship. 
22) De Beule, 
Elia, and 
Piscitello 
(2014) 
Firm Endogenous 
uncertainty; 
Exogenous 
uncertainty 
Related to the investment itself 
and can often be found as 
relationship-specific uncertainty 
when firms are sourcing 
intangibles externally for new 
business development; 
Take the form of either 
environmental turbulence or 
technological newness 
Proxied by investments by 
EMNEs, as compared to those 
by advanced country MNEs 
(AMNEs); 
Proxied by investments in 
high-tech industries, and by 
institutional distance 
451 acquisitions by 
foreign firms in 
Italy between 2001 
and 2010 in 78 
manufacturing 
industries 
Secondary EMNEs acquire significantly less 
ownership than AMNEs, 
especially in high-tech industries. 
Institutional distance in trade and 
investment freedom increases the 
probability to undertake full 
acquisition for EMNEs as 
opposed to AMNEs. 
  
  
 
211 
Author(s) Level Key variable(s) Definition Measures Data Method Major findings 
23) Delios and 
Beamish 
(1999) 
Firm Country risk Extent of political and 
economic risk 
Euromoney Country Risk 1424 greenfield 
subsidiaries of 
Japanese 
manufacturing firms 
Secondary Weak evidence on the negative 
relationship between host country 
political and economic risk and 
ownership levels 
24) Delios and 
Henisz (2000) 
Firm Public 
expropriation 
hazard; 
Private 
expropriation 
hazard 
Threats to firms’ revenue 
streams posed by the monopoly 
of the state on coercion; 
Opportunistic behaviour of 
partners due to incomplete 
contract 
Political Constraints  
(POLCON), and equity 
restrictions surveyed by 
World Competitiveness 
Report; 
R&D/advertising-to-sales 
2827 greenfield FDI 
by 660 Japanese 
firms in 18 
emerging 
economies 
Secondary Host country experience (industry 
experience) mitigates the effect of 
public (private) expropriation 
hazard, leading to higher (lower) 
equity ownership.  
25) Delios and 
Henisz 
(2003a) 
Firm Policy 
uncertainty 
Both the probability of a policy 
change and the likelihood that 
any change is likely to be 
adverse 
POLCON (policy change), 
and the sise of the host 
country’s manufacturing 
sector as a percentage of GDP 
(competitors’ lobbying effort) 
6465 FDI of 665 
Japanese 
manufacturing firms 
in 49 countries from 
1980 to 1998 
Secondary As uncertainty in the policy 
environment increases, initial 
entry by distribution is replaced 
by an initial entry by a joint 
venture manufacturing plant. 
26) Delios and 
Henisz 
(2003b) 
Firm Political hazard Uncertainty in the host policy 
environment due to weak 
institutional constraints on 
policy makers 
POLCON 3857 entries by 665 
Japanese 
manufacturing firms 
from 1980 to 1998 
Secondary Experience with political hazard 
countries help firms to expand to 
high hazard countries whilst 
market- and cultural-based 
experience helps them enter low 
hazard countries. 
27) Demirbag, 
Glaister, and 
Tatoglu 
(2007) 
Firm Political risk; 
Risk perception 
Not defined; 
Not defined 
POLCON; 
Linguistic distance 
6838 foreign equity 
ventures in Turkey 
as of 2003 
Secondary Both political constraint and 
linguistic distance induce MNEs 
to opt for majority owned JVs.  
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28) Demirbag, 
McGuinness, 
and Altay 
(2010) 
Individual Politically based 
uncertainty 
Not defined Perceptual measures based on 
PEU but extended to other 
institutional elements 
Turkish firms 
investing in the 
transitional 
economies of the 
Central Asian 
Republics. 
Survey Perceived ethical-societal 
uncertainties is positively 
associated with the choice of joint 
venture over wholly owned 
subsidiary. Perceived risk of 
intervention increases the 
likelihood of joint venture. 
29) Duanmu 
(2012) 
Firm Political risk; 
Economic risk 
Not defined; 
Not defined 
ICRG 264 entries by 189 
Chinese MNEs 
investing in 
47countries from 
1999 to 2008 
Secondary State owned enterprises (SOEs) 
respond to political risk less 
negatively than non-SOEs. 
Economic risk is insignificant to 
both SOEs and non-SOEs. 
30) Duanmu 
(2014) 
Firm Expropriation 
risk 
The deficiencies of a country’s 
protection of private property 
rights, especially their 
protection against government 
expropriation 
Property right protection 
index constructed by the 
Heritage Foundation 
894 greenfield 
investment by 
Chinese firms from 
2003 to 2010 
Secondary Political relations between home 
and host state mitigates the 
negative impact of expropriation 
risk on FDI. Both SOEs and 
private firms benefit, but SOEs 
benefit more. Only SOEs benefit 
from host country’s export 
dependence on the home country. 
31) Dunning 
(1981) 
Country Country risk Not defined Business Environment Risk 
Index (expert survey) 
FDI flows from 67 
countries from 
1967-1978 
Secondary Country risk does not affect FDI 
flows. 
32) Erramilli and 
Rao (1993) 
Firm Country risk Volatility in the external 
environment of the host country 
Categorical variable of high 
vs. low risk country 
114 US service 
firms engaged in 
FDI  
Survey Country risk intensifies the 
negative relationship between 
asset specificity and shared 
ownership mode. 
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33) Fatehi and 
Safizadeh 
(1994) 
Country Political risk Political-event-induced policy 
changes that could have a 
negative impact on foreign 
firms 
Count of socio-political 
disturbance events 
Annual flow of US 
manufacturing, 
mining, and 
petroleum FDI in 14 
developing 
countries over the 
period 1950-1982 
Secondary The relationship between FDI 
flow and political risk is industry 
specific. 
34) Feinberg and 
Gupta (2009) 
Firm Country risk A multidimensional construct 
encompassing many types of 
country-specific political and 
economic hazards that share 
common institutional drivers 
The risk of contract 
repudiation in the IRIS 
dataset provided by ICRG 
3739 subsidiaries of 
1279 US-based 
MNEs in 19 
countries, from 
1983 to 1996 
Secondary Under uncertainty, MNEs 
increase the extent of their within-
firm sales. Trade internalisation 
as a response to country risk is 
weaker when MNEs have greater 
experience deploying political 
strategies. 
35) Fernández-
Méndez, 
García-Canal, 
and Guillén 
(2015) 
Firm Governmental 
discretion 
The degree to which 
governments can unilaterally 
alter the conditions in which 
firms operate in a country, in a 
way that affects investments' 
profitability 
POLCONV FDI location 
choices made from 
1986 to 2008 by 
105 Spanish firms 
listed on the Madrid 
Stock Exchange in 
1990 
Secondary The willingness of regulated 
physical infrastructure firms to 
invest in countries with 
governmental discretion increases 
in countries having both a legal 
system from the same family as 
the one of the home country and 
infrastructure voids. 
36) Figueira-de-
Lemos and 
Hadjikhani 
(2014) 
Firm Risk and 
uncertainty 
Uncertainty consists of two 
types; pure uncertainty is 
associated with the 
unpredictability of the future 
events and contingent 
uncertainty refers to the lack of 
knowledge. Risk is a function 
of commitment and uncertainty. 
Illustrated with graphs 93 interviews with 
25 Swedish and 17 
Iranian managers 
involved in the nine 
Swedish MNEs’ 
foreign operations 
in Iran before, 
during and after the 
1978/79 Islamic 
Revolution 
Case 
study 
An environmental change is 
perceived as low risk induces 
incremental commitment of 
tangible assets, while firms 
decrease tangible assets and 
commit in a more intangible way 
when facing a detrimental change 
of environment. 
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37) Filatotchev, 
Strange, 
Piesse, and 
Lien (2007) 
Firm Risk preference Not defined Inferred from the equity stake 
of different shareholders 
285 FDI by 122 
Taiwanese firms in 
China, 1999-2003 
Secondary Risk preferences of family and 
institutional shareholders 
determine equity commitment. 
38) Fisch (2008a) Firm Uncertainty A continuous variable reflecting 
environmental volatility, which 
can be resolved by a wait-and-
see approach. 
The standard deviation of the 
6-month rate of change of the 
Composite Leading Indicator 
within a country and year 
5379 entries in the 
manufacturing 
sector by 2282 
German firms in 
OECD countries 
over 5 years 
Secondary Under the moderating influence 
of competition, the economic 
uncertainty in a host country has a 
U-shaped influence on the 
moment of entry. Uncertainty has 
a negative effect on the amount of 
capital at entry, but no effect on 
the share in capital at entry. 
39) Fisch (2008b) Firm Exogenous 
uncertainty; 
Endogenous 
uncertainty 
The time-variant volatility of 
the host country environment; 
A disability of the investor to 
control the subsidiary 
The standard deviation of the 
6-month rate of change of the 
Composite Leading Indicator 
within a country and year; 
International experience – the 
number of foreign 
subsidiaries held by the 
investor prior to the focal 
entry 
643 projects in the 
manufacturing 
sector by German 
firms in OECD 
countries 
Secondary The investment rate in new 
foreign subsidiaries depends 
negatively on the economic 
volatility of the host country but 
positively on the firm’s 
international experience. The 
influence of uncertainty declines 
over time after the entry.  
40) Forlani, 
Parthasarathy, 
and Keaveney 
(2008) 
Individual Risk perception; 
Risk propensity 
Risk as capital losses; 
Not defined 
Perceived riskiness rating on 
psychometric scales; 
Risk preference measured by 
Schneider and Lopes (1986) 
187 export 
managers across a 
large mid-western 
metropolitan area in 
US 
Field 
experimen
t 
Managers in lower-capability 
firms see the least risk in the non-
ownership entry mode whilst 
those in higher-capability firms 
see the least risk in the equal-
partnership entry mode. 
41) Garcia-Canal 
and Guillén 
(2008) 
Firm Policy risk The likelihood that the 
government might change 
policies in a way that adversely 
affects the interests of the 
foreign investors. 
POLCON Entries of 25 
Spanish listed 
companies in 
regulated industries 
into Latin American 
Secondary Firms from regulated industries 
prefer high policy risk. Firms 
with state equity (increased 
foreign experience) exhibit more 
(less) tolerance for political risk. 
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42) Gatignon and 
Anderson 
(1988) 
Firm Country risk Environmental threat to the 
stability of business operation 
Categorical variable featuring 
low, moderate and high risk 
countries  
1267 entries of 
firms among the 
largest MNEs over 
the period 1960-
1975 
Secondary In highly risky countries, firms 
avoid outright ownership of their 
subsidiaries. 
43) George, 
Wiklund, and 
Zahra (2005) 
Firm Risk propensity Not defined Inferred from scale and scope 
of internationalisation 
889 SMEs 
headquartered in 
Sweden 
Survey Increased ownership by SMEs’ 
managers can induce risk 
aversion. The involvement of 
institutional investors in SMEs’ 
strategic decisions reduces 
managers’ risk aversion. 
44) Goerzen, 
Sapp, and 
Delios (2010) 
Firm Environmental 
risk 
Financial and economic risks 
defined as fluctuations in the 
overall level of economic 
activity and prices in a country; 
Political risk defined as the 
possibility of political change 
and the feasibility of policy 
change by a host country 
government; 
Cultural risk defined as the 
difficulty of predicting the 
actions of others 
Economic, financial and 
political risk measured by 
ICRG, cultural risk measured 
by Kogut and Singh (1988) 
index 
305 Japanese FDI 
announcements 
including 168 JVs 
and 137 wholly 
owned subsidiaries 
(WOS) 
Secondary Firms’ direct and indirect 
experience plays a significant role 
in mitigating the stock market’s 
responses to host country risk.  
45) Globerman 
and Shapiro 
(2003) 
Country Foreign 
exchange risk; 
Political 
instability 
Currency volatility; 
Not defined 
The degree of exchange rate 
volatility against  the US 
dollar over the sample period;  
World Governance Indicators' 
(WGI) Political Instability 
and Violence index 
FDI flows from US 
to 88 countries over 
the period 1995-
1997 
Secondary Political instability does not affect 
FDI flows at all while foreign 
exchange risk is rarely significant.  
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46) Heidenreich, 
Mohr, and 
Puck (2015) 
Individual Uncertainty Uncertainty involves both 
downside risks and upside 
potential. 
Factor-market uncertainty, 
political-regulatory 
uncertainty, and socio-
cultural uncertainty 
Secondary data and 
interviews with two 
key decision-makers 
involved in a firm’s 
investment in 
Ghana 
Case 
study 
The possible use of political 
strategies reduces entrepreneurs’ 
perceived uncertainty regarding a 
developing country. Past 
experience in developed countries 
induces entrepreneurs to believe 
that their skills can outweigh the 
external threats.  
47) Henisz (2000) Firm Political hazard; 
Contractual 
hazard 
The feasibility of policy change 
by the host country government 
which either directly or 
indirectly diminishes MNEs’ 
expected return on assets in the 
host country; 
Comprised of asset specificity, 
hazard of technological leakage 
and hazard of free riding on 
reputation and brand name 
POLCON (formal), and 
unexpected corruption level 
measured corruption level in 
International Country Risk 
Guide minus POLCON 
(informal); 
Ratio of property, plant and 
equipment/R&D 
expense/advertising expense 
to total sales  
3389 foreign 
manufacturing 
operations 
established by 461 
US firms in 112 
countries 
Secondary The effect of political hazard on 
the probability of choosing a 
majority owned entry mode is 
contingent on contractual hazard. 
48) Henisz and 
Delios (2001) 
Firm Firm specific 
uncertainty; 
Policy 
uncertainty 
Not defined, but referring to the 
uncertainty derived from an 
organisation's unfamiliarity 
with market characteristics,  
and the uncertainty derived 
from characteristics of the 
policymaking apparatus of a 
market that make the 
characteristics of the market 
unstable or difficult to forecast 
Log of the sum of subsidiary 
years of manufacturing 
experience in a prospective 
host country; 
POLCON 
2,705 overseas 
investments made 
by 658 Japanese 
listed firms in new 
manufacturing 
plants in 52 
countries during the 
1990-96 
Secondary Imitating the behaviour of several 
reference groups of firms helps 
reduce the firm-specific 
uncertainty, but cannot mitigate 
the negative impact of policy 
uncertainty associated with a host 
country. 
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49) Henisz and 
Delios (2004) 
Firm Political hazard; 
Regime change 
The likelihood of change in the 
status-quo policies that affect 
firms’ costs, revenues and asset 
values; 
Unpredictability of the 
environment arising from the 
changes in political institutions 
to an entirely new structure 
POLCON; 
Polity index 
2,283 foreign 
subsidiaries, formed 
during 1991–2000 
by 642 Japanese 
manufacturing firms 
in 52 countries 
Secondary Under a stable political regime, 
peer exits increase the probability 
of exit and firm experience reduce 
it. Under a changing regime, peer 
exists continue to provide 
informational signals regarding 
the environment but the 
experience-based influence with 
the old regime proves a liability. 
50) Herrmann 
and Datta 
(2002) 
Firm Risk exposure Not explicitly defined, but 
associated with the extent of 
resource commitment and 
switching cost 
Proxied by full-control vs. 
shared-control entry mode 
271 foreign entries 
by US listed 
manufacturing firms 
Secondary Successor CEOs’ increasing 
tenure and international 
experience encourages full-
control (riskier) entry mode. 
51) Holburn and 
Zelner (2010) 
Firm Policy risk The risk that a government will 
opportunistically alter policies 
to expropriate an investing 
firm’s profits or assets 
POLCON FDI of global 
private electricity-
industry firms 
during the period 
1990–1999 
Secondary Firms from home countries with 
weak institutional constraints or 
strong redistributive pressures are 
less sensitive to host-country 
policy risk 
52) Hsieh, 
Rodrigues, 
and Child 
(2010) 
Individual Risk perception 1) the perception that the JV 
performance could decline in 
the foreseeable future; 2) the 
perception that the relationship 
between a foreign partner and 
its local partner could 
deteriorate in the foreseeable 
future; 3) the perception that a 
partner could be unreliable or 
unwilling to commit itself to the 
collaborative venture; and 4) 
the perception that a partner 
could not be trusted 
Perceptual measures 
developed for this study 
71 foreign 
expatriates of IJVs 
established in 
Taiwan from 1983-
2003 
Survey Partners’ perception of risk 
mediates the effect of JV 
situational conditions on post-
formation control. 
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53) Jiménez 
(2010) 
Firm Political risk Not defined Economic Freedom Index by 
Heritage Foundation, 
Corruption Perceptions Index 
by Transparency 
International, and POLCON 
166 Spanish MNEs 
in 119 countries at 
the year 2005 
Secondary MNEs with a broader 
international expansion tend to 
invest in more politically risky 
places. A higher level of diversity 
in the host countries’ political risk 
is associated with a greater scope 
of internationalisation. 
54) Jiménez, 
Luis-Rico, 
and Benito-
Osorio (2014) 
Firm Political risk The probability of a 
government using its monopoly 
over legal coercion to refrain 
from fulfilling existing 
agreements with an MNE, in 
order to affect the redistribution 
of rents between the public and 
private sector. 
Average and variance scores 
of Corruption Perceptions 
Index by Transparency 
International and POLCON 
for the investment location 
portfolio of each MNE 
164 Spanish MNEs 
with investments in 
119 countries 
Secondary Exposure to political risk 
increases a firm’s scope of 
internationalisation. The 
relationship is stronger in those 
companies belonging to industries 
subjected to higher levels of 
regulation by the authorities. 
55) Jiménez, 
Benito-
Osorio, and 
Palmero-
Cámara 
(2015) 
Firm Political risk Not defined POLCONV 119 Spanish firms 
with more than 250 
employees and 
more than one 
product line 
Secondary MNEs that have experience in 
high political risk environments 
are more likely to tolerate risk 
and find a suitable environment to 
achieve economies of scope. 
56) Jiménez and 
Delgado-
García (2012) 
Firm Political risk Not defined Corruptions Perception Index, 
POLCONV, and Economic 
Freedom by the Heritage 
Foundation 
164 Spanish MNEs 
with investments in 
119 countries 
Secondary The level of political risk 
assumed by the MNEs has a 
positive influence on their 
performance and vice versa. 
57) Kim and 
Hwang 
(1992) 
Firm Country risk Not defined Managers’ perceptions about 
the instability of host political 
system and the likelihood of 
adverse policies 
96 US manufacturer 
that have recently 
engaged in 
international 
expansion 
Survey High country risk leads to low 
commitment entry mode. 
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58) Kim, Hwang, 
and Burgers 
(1993) 
Firm Corporate risk Not defined Standard deviation of firm’s 
return on assets 
125 large US MNEs 
over a 5-year period 
Secondary A new risk-adjusted return 
measure suggests that high return-
low risk profile can be achieved 
through international 
diversification. 
59) Kiss, 
Williams, and 
Houghton 
(2013) 
Individual Internationalisat
ion risk bias 
The difference between 
objective risk and subjective 
risk perception 
Compare OECD country risk 
measures with managers’ rate 
on the riskiness of host 
countries 
CEOs of 286 firms 
that 
internationalised 
early 
Survey Internationalisation risk bias 
mediates the relationship between 
internationalisation motivation 
and post-entry scope. 
60) Kobrin 
(1976) 
Country Political risk Discontinuities in the political 
environment that potentially 
affect the profit or other goals 
of a particular firm 
A composite measure based 
on political event data, 
including political rebellion, 
government instability and 
planned subversion 
The number of new 
manufacturing 
subsidiaries 
established by 187 
large US 
manufacturer in 61 
countries over the 
period 1966-1967 
Secondary Political risk does not affect FDI 
flows.  
61) Kwok and 
Reeb (2000) 
Firm Corporate risk Not defined Total risk, measured as the 
standard deviation of monthly 
returns using 60 months of 
return data 
1921 public firm 
from 32 countries in 
which 1007 are 
MNEs, over the 
period 1992-1996 
Secondary Emerging country firms see a 
decrease in total and systematic 
risks as they increase the degree 
of internationalisation. The effect 
is opposite for developed country 
firms.  
62) Levis (1979) Country Political 
instability 
Not defined Political competition index 
regarding the legitimacy of 
political system 
FDI flows from 25 
developing 
countries over the 
period 1965-1967 
Secondary Political instability deters FDI, 
but of secondary importance to 
economic factors. 
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63) Li and Yao 
(2010) 
Firm Policy 
uncertainty 
Political institutions that allow 
policy-makers to change the 
policy regime capriciously 
Provincial level index 
consisting of five factors: 
lagged unemployment rate; 
employment in SOEs as a 
percentage of provincial 
population; total provincial 
government budgetary 
expenses as a percentage of 
GDP; provincial government 
employment as a percentage 
of provincial population; and 
FDI policy incentives (the 
existence of special economic 
zones (SEZs) and coastal 
open cities in the province) 
All foreign-invested 
manufacturing 
ventures established 
in China over 1979–
95 by firms from 
other emerging 
economies 
Secondary EMNEs are more likely to be 
influenced by prior entries from 
their home country than by firms 
from other countries Prior 
investments by developed 
economy firms deter new entries 
by emerging economy 
multinationals. Policy uncertainty 
leads to a stronger effect of 
mimicry. 
64) Liang, Lu, 
and Wang 
(2012) 
Firm Risk-taking 
tendency 
Not defined Inferred from the act of 
internationalisation and entry 
mode 
553 Chinese private 
firms in eight major 
cities spreading 
across Pearl River 
delta and Yangtze 
River delta region 
Survey The likelihood of private firms 
choosing a high-risk entry mode 
is determined by organizing 
capability advantages over SOEs, 
and disadvantages compared to 
foreign firms. 
65) López-Duarte 
and Vidal-
Suárez (2010) 
Firm External 
uncertainty 
Uncertainty perceived by the 
investing company in the 
formal and informal 
institutional environment 
Political risk measured by 
Euromoney Risk Index; 
Cultural distance measured by 
Kogut and Singh Index 
334 FDI by 63 
listed Spanish firms 
in 34 countries 
between 1989 and 
2003 
Secondary An interaction effect between two 
dimensions of external 
uncertainty on entry mode choice 
66) Loree and 
Guisinger 
(1995) 
Country Political 
instability 
Not defined ICRG Survey data on 
foreign subsidiaries 
of US firms in 48 
countries in 1977 
and 1982 
Secondary Political risk has a negative 
impact on equity FDI in 1982 but 
not in 1977. 
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67) Lu, Liu, 
Wright, and 
Filatotchev 
(2014) 
Firm Investment risk Not defined WGI’s Regulatory Quality 
index 
702 FDI entries of 
Chinese listed firms 
over the period 
2002-2009 
Secondary Favorable host country 
institutions can offset the need for 
prior international experience in 
EE firms’ FDI activities. 
68) Luo (2001) Firm Environmental 
hazard 
Not defined Government intervention, 
environmental uncertainty 
and property right protection 
measured on scales 
174 foreign 
subsidiaries in 
China across 
Yangtze River Delta 
and Pearl River 
Delta cities 
Survey Joint venture is preferred when 
perceived governmental 
intervention or environmental 
uncertainty is high and wholly-
owned entry mode is preferred 
when intellectual property rights 
are not well protected. 
69) Maitland and 
Sammartino 
(2015a) 
Individual Political hazard The broad spectrum of possible 
actions and outcomes flowing 
from the sovereign state’s 
monopoly control of formal rule 
setting and enforcement, when 
the status quo is maintained or 
changes to the status quo occur 
POLCON and the authors’ 
typology of political hazard 
Interviews and 
surveys with an 
MNE’s 11 senior 
executives and 
board directors, 
triangulated with 
corporate materials 
Interview, 
survey 
and 
secondary 
Individual managers bring 
different cognitive resources to 
the firm decision process of 
entering a politically hazardous 
country. The difference is a 
function of managers’ experience 
breadth and diversity. 
70) Meschi and 
Riccio (2008) 
Firm Country risk Not defined Scores of economic risk and 
political risk provided by 
Political Risk Services 
222 international 
joint ventures in 
Brazil, 1973-2006 
Secondary Survival of international joint 
ventures is not affected by 
country risk. 
71) Michel and 
Shaked 
(1986) 
Firm Firm risk Not defined Total risk and systematic risk 
measured by Sharpe and 
Treynor measure (beta) 
58 large US MNEs 
and 43 domestic 
firms among 
Fortune 500 
Secondary Domestic firms have higher total 
and systematic risk than MNEs. 
72) Oetzel and 
Oh (2014) 
Firm Discontinuous 
risk 
The possibility that a disaster, 
which is episodic and often 
difficult to anticipate or predict, 
might occur and may have a 
substantial impact on a firm and 
its operating environment 
The number of incidents, 
number of people killed, and 
duration of terrorist attacks, 
natural disasters and 
technological disasters 
respectively 
106 large European 
MNCs and their 
subsidiaries 
operating across 
109 countries 
during 2001-2007 
Secondary Experience with high-impact 
disasters encourages expansion 
within but not entry into other 
countries suffering the same 
disaster. 
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73) Oh and 
Oetzel (2011) 
Firm Disaster risk; 
Political risk 
Terrorist attacks, natural 
disasters, and technological 
disasters; 
Political instability 
Number of people killed by 
each disaster risk; 
WGI’s Political Instability 
and Violence index 
71 European 
Fortune Global 500 
firms and their 
subsidiaries from 
2001 to 2006 
Secondary Post-entry disaster risk increases 
subsidiary-level disinvestment. 
Political stability mitigates the 
impact of disaster risk.   
74) Pak and Park 
(2004) 
Firm Political risk One of internalisation costs in 
the form of discrimination 
against foreign firms and 
expropriation 
Stability of political situation 
measured by World 
Competitiveness Report 
3,236 foreign 
subsidiaries of 444 
Japanese 
manufacturing firms 
as of 1999 
Secondary Political risk leads to low 
ownership mode. 
75) Puck, Rogers, 
and Mohr 
(2013) 
Firm Risk exposure Caused by the comparatively 
under-developed institutional 
frameworks and more rapid 
changes in the investment 
climate 
Self-reported perceptual 
measure of a subsidiary’s 
exposure to legal, political, 
and economic risks 
173 subsidiaries in 
Brazil, China, India, 
Russia, South 
Africa and Turkey 
Survey Whether political strategies can 
reduce firms’ risk exposure 
depends on a) if they sell to 
businesses or end consumers and 
b) the specific strategies being 
employed. 
76) Quer, Claver, 
and Rienda 
(2012) 
Firm Political risk Institutional constraints related 
to political and legal regime that 
may negatively affect economic 
activity 
ICRG 139 investments 
made by 29 Fortune 
500 Chinese firms 
in 52 countries 
between 2002 and 
2009 
Secondary Political risk is not related to FDI 
location choice.  
77) Ramasamy, 
Yeung, and 
Laforet 
(2012) 
Firm Political risk Not defined WGI’s Political Instability 
and Violence Index 
FDI projects of 63 
large Chinese listed 
firms over the 
period 2006-2008 
Secondary SOEs are attracted to politically 
risky countries, whilst the effect 
is not significant for private firms. 
78) Ramos and 
Ashby (2013) 
Firm Organised crime 
risk 
Provide only definition of 
organised crime 
Denounced homicides per 
capita; Country crime score 
by Global Competitiveness 
Report 
FDI of 9 industries 
from 103 countries 
into the 32 Mexican 
states from 2001 to 
2010 
Secondary Home country experience with 
organised crime increases MNEs’ 
investment in host countries with 
high level of organised crime. 
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79) Reeb, Kwok, 
and Baek 
(1998) 
Firm Systematic risk Earning volatility Portfolio beta instead of 
individual security beta 
880 or 844 MNEs 
over the period 
1987-1996, 
depending on 
different dependent 
variables  
Secondary Internationalisation may incur 
additional risk like exchange risk, 
political risk and information 
asymmetry that offset the benefit 
of diversification, leading to a 
positive relationship between 
internationalisation and 
systematic risk. 
80) Reuer and 
Leiblein 
(2000) 
Firm Downside risk A probability-weighted function 
of below target performance 
outcomes 
Lower partial moments based 
on ROA, ROE and CAPM 
beta 
357 US 
manufacturing firms 
over the period 
1985-1994 
Secondary Corporate multinationality is not 
significantly related to downside 
risk, and firms that are more 
active in engaging in IJVs obtain 
higher levels of downside risk. 
81) Richards and 
Yang (2007) 
Firm Environmental 
uncertainty; 
Behavioural 
uncertainty 
Caused by unexpected 
occurrences in the political, 
economic, and social 
environment; 
Arises from partner 
opportunism 
ICRG; 
Whether the JV also engaged 
in marketing activities, and 
the frequency of prior joint 
venture collaboration with the 
same partner 
543 international 
R&D joint ventures 
by foreign firms in 
China, India, Japan, 
and the United 
States over 1985 to 
2004 
Secondary The influence of environmental 
uncertainty (country risk) on 
MNEs’ equity ownership in R&D 
IJVs is insignificant. MNEs 
require a higher equity ownership 
for R&D JVs that also engage in 
marketing. 
82) Rugman 
(1976) 
Firm Corporate risk Not defined Risk as variance in return Large US firms 
among Fortune 500 
over the period 
1960-1969 
Secondary A risk reduction advantage of 
MNEs over domestic firms 
83) Lee and Song 
(2012) 
Firm Macroeconomic 
uncertainty 
Not defined Depreciation of currency of 
each host country 
Foreign subsidiaries 
of publicly listed 
Korean 
manufacturing firms 
in 61 countries from 
1990 to 2007 
Secondary The increase of a subsidiary’s 
production at the time of its host 
country currency depreciation 
decreases the production of other 
subsidiaries within the same 
MNC network. 
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84) Schneider and 
Frey (1985) 
Country Political 
instability 
Internal political troubles that 
disrupt economic process and 
pose threats to MNEs like 
nationalisation 
Number of political strikes 
and of riots 
FDI flows from 54 
developing 
countries for the 
year 1976, 1979 and 
1980 
Secondary Political instability negatively 
affects FDI flows. 
85) Schwens, 
Eiche, and 
Kabst (2011) 
Firm Formal 
institutional risk 
The constraints resulting from 
insufficiently developed market 
support institutions in the host 
country 
Hermes Country Risk Rating, 
dividing countries into 7 
categories based on 
economic, political, and legal 
situation in the host country 
227 internationally 
active German 
SMEs 
Survey Formal institutional risk 
moderates the relationships 
between international experience, 
proprietary know-how, strategic 
importance, and equity based 
entry modes. 
86) Sethi, 
Guisinger, 
Phelan, and 
Berg (2003) 
Country Political and 
economic 
stability 
Not defined ICRG FDI flows from US 
to 17 West 
European and 11 
Asian countries 
from 1981 to 2000 
Secondary Very weak effect of political and 
economic stability on FDI flows 
87) Shan (1991) Firm Contextual risk; 
Transactional 
risk 
Risks out of firm’s control; 
Risk can be reduced or 
eliminated through 
internalisation of markets or 
integration 
Proxied by location, amount 
of investment, investment 
duration and business scope 
141 Sino-American 
joint ventures 
formed between 
1980 and 1987 in 
China  
Secondary Publicly listed firms are less risk 
averse than non-listed firms.  
88) Shrader, 
Oviatt, and 
McDougall 
(2000) 
Firm International 
risk 
With reference to Miller’s 
(1992) framework 
Inferred from country risk, 
entry mode commitment and 
foreign sales ratio, country 
risk measured by Euromoney, 
Institutional Investor and 
Wall Street Journal ratings 
212 entries of 87 
US firms that had 
both made an IPO 
and entered foreign 
markets within first 
six years of birth 
Secondary Firms tradeoff among foreign 
revenue exposure, country risk, 
and entry mode commitment in 
each country to keep the risk 
profile manageable. 
89) Slangen and 
van Tulder 
(2009) 
Firm External 
uncertainty 
Not defined Aggregate WGI index 231 entries by 150 
Dutch MNEs into 
48 countries 
Survey Both cultural distance and 
political risk are suboptimal 
proxy for external uncertainty. 
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90) Slangen and 
Beugelsdijk 
(2010) 
Firm Institutional 
hazard 
Not defined, but decomposed 
into two types, exogenous and 
endogenous hazard, depending 
on whether it can be resolved 
once realised 
Aggregate WGI index 
(exogenous), cultural distance 
measured by a Euclidean 
distance version of the Kogut 
and Singh (1988) Index 
(endogenous) 
Sales by US foreign 
affiliates to 
affiliated and local 
unaffiliated 
customers in 46 
countries over the 
period 1996-2004 
Secondary The impact of institutional 
hazards on the amount of foreign 
MNE activity is contingent upon 
the type of foreign activity 
(horizontal or vertical) and the 
type of institutional hazard 
(governance or cultural). 
91) Slangen 
(2013) 
Firm Policy 
uncertainty 
Sudden policy change 
stemming from political 
constraints shortages 
POLCON 172 wholly owned 
greenfields and full 
acquisitions by 122 
Dutch MNEs in 33 
foreign countries 
from 1995 to 2003 
Survey Policy uncertainty increases the 
likelihood of wholly owned 
greenfield over full acquisition. 
Planned subsidiary autonomy, 
expected industry performance, 
and religious distance moderate 
this relationship. 
92) Strange, 
Filatotchev, 
Lien, and 
Piesse (2009) 
Firm Risk preference Not defined Inferred from equity stake in 
foreign affiliates, along with 
cultural and historic links 
with the home country 
285 FDI projects by 
Taiwanese listed 
firms in China 
between 1999-2003 
Secondary Firms balance out resource 
commitment and locational risk. 
Different shareholders have 
different risk preferences that 
influence location choice. 
93) Tseng and 
Lee (2010) 
Firm Environmental 
uncertainty 
Not defined Managers’ perceptions about 
unpredictability of market 
environment and institutional 
environment 
84 Taiwanese 
manufacturing firms 
that have foreign 
operations 
Survey In the presence of high turbulent 
market and institutional 
uncertainty, firms with stronger 
market linking capability are 
more likely to choose WOS over 
JV. 
 
 
